《2019组织经济学与管理学ch02 Positioning课件》由会员分享，可在线阅读，更多相关《2019组织经济学与管理学ch02 Positioning课件（42页珍藏版）》请在金锄头文库上搜索。
1、Chapter 2 Positioning George Hendrikse,Economics and Management of Organisations: Co-ordination, Motivation and Strategy,Figure 2.1: Scheme of thought,Figure 2.2: Behavioural assumptions and organisation theories,Views of the firm Technological Contractual / judicial Psychological Sociological Biolo
2、gical Holistic,What is a firm?,Game theory A unified analytical structure for studying all situations of conflict and cooperation or A tool for modelling multiperson decision situations,Non-cooperative game theory,A non-cooperative game consists of 5 ingredients: Players Actions Payoffs Information
3、structure Rules of the game,1. Players,Number of players Types Government Firm Consumer Country Student Political party,2. Actions / strategies,Environmental pollution game,P,C,I,I,N,N,Firm,Government,Inspect ?,Pollute ?,The game tree A Node indicates that a player has to make a decision. A Branch r
4、epresents a choice or action.,Possible choices / actions: Firm: P and C Government: I and N,Strategy,A specification of an action/choice for each possible history/contingency/ situation which might occur, given the information structure. or Specification of an action/choice for each observable histo
5、ry of the game.,Possible strategies of the government are: (I, I) (I, N) (N, I) (N, N),Possible strategies of the firm are: P C,3. Payoffs,Environmental pollution game Costs of inspection 2 Benefit of pollution for firm: 4 Fee for detecting pollution: 5,P,C,I,I,N,N,Firm,Government,Inspect ?,Pollute
6、?,-1,3,4,0,0,-2,0,0,Payoff firm,Payoff Government,What will happen in the environmental pollution game ?,Equilibrium Nash equilibrium: a payoff maximising strategy for each player, given the choice of strategy of all other players.,Game representations,Extensive form: tree diagram Strategic form: ma
7、trix,Environmental pollution game in strategic form,Determining NE in strategic form,Nash Equilibrium,Firm: C Government: (I,N),4. Information structure,Firm,Government,Environmental pollution game (information set added),P,C,I,N,I,N,-1,4,0,0,3,0,-2,0,The oval represents an information set. Governme
8、nt does not know which action is taken by the firm when it has to decide.,A specification of an action for each observable history of the game or A specification of an action for each information set.,Strategy,What are the strategies of Firm and Government?,Firm: P C Government: I N,NE determination
9、,Conclusions,Equilibrium changes when the information structure changes. Circling: it can be shown that each player will choose each strategy with a certain probability, i.e. endogenous uncertainty.,Subgame perfect equilibrium,To be used when there is complete information.,Extensive form,C,N,R,S,R,S
10、,-11,-1,-10,0,-4,1,-5,0,Frank,Cookie ?,Ann,Run ?,Cookie extraction game,Nash equilibria,Frank: C Ann: (S, R) and Frank: N Ann: (R, S) and Frank: N Ann: (S,S),Conclusion,Almost everything can happen Concept of Nash equilibrium does not always point to a unique pair of strategies,There is something pe
11、culiar about NE,Frank: C Ann: (S, R),Ann extracts a cookie from Frank (, i.e Frank chooses C) by threatening to run away (, i.e Ann chooses R as a response to N by Frank which is represented by the strategy (. , R) ).,No. If Frank chooses N, than Ann earns -5 when she chooses R; 0 when she chooses S
12、.,Is this threat by Ann credible ?,Subgame perfect equilibrium,Motivation: An equilibrium concept which does not allow non-credible threats.,Cookie extraction game,SPE is most easily determined by using the extensive form. Solution method: Start at the bottom of the tree and work your way upward (Ba
13、ckward induction).,C,N,R,S,R,S,-11,-1,-10,0,-4,1,-5,0,Frank,Cookie ?,Ann,Run ?,SPE: Frank: N; Ann:(S, S),Examples of rules: Sport Payment schemes Elections Contracts Corporate charters ,5. Rules,Timing of decisions,Decisions are depicted as simultaneous when either the other choice can not be observ
14、ed or the observation lag is long. Decisions are depicted as sequential when the time between strategy choices is sufficiently long.,McKelvey-theorem,Every possible outcome of a democratic decision process can be established by an appropriate choice of the layers in a decision procedure.,Management implications of non-cooperative game theory,Change one or more of the 5 ingredients in order to obtain a more attractive equilibrium.,
