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1、2008PearsonAddisonWesley.AllrightsreservedChapterNineProperties and Applications of the Competitive Model商學新書：聖誕禮物折現最好商學新書：聖誕禮物折現最好大公報大公報2009-12-07聖誕節在美國，互贈禮物被視為聯絡感情、表達關懷的最好手聖誕節在美國，互贈禮物被視為聯絡感情、表達關懷的最好手法，故禮物支出每年高達約法，故禮物支出每年高達約650億美元，也是經濟的寒暑表。億美元，也是經濟的寒暑表。賓州大學華頓商學院教授賓州大學華頓商學院教授JoelWaldfogel在他的著作吝嗇鬼在他的
2、著作吝嗇鬼經濟學：節日不該送禮的理由經濟學：節日不該送禮的理由(Scroogenomics:WhyYouShouldntBuyPresentsfortheHolidays)一書中指出，聖誕一書中指出，聖誕節送禮是節送禮是集體價值毀滅行為集體價值毀滅行為。他表示，在發達國家，送禮慶祝聖誕節，每年讓價值就這樣蒸他表示，在發達國家，送禮慶祝聖誕節，每年讓價值就這樣蒸發掉發掉250億美元，收到禮的人，跟自己買給自己的禮物相比，億美元，收到禮的人，跟自己買給自己的禮物相比，價值少價值少20%，很多禮物其實不適合收禮人。，很多禮物其實不適合收禮人。商學新書：聖誕禮物折現最好商學新書：聖誕禮物折現最好送禮與
3、親密性成正比送禮與親密性成正比送禮人若與收禮的人不常往來，其送禮的價值，比其雙方常接送禮人若與收禮的人不常往來，其送禮的價值，比其雙方常接觸來得更低。他續指出，要消弭這種價值浪費，方法之一是乾觸來得更低。他續指出，要消弭這種價值浪費，方法之一是乾脆脆送現金送現金，這樣收禮的人可以自由選擇去買別的東西。不過他，這樣收禮的人可以自由選擇去買別的東西。不過他承認習俗上送現金給人會令收者不悅。承認習俗上送現金給人會令收者不悅。送禮的文化不太可能完全廢除，因此他建議，對於送禮的文化不太可能完全廢除，因此他建議，對於熟的人熟的人，要，要送貼心的禮送貼心的禮，若是對，若是對不常往來的人不常往來的人，送賀卡送
4、賀卡是好方式。是好方式。資料來源資料來源http:/ Profit for Competitive Firms in the Long RunProducer WelfareHow Competition Maximizes WelfarePolicies That Shift Supply CurvesPolicies That Create a Wedge Between Supply and DemandComparing Both Types of Policies 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved.9-4ZeroProf
5、itforCompetitiveFirmsintheLongRunCompetitivefirmsearn zeroprofitin the long run whether or not entry is completely free. 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved.9-5ZeroLong-RunProfitwithFreeEntryThe long-runsupplycurveishorizontalif firms are free to enter the market, firms have identical c
6、ost, and input prices are constant.All firms in the market are operatingatminimumlong-runaveragecost.They are indifferent between shutting down or not because they are earningzeroprofit. 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved.9-6ZeroLong-RunProfitWhenEntryisLimitedIn some markets, firms ca
7、nnot enter in response to long-run profit opportunities.One reason for the limited number of firms is that the supply of an input is limited.One might think that firms could make positive long-run economic profits in such markets; however, thats not true.The reason why firmsearnzeroeconomicprofitsis
8、 that firms bidding for the scarce input drive its price up until the firms profits are zero. 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved.9-7 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved.9-8Figure9.1RentProducerWelfareA suppliers gain from participating in the market is measured by its prod
9、ucersurplus(PS), which is the difference between the amount for which a good sells and the minimum amount necessary for the seller to be willing to produce the good. 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved.9-9MeasuringProducerSurplusUsingaSupplyCurveThe producer surplus is closely related t
10、o profit. Producer surplus is revenue, R, minus variable cost, VC. Equation9.1Equation9.2 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved.9-10 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved.9-11Figure9.2ProducerSurplusMeasuringProducerSurplusUsingaSupplyCurveAnother interpretation of producer sur
11、plus is as a gain to trade.Producer surplus equals the profit from trade minus the profit (loss) from not trading.PS = ( R VC F ) ( F ) = R VC 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved.9-12UsingProducerSurplusA major advantage of producer surplus is that we can use it to measure the effect of
12、 a shock on all the firms in a market without having to measure the profit of each firm in the market separately. 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved.9-13HowCompetitionMaximizesWelfareHow should we measure societys welfare? One commonly used measure of the welfare of society, W, is the
13、sum of consumer surplus plus producer surplus:W = CS + PS 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved.9-14 2007 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 915WhyProducingLessThantheCompetitiveOutputLowersWelfareProducing less than the competitive output lowers welfare.The change in consumersu
14、rplusis The change in producersurplusis The change in welfare , , is 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved.9-16Figure9.3WhyReducingOutputfromtheCompetitiveLevelLowersWelfare 2007 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 917WhyProducingLessThantheCompetitiveOutputLowersWelfareThis drop
