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1、第 17 章信息不对称的市场信息不对称的市场信息不对称的市场信息不对称的市场本章要讨论的问题本章要讨论的问题质量不确定性与柠檬市场市场信号道德风险委托代理问题本章要讨论的问题本章要讨论的问题一体化企业的管理激励问题劳动力市场的信息不对称: 效率工资理论引言引言我们将研究不完全信息对资源配置和价格机制所产生的影响。质量不确定与柠檬市场质量不确定与柠檬市场在购买一辆二手车时，由于信息不完全，将增加购买的风险并降低消费者的效用；二手车市场l假定u买卖双方都能鉴别高质量和低质量的车；u将会出现两个市场；质量不确定与柠檬市场质量不确定与柠檬市场柠檬问题柠檬问题PHPLQHQLSHSLDHDL5,0005
2、0,00050,000买卖双方能鉴别车的质量时，买卖双方能鉴别车的质量时，将出现高质量和低质量两个市场将出现高质量和低质量两个市场10,000DLDMDM75,00025,000由于信息不对称，消费者无法确定车的质量，他们将降低由于信息不对称，消费者无法确定车的质量，他们将降低对二手车质量的期望对二手车质量的期望 。 Demand for low and high quality used cars shifts to DM.DLMDLMThe increase in QLreduces expectations anddemand to DLM. The adjustment process
3、continues until demand = DL. The Market for Used CarslWith asymmetric information:uLow quality goods drive high quality goods out of the market.uThe market has failed to produce mutually beneficial trade.uToo many low and too few high quality cars are on the market.uAdverse selection occurs; the onl
4、y cars on the market will be low quality cars.Quality Uncertaintyand the Market for LemonsImplications of Asymmetric InformationMedical InsurancelQuestionuIs it possible for insurance panies to separate high and low risk policy holders?lIf not, only high risk people will purchase insurance.lAdverse
5、selection would make medical insurance unprofitable.The Market for InsuranceImplications of Asymmetric InformationAutomobile InsurancelQuestionsuWhat impact does asymmetric information and adverse selection have on insurance rates and the delivery of automobile accident insurance?uHow can the govern
6、ment reduce the impact of adverse selection in the insurance industry?The Market for InsuranceImplications of Asymmetric InformationThe Market for CreditlAsymmetric information creates the potential that only high risk borrowers will seek loans.lQuestionuHow can credit histories help make this marke
7、t more efficient and reduce the cost of credit?Implications of Asymmetric InformationThe Importance of Reputation and StandardizationlAsymmetric Information and Daily Market DecisionsuRetail salesuAntiques, art, rare coinsuHome repairsuRestaurantsImplications of Asymmetric InformationQuestionlHow ca
8、n these producers provide high-quality goods when asymmetric information will drive out high-quality goods through adverse selection.lAnsweruReputationImplications of Asymmetric InformationQuestionlWhy do you look forward to a Big Mac when traveling even though you would never consider buying one at
9、 home.Holiday Inn once advertised “No Surprises” to address the issue of adverse selection.Lemons in Major League BaseballAsymmetric information and the market for free agentslIf a lemons market exists, free agents should be less reliable (disabled) than renewed contracts.Player DisabilityAll Player
10、s4.7312.55165.4Renewed players4.769.68103.4Free agents4.6717.23268.9Days Spent on Disabled List per SeasonPrecontractPostcontract Percentage ChangeFindingslDays on the disabled list increase for both free agents and renewed players.lFree agents have a significantly higher disability rate than renewe
11、d players.lThis indicates a lemons market.Lemons in Major League BaseballQuestionlIf you are a team owner, what steps would you take to reduce the asymmetric information for free agents?Lemons in Major League BaseballMarket SignalingThe process of sellers using signals to convey information to buyer
12、s about the products quality helps buyers and sellers deal with asymmetric information.Market SignalingStrong SignallTo be effective, a signal must be easier for high quality sellers to give than low quality sellers.lExampleuHighly productive workers signal with educational attainment level. Market
13、SignalingA Simple Model of Job Market SignalinglAssumeuTwo groups of workerslGroup I: Low productivity-AP & MP = 1lGroup II: High productivity-AP & MP = 2lThe workers are equally divided between Group I and Group II-AP for all workers = 1.5Market SignalingA Simple Model of Job Market SignalinglAssum
