《{财务管理利润管理}微观经济学之利润最大化和竞争性供给》由会员分享，可在线阅读，更多相关《{财务管理利润管理}微观经济学之利润最大化和竞争性供给（83页珍藏版）》请在金锄头文库上搜索。
1、,第八章 利润最大化和竞争性供给,本章概要,完全竞争市场的利润最大化 以及短期、长期均衡,1,假设：厂商追求利润最大化,不符合三条件,定义：完全竞争市场,分析框架：,结论 短期供给线；三种长期供给线,经验研究,符合三条件,竞争市场利润最大化与均衡,短期均衡：短期供给线、生产者剩余,长期均衡：长期供给线,长期利润最大化受冲击：税收效应,2,1.1厂商追求利润最大化的假设,3,2.1完全竞争市场的定义,符合下面三个特征的市场称为完全竞争市场： （1）产品同质 （ Product homogeneity）； （2）厂商和消费者都是价格接受者 （ Price taking ）； （3）厂商无成本进入与
2、退出 （ Free entry and exit ）,4,Industry,D,$4,S,（1）产品同质：存在市场均衡价格P,5,Firm,Industry,D,$4,S,6,Firm,AVCi,AVCj,7,Firm,2.2完全竞争市场的重要性质,8,证明,9,3.1.分析框架：数学解,10,q2,MC,q*,AR=MR=P,A,q1 : MR MC q2: MC MR q*: MC = MR,q1,Lost Profit for q2q*,Lost Profit for q2q*,3.2.分析框架：几何解,11,当MRMC时 增加产量所增加的收益大于所增加的成本，因而总利润可以增加； 当M
3、RMC时 减少产量所减少的收益小于所减少的成本，因而总利润可以增加； 当MR=MC时 无论怎样调整产量，总利润都只会减少而不会增加。,12,MC,AVC,AC,q*,AR=MR=P,A,4.1.短期均衡MR=MC,情形1：利润为正,13,MC,AVC,AC,q*,AR=MR=P,A,情形2：利润为0,14,MC,AVC,AC,q*,AR=MR=P,A,情形3：弥补全部可变成本之外还能弥补部分固定成本,15,MC,AVC,AC,q*,AR=MR=P,A,情形4：刚好弥补全部可变成本，不能弥补一点固定成本,16,MC,AVC,AC,q*,AR=MR=P,A,情形5：甚至不能弥补全部可变成本，更谈不
4、上弥补一点固定成本,17,关于短期均衡的总结,短期均衡的条件是：SMC=SMR=P 短期均衡中利润可能为正，为零，为负。,18,Price ($ per unit),Output,MC,P = AVC,S,4.2.1由短期均衡的五种情形可推导出完全竞争厂商的短期供给线：几何,19,4.2.2由短期均衡的五种情形可推导出完全竞争厂商的短期供给线：数学,20,Producer Surplus,Price ($ per unit of output),Output,AVC,MC,q*,4.3.1由短期条件理解生产者剩余的定义：几何,C,D,21,4.3.2由短期条件理解生产者剩余的定义：数学,22,
5、生产者剩余与经济利润的区别,23,D,Producer Surplus,Price ($ per unit of output),Output,S,市场的生产者剩余,24,q1,Price,Output,q3,LAC,LMC,4.4.1从长期利润最大化到长期均衡,25,Price,Output,q3,LAC,LMC,4.4.2从长期利润最大化到长期均衡,26,4.5行业的长期供给曲线,27,q1,D1,S1,Q1,P1,D2,P2,S2,Q2,Output,Output,$,$,P1,SL,（1）成本不变行业,28,Output,Output,$,$,D1,S1,q1,P1,SL,P3,S2,
6、P3,Q3,D2,Q2,P2,（2）成本递增行业,29,S2,SL,P3,Output,Output,$,$,P1,D1,S1,q1,D2,（3）成本递减行业,30,Price ($ per unit of output),Output,t,MC2 = MC1 + tax,AVC2,4.5长期利润最大化受到税收冲击的情形,q2,31,32,The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2009,Elinor Ostrom 1/2 USA Indiana University Blooming
7、ton, IN, USA b. 1933, for her analysis of economic governance, especially the commons,33,The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2009,Oliver E. Williamson 1/2 USA University of California Berkeley, CA, USA b. 1932, for his analysis of economic governance, especiall
8、y the boundaries of the firm ,34,35,Economic governance: the organization of cooperation Elinor Ostrom has demonstrated how common property can be successfully managed by user associations.,Press Release 12 October 2009,36,Oliver Williamson has developed a theory where business firms serve as struct
9、ures for conflict resolution.,37,Over the last three decades these seminal contributions have advanced economic governance research from the fringe to the forefront of scientific attention.,38,Economic transactions take place not only in markets, but also within firms, associations, households, and
10、agencies. Whereas economic theory has comprehensively illuminated the virtues and limitations of markets, it has traditionally paid less attention to other institutional arrangements.,39,The research of Elinor Ostrom and Oliver Williamson demonstrates that economic analysis can shed light on most fo
11、rms of social organization.,40,Elinor Ostrom has challenged the conventional wisdom that common property is poorly managed and should be either regulated by central authorities or privatized. Based on numerous studies of user-managed fish stocks, pastures, woods, lakes, and groundwater basins, Ostro
12、m concludes that the outcomes are, more often than not, better than predicted by standard theories.,41,She observes that resource users frequently develop sophisticated mechanisms for decision-making and rule enforcement to handle conflicts of interest, and she characterizes the rules that promote s
13、uccessful outcomes.,42,Oliver Williamson has argued that markets and hierarchical organizations, such as firms, represent alternative governance structures which differ in their approaches to resolving conflicts of interest.,43,The drawback of markets is that they often entail haggling and disagreem
14、ent. The drawback of firms is that authority, which mitigates contention, can be abused. Competitive markets work relatively well because buyers and sellers can turn to other trading partners in case of dissent.,44,But when market competition is limited, firms are better suited for conflict resoluti
15、on than markets. A key prediction of Williamsons theory, which has also been supported empirically, is therefore that the propensity of economic agents to conduct their transactions inside the boundaries of a firm increases along with the relationship-specific features of their assets.,45,Elinor Ost
16、rom delivering a lecture at Indiana University, Bloomington, July 2008.,46,例题1,47,48,49,50,例题2,51,52,例题3,53,54,例题3,55,56,例题4,57,58,例题5,Suppose you are given the following information about a particular industry: Assume that all firms are identical, and that the market is characterized by pure competition.,