15、 in welfare, , is deadweightloss(DWL):the net reduction in welfare from a loss of surplus by one group that is not offset by a gain to another group from an action that alters a market equilibrium.In short, the deadweight loss is the opportunity cost of giving up some of this good to buy more of ano
16、ther good. 2007 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 918WhyProducingMoreThantheCompetitiveOutputLowersWelfareIncreasing output beyond the competitive level also decreases welfare because the cost of producing this extra output exceeds the value consumers place on it.Because price falls from
17、p1 to p2, consumer rises by The increase in output causes producer surplus to fall by 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved.9-19Figure9.4WhyIncreasingOutputfromtheCompetitiveLevelLowersWelfare 2007 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 920WhyProducingMoreThantheCompetitiveOutputLow
18、ersWelfareBecause producers lose more than consumers gain, the deadweight loss is A marketfailureis inefficient production or consumption, often because a price exceeds marginal cost.PoliciesThatShiftSupplyCurvesOne of the main reasons that economists developed welfare tools was to predict the impac
19、t of government policies and other events that alter a competitive equilibrium. 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved.9-21PoliciesThatShiftSupplyCurvesVirtually all government actions affect a competitive equilibrium in one of two ways. Some government policies, such as limits on the numb
20、er of firms in a market, shift the supply or demand curve. 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved.9-22PoliciesThatShiftSupplyCurvesOther government actions, such as sales taxes, create a wedge or gap between price and marginal cost so that they are not equal, even though they were in the o
21、riginal competitive equilibrium. 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved.9-23RestrictingtheNumberofFirmsAlimitonthenumberoffirmscauses the supply curve to shift to the left, which raises the equilibrium price and reduces the equilibrium quantity. 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights rese
22、rved.9-24 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved.9-25Figure9.5EffectofaRestrictionontheNumberofCabsRaisingEntryandExitCostsBarriertoentryAn explicit restriction or a cost that applies only to potential new firmsexisting firms are not subject to the restriction or do not bear the cost. 2008
23、 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved.9-26RaisingEntryandExitCostsExitBarriers: Some markets have barriers that make it difficult (though typically not impossible) for a firm to exit by going out of business.In the short run, exit barriers can keep the number of firms in a market relatively h
24、igh.In the long run, exit barriers may limit the number of firms in a market. 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved.9-27 2007 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 928PoliciesThatCreateAWedgeBetweenSupplyandDemandWelfareeffectsofasalestaxA new sales tax causes the price that consum
25、ers pay to rise, resulting in a loss of consumer surplus, , and a fall in the price receive, resulting in a drop in producer surplus, . However, the new tax provides the government with new tax revenue, , if tax revenue was zero before this new tax.As a result, the change in welfare is 2008 Pearson
26、Addison Wesley. All rights reserved.9-29Figure9.6WelfareEffectsofaSpecificTaxonRosesWelfareEffectsofAPriceFloorPricefloor: the lowest price a consumer can legally pay for the good.Excessproduction: More output is produced than is consumed, so Qg is stored, destroyed, or shipped abroad.Inefficiencyin
27、consumption: At quantity they actually buy, Qd, consumers are willing to pay $5 for the last bushel of soybeans, which is more than the marginal cost, MC = $3.60, of producing that bushel. 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved.9-30 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved.9-31Figu
28、re9.7EffectofPriceSupportsinSoybeansWelfareEffectsofAPriceCeilingPriceCeiling: the highest price that a firm can legally charge.Because of the price ceiling, consumers can buy the good at a lower price but cannot buy as much of it as they would like. 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved.