14、euCompetitive Product MarketlP = $10,000lEmployees average 10 years of employmentlGroup I Revenue = $100,000 (10,000/yr. x 10)lGroup II Revenue = $200,000 (20,000/yr. X 10)Market SignalingWith Complete Informationlw = MRPlGroup I wage = $10,000/yr.lGroup II wage = $20,000/yr.With Asymmetric Informat
15、ionlw = average productivitylGroup I & II wage = $15,000Market SignalingSignaling With Education to Reduce Asymmetric Informationly = education index (years of higher education)lC = cost of attaining educational level ylGroup I-CI(y) = $40,000ylGroup II-CII(y) = $20,000yMarket SignalingSignaling Wit
16、h Education to Reduce Asymmetric InformationlAssume education does not increase productivitylDecision Rule:uy* signals GII and wage = $20,000uBelow y* signals GI and wage = $10,000SignalingYears ofCollegeValue ofCollegeEduc.0$100KValue ofCollegeEduc.Years ofCollege1234560123456$200K$100K$200KGroup I
17、Group IICI(y) = $40,000yOptimal choice of y for Group IHow much educationshould a person obtain?The education decisionis based on benefits/costparison.B(y)B(y)y*y*B(y) = increase inwage associated witheach level of educationCII(y) = $20,000yOptimal choice of y for Group ISignalingYears ofCollegeValu
18、e ofCollegeEduc.0$100KValue ofCollegeEduc.Years ofCollege1234560123456$200K$100K$200KCI(y) = $40,000yOptimal choice of y for Group IB(y)B(y)y*y*Benefits = $100,000CostCI(y) = 40,000y$100,000 2.5Choose no educationCII(y) = $20,000yOptimal choice of y for Group IBenefits = $100,000CostCII(yO)= 20,000y
19、$100,000$20,000y*y* Qf ;B = .3Qf + .2(Q - Qf)uIf Q Qf ;B = .3Qf - .5(Qf - Q)Incentive Design in an Integrated FirmOutput(units per year)2,0004,0006,00010,000010,00020,00030,00040,000Bonus($ peryear)8,000If Qf = 30,000,bonus is $6,000,the maximumamount possible.Qf = 30,000Qf = 10,000If Qf = 10,000,bo
20、nus is $5,000Qf = 20,000If Qf = 20,000,bonus is $4,000Asymmetric Information in Labor Markets: Efficiency Wage TheoryIn a petitive labor market, all who wish to work will find jobs for a wage equal to their marginal product.lHowever, most countries economies experience unemployment.The efficiency wa
21、ge theory can explain the presence of unemployment and wage discrimination.lIn developing countries, productivity depends on the wage rate for nutritional reasons.Asymmetric Information in Labor Markets: Efficiency Wage TheoryThe shirking model can be better used to explain unemployment and wage dis
22、crimination in the United States.lAssumes perfectly petitive marketslHowever, workers can work or shirk.lSince performance information is limited, workers may not get fired.Asymmetric Information in Labor Markets: Efficiency Wage TheoryWithout shirking, the market wageis w*, and full-employment exis
23、ts at L*Demand forLaborw*L*SLUnemployment in a Shirking ModelQuantity of LaborWageNo-ShirkingConstraintThe no-shirkingconstraint givesthe wage necessaryto keep workers from shirking.weLeAt the equilibrium wage, We the firm hires Le workerscreating unemployment of L* - Le.Efficiency Wages at Ford Mot
24、or CompanyLabor turnover at Ford l1913: 380%l1914: 1000%uAverage pay = $2 - $3uFord increased pay to $5Efficiency Wages at Ford Motor CompanyResultslProductivity increased 51%lAbsenteeism had been halvedlProfitability rose from $30 million in 1914 to $60 million in 1916.SummaryAsymmetric information
25、 creates a market failure in which bad products tend to drive good products out of the market.Insurance markets frequently involve asymmetric information because the insuring party has better information about the risk involved than the insurance pany.SummaryAsymmetric information may make it costly for the owners of firms to monitor accurately the behavior of the firms manager.Asymmetric information can explain why labor markets have substantial unemployment when some workers are actively seeking work. End of Chapter 17Markets with Markets with Asymmetric Asymmetric InformationInformation
