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1、? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Technology and trade Technology affects trade. The advent of new technologies, often referred to as the digital or ICT revolutions, can reduce demand for routine-task jobs, through cheaper capex prices and easier substitution of capital for labor, al
2、though not necessarily destroying jobs on aggregate because of new jobs created by new technologies. Many attribute the advent of new technologies to sustained declines in labor income shares in DM since the early 1980s and document their polarizing impact on labor markets, with routine-task jobs on
3、 structurally declining trends.1 We explore the impact of new technologies on EM economies. Broadly speaking, labor-saving technologies, by definition, could be more damaging to labor-abundant EM than to capital-rich DM. In addition to the overarching impact of new technologies on labor-capital subs
4、titution, globalization could have affected EM economies by fostering a switch of suppliers to EM from DM.2 These mega trends of digital revolutions and globalization could have a potentially opposing impact on EM economies-some jobs could be created in EM as part of global value chains shift away f
5、rom DM, but others could be lost in EM as new machines and new software replace routine manual or cognitive jobs and render production in EM less attractive than before. We are particularly interested in the impact of these forces on EM trade, given sustained trade stagnation in recent years and the
6、 potential implications of a trade recovery. A decade-long relationship between trade flows and trade partners GDP growth has been broken in EM Asia, but not in DM. Asian exports used to grow 2-3 times faster than the real GDP growth of trade partners but this relationship has substantially changed
7、in recent years (Exhibit 1). While our tentative conclusion was that the stagnation is primarily coming from Chinese rebalancing and unwinding of value-chain trade in Asia, new technologies might also have contributed to trade stagnation (see Asia Econ Analyst 15/32: Weakening value chains and trade
8、 stagnation in Asia, Oct 22, 2015). Even if not, the impact of new technologies is still worth exploring since the impact could emerge gradually, potentially weighing further on global trade in coming years. Exhibit 1: Asian export volumes have contracted even as trading partners have continued to g
9、row Source: Haver, OECD 1 Acemoglu, Daro and David Autor (2010), “Skills, Tasks and Technologies: Implications for Employment and Earnings,” NBER Working Paper No. 16082, June 2010; Jaimovich, Nir and Henry E. Siu (2012), “The Trend is the Cycle: Job Polarization and Jobless Recovery,” NBER Working
10、Paper No. 18334, August 2012. 2 Among many, Autor, Dorn and Hansen (2013), “Geography of trade and technology choices,” American Economic Review, 103(3):220-25; Baldwin (2011), Trade and Industrialization after Globalizations Second Unbundling: How Building and Joining a Supply Chain Are Different a
11、nd Why It Matters,” NBER Working Paper No. 17716, Dec 2011. Trends in foreign direct investment to EM: Weakening While technologies have many channels of influence on EM trade, we focus on two dimensions: foreign direct investment (FDI), which we discuss here, and labor components in EM trade, which
12、 we discuss in the following section. The former is easy to understand and straightforward to test as FDI is one of the main transmission channels of new technologies to EM. A host of literature on FDI documents evidence for the importance of green-field investment, a subset of FDI, on growth and tr
13、ade. That said, the data come with considerable lags and do not include M&A, which is also an important part of FDI, especially in DM. We hence look into FDI statistics from balance of payments as well as green-field investment data. Green-field investment (GFI) to EM Asia has been trending down sin
14、ce at least 2003 relative to GDP. It peaked in 2003 at 5.4% of GDP, with broad declines thereafter before falling sharply after the Global Financial Crisis (Exhibit 2). GFI has stagnated since 2012 at around 1.0% of GDP. We find broadly similar trends in GFI to EM. However, GFI to DM has been much lower at below 1% of GDP and declined only slightly from 1.0% of GDP in 2008 to 0.5% of GDP in 2012, followed by stagnation ther