29、9-32 2007 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 933ComparingBothTypesofPolicies:TradeAllowfreetrade: Any firm can sell in this country without restrictions.Banallimports: The government sets a quota of zero on imports.Setapositivequota: The government limits imports to .Setatariff: The govern
30、ment imposes a tax called a tariff (or a duty) on only imported goods.FreeTradeVersusABanOnImportsEquation 9.3:Equation 9.4:Because the supply curve foreigners face is horizontal at the world price of $14.70, the total U.S. supply curve of crude oil is S1 when there is free trade. The free-trade equ
31、ilibrium is e1. 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved.9-34 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved.9-35Figure9.8LossfromEliminatingFreeTradeFreeTradeVersusABanOnImportsWith a ban on imports, the equilibrium e2 occurs where the domestic supply curve, Sa = S2, intersects D. The ban
32、 increases producer surplus by B = $132.5 million per day and decreases consumer surplus by B + C = $163.7 million per day, so the deadweight loss is C = $31.2 million per day or $11.4 billion per year. 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved.9-36 2007 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights res
33、erved. 937FreeTradeVersusATariffA tariff of per barrel of oil imported or a quota of drives the U.S. price of crude oil to $19.70, which is $5 more than the world price. Under the tariff, the equilibrium, , is determined by the intersection of the total U.S. supply curve and D demand curve. Under th
34、e quota, is determined by a quantity wedge of 2.8 million barrels per day between the quantity demanded, 9.0 million barrels per day, and the quantity supplied, 11.8 million barrels per day. 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved.9-38Figure9.9EffectofaTariff(orQuota)FreeTradeVersusATariffC
35、ompared to free trade, producers gain B = $42.8 million per day and consumers lose B + C + D + E = $61.9 million per day from the tariff or quota. The deadweight loss under the quota is C + D + E = $19.1 million per day. With a tariff, the governments tariff revenue increases by D = $14 million a da
36、y, so the deadweight loss is only C + E = $5.1 million per day. 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved.9-39RentSeekingGiven that tariffs and quotas hurt the importing country, why do the Japanese, U.S., and other governments impose tariffs, quotas, or other trade barriers?The reason is tha
37、t domestic producers stand to make large gains from such government actions; hence it pays for them to organize and lobby the government to enact these trade policies. 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved.9-40RentSeekingIn most countries, producers are often able to convince (cajole, inf
