《德意志银行-欧洲-石油行业-欧洲综合油：可持续吗？通向2025年的桶、资本支出、收益和现金流-20170904-European Integrated Oils：F.I.T.T. for investors-Deutsche Bank》由会员分享，可在线阅读，更多相关《德意志银行-欧洲-石油行业-欧洲综合油：可持续吗？通向2025年的桶、资本支出、收益和现金流-20170904-European Integrated Oils：F.I.T.T. for investors-Deutsche Bank（43页珍藏版）》请在金锄头文库上搜索。
1、Deutsche Bank Markets Research Industry European Integrated Oils Date 4 September 2017 Europe United Kingdom Oil we cut to Sell (12.5). By contrast, Statoils peer-leading opportunity set and moderating spend suggest attractive scope to both recycle and return the impending Sverdrup cash bulge. Upgra
2、de to Hold (NK150). At Shell low decline, high base spend and shale opportunity argue the potential for cash flow stability is greater than the consensus might advocate despite sub-$25bn capex (Buy 2450p). Finally, where ENI (Hold 14.5) may offer predictable growth, value and diversity at Total outs
3、hines (Buy 51). 4 September 2017 Oil Wood Mac data Figure 3: Capex outlook to 2025. Plans struggle to meet guidance 0 20000 40000 60000 80000 100000 120000 140000 2010201120122013201420152016201720182019202020212022202320242025 BaseUnder development ProbableAccess/Exp. R Wood Mac data Figure 4: CFFO
4、 to 2025: Flat growth, collapsing capex, FCF rises to $90bn 0 20,000 40,000 60,000 80,000 100,000 120,000 140,000 160,000 201720182019202020212022202320242025 $bncashflow Baseinc exploration UnderPre-FIDDownstream LNGtrading CapexCapexplusdividends By 2025 the sector drives $50bn more cash than cape
5、x and dividends Source: Deutsche Bank; Wood Mac data 4 September 2017 Oil Deutsche Bank Figure 6: CFFO by source (Appendix A) CFFO ($bn) 2017E 2021E 2025E Base 78.2 75.5 68.7 Under 3.3 25.4 20.7 Probable 0.0 2.5 12.3 E Wood Mac data 4 September 2017 Oil at ENI, the benefits to capex and CFFO of end
6、2017 start-up at Zohr (ENI 60%, BP 10%). Weakest cash momentum in our view is apparent at Repsol and Statoil. Long-term valuation. DCF models suggests the sector is 15% too cheap. And what of valuation? Having built summary bottom-up cash flow models out through 2025 using Wood Mac upstream and DB d
7、ownstream forecasts we construct longer-term DCF models for each company. Using DBs nominal price deck (Figure 1) we assume Wood Macs upstream profiles through 2025, setting 2025 as our terminal cash flow year. Adjusting capital spend UPWARDS to offset Wood Macs implied forward decline rates to 1% p
8、.a. in effect to reflect the view that the global crude oil market moves into annual decline by the middle of the next decade we derive a terminal value for each companys portfolio post 2025. Illustrated in Figure 11 we summarise the assumptions used and the value outputs. Overall, our work suggests
9、 that the sector is towards 15% undervalued with the greatest mismatches evident in the two UK majors. BP in particular appears to us to be towards 25% undervalued, surprising in our view given both the much greater visibility of its forward production profile, the companys strong near-term cash flo
10、w momentum and our perception that BP, as much as any, is adjusting its business approach to accommodate a structurally changed industry outlook. We raise our price target to 520p (was 505p) and reiterate Buy. We also modestly increase our price target for Shell to 2450p (was 2400p) and retain our B
11、uy stance. At the other end of the spectrum, after two years of intense capital rationing and limited investment decisions, our DCF derived long-term valuation of Repsol stands out as a material 14% below the current share price. With the most limited visibility on forward growth and an impending ne
12、ed to invest we lower our recommendation to Sell and our price target to 12.5 (was 13). Finally at Statoil, a lower-than-anticipated outlook for capex combined with the potential for CFFO growth from Sverdrup sees us upgrade our forecasts and price expectations. Upgrade from Sell to Hold with a Nok1
13、50 PT. Figure 11: What value in a 1% decline world from 2025? Assumptions, sensitivities and outputs price (local) WACC KoE WM implied decline to 35 $/boe base spend (WM) $/bbl growth spend (est). % DCF value pre-25 FCF Sensitivity 1% growth Sensitivity $/boe capex Implied price Upside % BP 440 7.4%
14、 9.3% -6.0% 3.69 10.00 40% 7.0% 2.1% 550.0 25% Shell 2161 7.7% 9.3% -4.4% 6.07 10.00 39% 6.6% 1.1% 2581 18% Total 43.45 7.7% 9.3% -5.5% 4.53 10.00 36% 6.6% 1.5% 48.86 13% ENI 13.25 7.9% 9.3% -7.2% 4.27 8.00 36% 5.7% 3.9% 13.90 5% Statoil 147.0 7.8%* 9.3% -9.2% 3.60 8.00 26% 6.4% 7.1% 153.9 5% Repsol
15、 14.46 7.3%* 9.3% -7.4% 2.54 5.00 24% 9.3% 5.5% 12.45 -14% Source: Deutsche Bank * For Statoil we use 2.5% CoD (Government backed); For Repsol 3.5% (weaker credit rating). Figure 8: Estimated CFFO growth 2018 Wood Mac data Figure 9: Estimated capex Vs. Mid- point guidance -30% -25% -20% -15% -10% -5
16、% 0% 5% BP ($16bn) Shell ($25bn) Total ($16bn) ENI ($9bn) Statoil ($11bn) Repsol ($4bn) 201820192020 Source: Deutsche Bank; Wood Mac data Figure 10: DCF upside to current share prices BP leads, Repsol lags 25% 19% 12% 5% 4% -14% -20% -15% -10% -5% 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% BPShellTotalENIStatoilRepsol Upside% Source: Deutsche Bank 4 September 2017 Oil Wood Mac data Source: Deutsche Bank Figure 14: Unsurprisingly a decade of two halves. Growth is visible to 202
