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1、 Pacific Affairs: Volume 82, No. 2 Summer 2009 279India in the Indian Ocean: Growing Mismatch Between Ambitions and CapabilitiesHarsh V. Pant In February 2008, India hosted naval chiefs from around the Indian Ocean in what was named the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, highlighting the role of the Indi
2、an navy as an important instrument of the nations foreign and security policy. It was also an attempt by India to promote a multilateral approach in the management of the security of the Indian Ocean. India signalled that as a rising power it is willing to fulfil its maritime responsibilities in the
3、 region but, unlike in the past when India had been suspicious of what it saw as “extra-regional navies,” it is now ready to cooperate with other navies in and around the Indian Ocean. Whether Indias leadership will be enough to promote genuine maritime multilateralism in the region, however, remain
4、s to be seen. The Indian Ocean has long been the hub of great power rivalry and the struggle for its domination has been a perennial feature of global politics. It is third-largest of the worlds five oceans and straddles Asia in the north, Africa in the west, Indochina in the east, and Antarctica in
5、 the south. Home to four critical access waterwaysthe Suez Canal, Bab-el Mandeb, the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malaccathe Indian Ocean connects the Middle East, Africa and East Asia with Europe and the Americas.1 Given its crucial geographical role, major powers have long vied with each oth
6、er for its control, though it was only in the nineteenth century that Great Britain was able to enjoy an overwhelming dominance in the region. With the decline in Britains relative power and the emergence of two superpowers during the Cold War, the Indian Ocean region became another arena where the
7、US and the former Soviet Union struggled to expand their power and influence. The US, however, has remained the most significant player in the region for the last several years.Given the rise of major economic powers in the Asia-Pacific that rely on energy imports to sustain their economic growth, t
8、he Indian Ocean region has assumed a new importance as various powers are once again vying for the control of the waves in this part of the world. Nearly half of the worlds _1 For details, please see the CIA website, at , last accessed 8 April 2009.Pacific Affairs: Volume 82, No. 2 Summer 2009280sea
9、borne trade is through the Indian Ocean, and approximately 20 percent of this trade consists of energy resources. It has also been estimated that around 40 percent of the worlds offshore oil production comes from the Indian Ocean, while 65 percent of the worlds oil and 35 percent of its gas reserves
10、 are found in the littoral states of this Ocean.2Unlike the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, almost three quarters of trade traversing through the Indian Ocean, primarily in the form of oil and gas, belongs to states external to the region. Free and uninterrupted flow of oil and goods through the oceans
11、 SLOCs is deemed vital for the global economy and so all major states have a stake in a stable Indian Ocean region. It is for this reason that, during the Cold War years when US-Soviet rivalry was at its height, the states bordering the Indian Ocean sought to declare the region a “zone of peace” to
12、allow for free trade and commerce across the lanes of the Indian Ocean. Today, the reliance is on the US for the provision of a “collective good”: a stable Indian Ocean region. This article examines the emerging Indian approach towards the Indian Ocean in the context of the countrys rise as a major
13、regional and global actor. This is an empirical analysis of Indias role in the Indian Ocean region, not a theoretical exposition of the issue.3 It argues that though India has historically viewed the Indian Ocean region as one in which it would like to establish its own predominance, its limited mat
14、erial capabilities have constrained its options. With the expansion, however, of Indias economic and military capabilities, Indian ambitions vis-vis this region are soaring once again. India is also trying its best to respond to the challenge that growing Chinese capabilities in the Indian Ocean are
15、 posing to the region and beyond. Yet, preponderance in the Indian Ocean region, though much desired by the Indian strategic elites, remains an unrealistic aspiration for India, given the significant stakes that other major powers have in the region. In all likelihood, India will look towards cooper
16、ation with other major powers in the Indian Ocean region to preserve and enhance its strategic interests. _2 P.K. Das, “Maritime Dimensions of Indias Security,” Indian Defence Review, vol. 18 (2) (2003), pp. 43-47. 3 Space limitations do not permit a theoretical discussion of the issues raised in this article. Variants of realism can be used to assess how rising powers respond to their st