38、luence, or bribe) legislators or government officials to aid them, even though consumers suffer more-than-offsetting losses. 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved.9-41RentSeekingEconomists call efforts and expenditures to gain a rent or a profit from government actions rentseeking.If prod
39、ucers or other interest groups bribe legislators to influence policy, the bribe is a transfer of income and hence does not increase deadweight loss (except to the degree that a harmful policy is chosen). 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved.9-42RentSeekingIf this rent-seeking behaviorsuc
40、h as hiring lobbyists and engaging in advertising to influence legislatorsuses up resources, the deadweight loss from tariffs and quotas understates thetrueloss to society. 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved.9-43LaI6F3C0y)v%s#pXlUiRfNcK8H5E2A+x(u$rZnWkThPeMbJ7G4C1z-w&t!qYmVjRgOdL9I6F3B
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50、ThPeMbJ7G4D1z-w&t!qYmVjSgOdL9I6F3B0y)v%s#oXlUiQfNcK8H5D2A+x*u$rZnWkShPeMaJ7G4C1z)w&t!pYmVjRgOdL9I6E3B0y(v%s#oXlTiQfNbK8H5D2A-x*u$qZnWkShP9I6F3B0y)v%s#oXlUiQfNcK8H5D2A+x*u$rZnWkThPeMaJ7G4C1z-w&t!pYmVjRgOdL9I6E3B0y(v%s#oXlTiQfNbK8H5D2A-x*u$qZnWkShPdMaJ7F4C1z)w&s!pYmUjRgOcL9H6E3B+y(v%r#oXlTiQeNbK8G5D2A
51、-x*t$qZnVkShPdMaI7F4C0z)w&s!pXmUjRfOcL9H6E2B+y(u%r#oWlThQeNbJ8G5D1A-w*t$qYnVkSgPdMaI7F3C0z)v&s!pXmUiRfOcK9H6E2B+x(u%rZoWlThQeMbJ8G4D1A-w*t!qYnVjSgPdLaI6F3C0y)v&s#pXlUiRfNcK9H5E2A+x(u$rZoWkThQeMbJ7G4D1z-w*t!qYmVjSgOdLaI6F3B0y)v%s#pXlUiQfNcK8H5E2A+x*u$rjSgPdLaI6F3C0y)v&s#pXmUiRfNcK9H5E2B+x(u$rZoWkThQe
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53、(u%rZoWlThQeNbJ8G4D1A-w*t$qYnVjSgPdLaI7F3C0y)v&s#pXmUiRfNcK9H5E2B+x(u$rZoWkThQeMbJ8G4D1z-w*t!qYnVjSgOdLaI6F3C0y)v%s#pXlUiRfNcK8H5E2A+x(u$rZnWkThPeMbJ7G4C1z-w&t!qYmVjRgOdL9I6F3B0y)v%s#oXlUiQfNcK8H5D2A*t!qYnVjSgOdLaI6F3C0y)v%s#pXlUiRfNcK8H5E2A+x(u$rZnWkThPeMbJ7G4C1z-w&t!qYmVjSgOdL9I6F3B0y)v%s#oXlUiQfN
54、cK8H5D2A+x*u$rZnWkShPeMaJ7G4C1z)w&t!pYmVjRgOcL9I6E3B0y(v%r#oXlTiQfNbK8H5D2A-x*u$qZnWkShPdMaJ7F4C1z)w&s!pYmUjRgOcL9H6E3B+y(v%r#oWlTiQeNbK8G5D1A-x*t$qZnVkSgPdMaI7F4C0z)w&s!pXmUjRfOcL9H6E2B+y(u%r#oWlThQeNbJ8G5D1&s!pYmUjRgOcL9H6E3B+y(v%r#oWlTiQeNbK8G5D1A-x*t$qZnVkShPdMaI7F4C0z)w&s!pXmUjRfOcL9H6E2B+y(u%r
55、#oWlThQeNbJ8G5D1A-w*t$qYnVkSgPdLaI7F3C0z)v&s#pXmUiRfOcK9H6E2B+x(u%rZoWlThQeMbJ8G4D1A-w*t!qYnVjSgPdLaI6F3C0y)v&s#pXlUiRfNcK9H5E2A+x(u$rZoWkThPeMbJ7G4D1z-w&t!qYmVjSgOdLaI6F3B0y)v%s#pXlUiQfNcK8H5E2A+x*u$rZnWkThPeMaJ7G4C1z-w&t!pYmVjRgOdL9I6E3B0y(v%s#oXlTiQfNbK8H5D2A+x*u$qZnWkShPeMaJ7F4C1z)w&t!pYmUjRgOcL
56、9I6E3B+y(v%rWkThPeMaJ7G4C1z-w&t!pYmVjRgOdL9I6E3B0y(v%s#oXlUiQfNbK8H5D2A+x*u$qZnWkShPeMaJ7F4C1z)w&t!pYmUjRgOcL9I6E3B+y(v%r#oXlTiQeNbK8G5D2A-x*t$qZnVkShPdMaJ7F4C0z)w&s!pYmUjRfOcL9H6E3B+y(u%r#oWlTiQeNbJ8G5D1A-x*t$qYnVkSgPdMaI7F3C0z)v&s!pXmUiRfOcK9H6E2B+y(u%rZoWlThQeNbJ8G4D1A-w*t$qYnVjSgPdLaI7F3C0y)v&s#pXmUiRfNcK9H5E2B+x(u$rZoWkThQeMbJ7G4D1z-w*t!qYmVjSgOdLaI6F3C0y)v%s#pXlUiRfNcK8H5E2A+x(u$rZnWkThPeMbJ7G4C1z-w&t!qYmVjRgOdL9I6F3
