《责任代理模式分析报告》由会员分享，可在线阅读，更多相关《责任代理模式分析报告（26页珍藏版）》请在金锄头文库上搜索。
1、1,Principal-agent Modeling 責任代理模式,Dr. Chak-Tong Chau 仇澤棠博士 U.S. Fulbright Professor 中美交流富布萊特教授,Dr. Chak-Tong Chau,Fulbright Guest Lecture Materials,2,我請您們考慮一些問題,A small medical insurance scenario 一個醫療保健的問題 When you have a small illness, do you normally see your doctor? 當你有小病的時候，你會不會自費看醫生？ What about
2、, if your firm pay for your expense? 但是，如果是單位付錢呢，那又怎樣？,Dr. Chak-Tong Chau,Fulbright Guest Lecture Materials,3,我請您們考慮一些問題,A car maintenance scenario 一個汽車維修的問題 Your car is being rented for 2 months. Supposedly, it needs oiling every month. How likely you will remember to do so? 你的汽車是租來用兩個月的，它需要每月潤滑上油一
3、次。你會不會依時地去上油？ How about if this is your own car? 如果這是你自己的汽車，你又會不會去做？,Dr. Chak-Tong Chau,Fulbright Guest Lecture Materials,4,我請您們考慮一些問題,A medical insurance problem 自費醫療保險的問題 When we purchase medical insurance, the insurance company usually requires that you disclose your medical history. Pre-conditio
4、ns are usually excluded from the coverage. 購買保險的時候，它們通常要求你列出你的病歷。但是如果你有大病的話，很可能保險公司不愿意受保。,Dr. Chak-Tong Chau,Fulbright Guest Lecture Materials,5,我請您們考慮一些問題,If you do in fact have some major medical problems that require expensive treatments, would you disclose these problems? 如果你真的有大病, 你會不會真實地上報？ Wh
5、at do all these tell us about certain human behavior? 這些問題表明了一些什么的人性行為？,Dr. Chak-Tong Chau,Fulbright Guest Lecture Materials,6,Agency Problems and Behavior 代理人的行為与問題,A moral hazard problem (道德危机問題) when an individual has an incentive to deviate from the contract and take self-interested actions beca
6、use the other party has insufficient information to know if the contract was honored. 醫療保健 雖然我知道我与雇主的契約明确列出我不要浪費公司的資源。但是用公司的好過用我的嘛！而且公司又不會知道我未能遵守契約。,Dr. Chak-Tong Chau,Fulbright Guest Lecture Materials,7,Agency Problems and Behavior 代理人的行為与問題,A horizon problem 水平界線問題 If one partys risk or compensati
7、on is not the same as the other partys, the one with a shorter horizon will tend to secretly maximize the short-term benefits, at the expense of the other longer-term party. 汽車維修 我明白汽車不維修壽命不會長。但是，兩個月以后這車子變成怎么樣与我無關了吧。,Dr. Chak-Tong Chau,Fulbright Guest Lecture Materials,8,Agency Problems and Behavior
8、 代理人的行為与問題,An adverse selection problem 逆向選擇問題 The tendency of individuals with private information about something that affects a potential trading partners benefits to make offers that are detrimental to the trading partner. 自費醫療保險:雖然我知道保險公司需要知道我的病歷從而決定保險費。但是誠實的代价是較高的費用。此外，我不說，誰知道。,Dr. Chak-Tong C
9、hau,Fulbright Guest Lecture Materials,9,誰是代理人？什么是代理成本？,An agent is someone who has certain special expertise that is desired by the principal to use for his/her benefits. The agent is usually risk adverse, has decision rights to manage, but does not own, the organizations assets. 代理人(agent) 是任何人在公司有
10、決策權力，但是并非產權的最終所有者。代理人通常有較佳的專長，更好的資訊，和對風險抱保守的態度(risk adverse)。,Dr. Chak-Tong Chau,Fulbright Guest Lecture Materials,10,誰是代理人？什么是代理成本？,There are three (3) types of agency costs. 代理成本有三類： 設計限制性契約的成本 (bonding costs) 建立監督制度的成本 (monitoring costs) 剩餘的損耗 (residual loss) Note that some costs are bornt by the
11、 principal but some are bornt by the agent. 注意的是，有時這些成本是由委托人(principal)負擔。不過有時這些成本是由代理人自己負擔的。,Dr. Chak-Tong Chau,Fulbright Guest Lecture Materials,11,Agency Costs,Bonding costs costs incurred, before entering the contract, to convince the principal that such agency relationship will not result in th
12、e above-mentioned agency problems. Examples are: reputation building, 3rd party guarantor, etc.,Dr. Chak-Tong Chau,Fulbright Guest Lecture Materials,12,Agency Costs,Monitoring costs costs incurred, after entering the contract, to ensure that such agency problems will not arise. Examples include audi
13、ting and inspection costs.,Dr. Chak-Tong Chau,Fulbright Guest Lecture Materials,13,Agency Costs,Residual loss loss unavoidably arise, despite the bonding and monitoring costs, the contract still cannot yield the utmost benefits, because: the agency problems do arise, or due to the suspicion of the a
14、gency problems, the principal refuses to pay the agent compensations that fully reflect his/her efforts.,Dr. Chak-Tong Chau,Fulbright Guest Lecture Materials,14,Examples of the Principal-agent Model,Dr. Chak-Tong Chau,Fulbright Guest Lecture Materials,15,Examples of the Principal-agent Model,Agents
15、Utility Function: Xa - e2 100 where: Xa = agents compensations e = the effort level used by the agent,Question 1: If you were the principal in entering the contract, which level of effort (e1, e2, or e3) would you demand?,Question 2: If you, the principal, can closely monitor and observe the agent a
16、t all time, what are the amount and condition of payment? And, what is the expected payoff for the principal?,Dr. Chak-Tong Chau,Fulbright Guest Lecture Materials,16,Now, lets assume that you cannot monitor and observe the agent directly. What would you, as the agent, do?,Now, can you see the agency problems here?,Is it likely to have the “adverse selection” problem?,How about the “moral hazard” problem?,And, the horizon problem? Residual loss?,Dr. Chak-Tong Chau,Fulbright Gue
