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1、CHINASNEWROLEINAFRICAIanTaylorSchoolofInternationalRelations,UniversityofStAndrewsFromChinas New Role in Africa,publishedbyLynneRiennerPublishersthisyear MaterialandideasbasedonfieldworkandinterviewsIconductedin:Botswana,CapeVerde,Eritrea,EthiopiaTheGambia,Mauritius,NamibiaNigeria,Senegal,SierraLeon
2、eSouthAfrica,Uganda,Zambia,ZimbabweChina(BeijingandHongKong)LondonandWashington,DC. CONTENTS OF BOOK1.CHINAS AFRICA POLICY IN CONTEXT2.OIL DIPLOMACY3.THE IMPACT OF CHEAP CHINESE GOODS4.THE ISSUE OF HUMAN RIGHTS5.ARMS SALES6.PEACEKEEPING IN AFRICA7.WHAT DOES IT ALL MEAN?OILOildominatestheproAfricasex
3、portstoChina(around70%)Chinasdependenceonimportedoilroseto47%ofannualdemand,anincreaseof4.1percentsince2005-expectedtorisetoaround60%by2020FIVEKEYWAYSBEIJINGSEEKSTOLESSENPRESSUREIncreased energy conservation (this will onlymoderategrowthinconsumption)Fuel switchingreducing the dependence onimportedf
4、uelsbyswitchingtorenewableenergyand coal, of which China has large domesticreserves(buttheenvironment)Increase in domestic oil production by seekingout new resources and exploiting existing onesmoreefficiently(therehavebeennewdiscoverieswithinChinabutnotenoughtosatisfydemand).4.Beijingencouragesnati
5、onaloilcompanies(NOCs)toincreasepurchasesininternationaloilmarkets5.Beijingfacilitatesacquisitionofoilreservesabroadthrough“sweetenerdeals”withforeigngovernmentsHowever,liberalizationhasresultedinashiftofpowerawayfromBeijingtowardNOCsTheabilitybyBeijingtotelltheNOCswhattodoislimitedQuestion: Are par
6、ticular ventures aresultofBeijing directing an NOC or the NOCseekingdiplomatic assistance once it hasidentifiedatargetoilfield?ChinalacksacentralministerialagencyoverseeingtheoilindustryPROBLEM:Beijing has as yet been incapable of enforcinga geographical division of labour on the mainNOCsResult: com
7、petition and overlap between:China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation (Sinopec)China National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC)ExampleCNPC and China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (Sinopec) competed against each other for a pipeline project in Sudan. The NOCs
8、 in fact view one another as rivals,competing not only for oil and gas assets, but alsofor political advantage. The more high-quality assets a company acquires,the more likely it is to obtain diplomatic andfinancial support from Beijing for its subsequentinvestments. especially true for CNOOC, which
9、 does not have as much political influence as CNPC and SinopecThis inter-firm competition is normal in the capitalist West, obviously, but puts a different take on “China Inc.” and its “oil strategy” in Africa. Problem:theNOCshavethereputationtolettheChinesegovernmenttakethedangerousconsequencesenge
10、nderedbytheirforeign-oilandgasquestThuscommercialinterestsofChineseNOCscanriskdamagingChinesegovernmentsdiplomacyandinternationalreputationoverseas-SameassomeWesternoilcompaniesbehaveButgovernmentcontrolovertheactionsofChineseNOCsinAfricanotbeaseasyasmanyseemtothinkintheWestIMPACTOFCHINESEIMPORTSOne
11、 of the more contentious issues in Sino-AfricanrelationsCheap manufactured goods blamed for decline inAfricanexportsparticularlyofclothingandtextilesAfricanimportsfromChina712%jumpfrom$895min1996to$7.3bnin2005ManyAfricanobserversseethisasthecauseofdeclineofAfricasmanufacturingsector“Africa is becomi
12、ng a dumping ground while Africancompanies are dying” - quote from an AfricannewspaperINTERNATIONALDYNAMICSAfricanGrowthandOpportunityAct(AGOA)(May2000)offered incentives for African countries to opentheireconomiesandbuild“freemarkets”Modifications made permitting least developedAfricancountriestoem
13、ploymaterialsfromthecheapestcontractorsworldwideEffect was that global apparel industry tookadvantageofAfricasunexploitedquotaaccesstoEUandUSvia“quotahopping”“Quota hopping”variousforeigncompanies,mostlyAsian,setthemselvesupinAfricaasameanstoevadetheobstaclesplacedonthembytheMulti-FibreAgreementTheM
14、FAallocatedexportquotastolow-costdevelopingcountriesandlimitedamountofimportsforstateswhosedomestictextileindustrieswerenegativelyaffectedtargetedatimportsfromAsiaandparticularlyChinaTriangularproductionnetworksthusdevelopedwherebyAsianfirmsmadeproductsinAfricaforexporttoWesternmarketsResult:African
15、exportsoftextilesandclothingtoUSboomedIn2000,apparelexportstoUS=$776m;by2004=$1,782m-increaseof130%HOWEVER,thiswasartificial-vastmajorityof“African”clothingbeingexportedtoUSwasmadeusingforeignfabrics:Lesotho=98%Madagascar=92%Kenya=98%Mauritius=64%Swaziland=98%SouthAfrica=68%Namibia=96%Malawi=95%Bots
16、wana=99%SinceChinaisnowbeingheld“responsible”forpost-MFAcollapseofAfricasclothingindustry,weshouldnotethatasizeableproportionofthefabricinquestionwasactuallyChineseCLOTHINGS“BIGBANG”MFAexpiredJanuary1,2005,affecting87%ofUSquotasand73%ofEUsMarketshareenjoyedbyAfricanexportersnowtakenoverbyChinesemanu
17、facturers-also,manyChinesecompaniesthathadrelocatedtoAfricaduringtheMFAmovedbacktoChinaAfricantextileandclothingmanufacturersexportstoUSfellby16%from2004-05USimportsfromChinawentupby44%EUimportsfromChinawentupby78%ISAFRICACOMPETITIVE?VerydifficulttoassesswhetherAfricantextilescouldcompetewithChinese
18、importsbecausetheplayingfieldisnotlevelAfricanmanufacturershavetocontendwithchronicenergyandtransportissuesExample:Nigeriahasworlds10thlargestreserveofgasbutgeneratesonly3,000mwofelectricity,eventhoughdomesticdemandis6,000mwCostofdoingbusinesshighandproductsexpensiveWorldBank:ifZambianandKenyanpower
19、systemswereofsamequalityastheChinesethecostsavingsforZambianandKenyanfirmswouldbeequivalenttotheirentirewagebillsSouthAfricahasbeenlosingclothingjobssinceaccedingtotheWTO-theindustrywashighlyprotectedduringapartheidbutisbasicallyuncompetitivetodayThe popular imageTHEREALITYAfricas industries have be
20、en in decline for alongtimeBetween1975-2000,Ghanastextileoutputfeelby50%andemploymentinthesectorby80%In Zambia, employment in the clothing andtextilesectorfellfrom25,000in1980stobelow10,000in2002In Kenya, number of large-scale garmentmanufacturersdroppedfrom110in1980sto55in2000sAfricastextileexporti
21、ngsuccessinmid-2000swasanartificialboomforanindustrythatlostitscompetitiveedgelongagoOnlyfactorsupportingthegrowthofmuchofAfricasexport-orientedclothingsector=preferentialaccesstooverseasmarketsWhentheseprivilegeswereabolished,AfricassuccessintheclothingandtextilesectorsevaporatedPoororganizationalp
22、rocedures,lowlevelsofskill,andinadequatemanagementGhanaianmanufacturersoftextileshavetofacetheimpositionofanillegal20%dutybyCtedIvoire,a“transittax”collectedatBeninandextortionbyNigerianauthoritiesPoorpackaging,poorfinishingofproducts(quality/conformitytostandards),inabilityofsomemanufacturerstomeet
23、exportordersonschedulealsocomeintoplayWorld Bank estimates that the cost of doingbusinessinAfrica is 2040 % above that for otherdevelopingregionsdueto:-Unpredictablepropertyrights-Ineffective/corruptjudiciarysystems-policyuncertainty-unfaircompetitionfrompoliticallyconnectedcompanies,whichresultsina
24、fewlargefirmsholdingverydominantmarketsharesFinishedgoodsfromChinaarearrivingintoAfricanmarketswithfewdomesticcompetitors,wipedoutnotonlybylowpricesofChineseimportsbutbyAfricanconditionsBUT “the Chinese” are being blamed forAfricangovernmentsfailingsPolicymakersinBeijingwillhavetoaddressnegativeimpr
25、essionsBigchallenge=increasingSinophobicresentmentvs.ChinesetraderswhoseproductsdominatelocalAfricanmarketsKEYPOINTSTwomainpointsstandout:1.DegreeofirrationalhostilitytoChinainAfrica.2.ItisuptoAfricanleaderstomanagetheirrelationswithChinatobenefittheirowneconomiesandcitizensIRRATIONALHOSTILITYChines
26、etradewithAfricahasbecome,inmanyways,normalized,whichistosaydiverse,andinvolvingmultipleactors,ratherthanstatedirectedandcontrolledYetpeoplestilltalkof“China”inAfrica,asifallactionsbyChineseactorsrepresentsofficialChineseforeignpolicyMuchofAfricasmanufacturingindustrycollapsedlongago,wellbeforeChine
27、seimportsappearedonthesceneBesides,itisnotonlyAfricanproducerswhohavehadtoadjusttocompetitionbetween1995and2002,morethan15millionfactoryjobs,representing15%ofthetotalmanufacturingworkforce,werelostinChinaItispossiblethatsomeChineseexportsmayblockavenuesforAfricasdiversification awayfromitstraditiona
28、lexportsIfAfricaistoescapeitsdependentrelationshipontheglobaleconomyandmoveonfrombeingsimplyanexporterofprimarycommodities,itneedstostartmanufacturingButdomesticproblemsfiguremoresignificantlyinAfricanmanufacturersplightPlus,AfricansthemselvesimportahugeamountofChinese-madeproducts-gotoYiwu!Thosetha
29、tareshoddyorcounterfeitshouldberegulatedandcontrolledbyAfricangovernmentsButthesecorruptgovernmentsinsteadprefertoblame“China.”Beijings engagement with Africa is grounded inpragmatismitisuptoeachAfricanstatetodecidehowandwhereittakesshapeChinas abandonment of ideology for economicgrowthgivesAfricagreaterroomtomanoeuvrebutAfricaselitesmustdosowisely,withaneyetowardmutualbenefitInsomecountries,theywillIn others, however, predatory elites at the apex ofneopatrimonialregimes,unconcernedwithpromotingdevelopment,willforfeitthechancetomakethemostofrenewedChineseinterestinAfricaTHEEND