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1、Assessing Managerial Power Theory:A Meta-Analytic Approach toUnderstanding the Determinants of CEO Compensation评价管理层权力理论（MPT）：用元分析的方法来理解CEO薪酬的的决定因素Marc van Essen（Utrecht University）. 2015, Journal of Management：164-203一、提出问题尽管对 CEO 薪酬的研究在不断增加，但是关于形成高管薪酬类型的基本决定因素，各 学科之间仍缺少共识。这种缺少的共识最常见的在：一方面：提倡基于市场解释
2、的经济和金融学者另一方面：经济和金融学科之外的学者挑战这些解释，他们主在薪酬实践创新过程中强 调权力、社会心理过程和机构环境的重要性。这种差异引起了更多有创造性的讨论，最近对纯粹基于市场解释最杰出的挑战是管理层 权力理论（MPT）。这个理论由 Bebchuk and Fried （Bebchuk & Fried, 2004; Bebchuk, Fried, & Walker, 2002）推动。这个理论框架的核心是对代理理论最优契约假设的一种直接挑战。最优契约理论中，董 事会致力于和高管在薪酬安排上达成正常交易；这种正常交易可以通过建立高管和股东利益 最紧密连接的薪酬机制来解决代理问题。相反，B
3、ebchuk and Fried （2004）发现，董事会很少致力于建立这种正常交易，因为 企业特殊的结构和社会心理机制会对董事会制定高管薪酬的决策过程产生很重要的影响，所 以 CEOs 通常会拥有比董事会更大的权力。这些机制为董事会提供了了新的动机来挑战薪酬 安排，而这样的安排更偏向高管的利益而不是股东的利益，也就是董事会提供了更高层次的 薪酬以及与业绩不太相关的薪酬。MPT 的目标不是反驳代理理论，而是去深化，通过提出管理层权力和它对高管薪酬的 影响引起了对最优契约假设的质疑。一些经济和金融领域的学者用了多种类型的证据反过来批评了 MPT，虽然他们对MIP 范围和影响提出了很重要的问题，但
4、是对于MPT有效性，他们没有提供有效的决定性的证 据来反驳。 Bebchuk and Fried （2004）已经直接提出了对这些批评的直接抗辩。最重要的是在公司层面，大部分挑战没有基于对管理层权力和薪酬支出指标关系的直接 检验。相反，这些批评倾向于集中在集团层面相关的董事会独立性、薪酬、公司业绩和CEO 更替。因此，我们主张用两个核心的问题来检验MPT的有效性：1. 比董事会拥有更多权力的CEO是否比拥有较少权力的CEO有更高的薪酬？2. 比董事会拥有更多权力的CEO是否有跟公司业绩不相符（对公司业绩不敏感）？已经有大量和多样的研究在公司层面实证检验了这些关系，然而这些文献仍然是不确定 性的
5、，特点就是不同的和冲突的发现允许支持者和反对者对不同的结论进行论证。所以，现 阶段需要一个对现存文献更严格的评价方法，能够巩固这种混合的实证发现以及从薪酬水平 和薪酬业绩敏感性的角度来评价对MPT有效性的一般解释。这篇文章我们用元分析的方法提供了一种对现有文献巩固和评价。元分析(meta-analysis )统计方法是对众多现有实证文献的再次统计，通过对相关文献 中的统计指标利用相应的统计公式，进行再一次的统计分析，从而可以根据获得的统计显著 性等来分析两个变量间真实的相关关系。元分析是一种有用和稳健的方法，用来分析在大量研究中已经被检验过的变量之间的关 系。当存在大量混合结果和冲突结果研究的
6、情形下，元分析方法提供了综合和严密的评价来 均衡最接近结果的数据证据。二、研究方法We use these techniques to assess the accumulated evidence of 219 studies that measure the influence of managerial power directly on both CEO compensation levels and the relationship between corporate performance and CEO pay.If our analysis finds higher level
7、s of pay and pay that is less sensitive to performance when executives have more power, and the opposite when directors have more power, this will provide empirical evidence in favor of MPT.To test these predictions, scholars have relied on a number of different indicators of CEO and board powerWe f
8、ocus on the two sets of mechanisms on which researchers have focused most frequently when analyzing managerial power: board structures and ownership characteristics三、研究假设Board CharacteristicsVariables：CEO duality,CEO tenure, size of the board, and the percentage of independent directorsHypothesis 1a
9、: CEO duality is positively associated with the value of total CEO compensation.Hypothesis 1b: In the presence of CEO duality, the association between corporate performance and CEO compensation will be weaker.Hypothesis 2a: CEO tenure is positively associated with the value of total CEO compensation
10、.Hypothesis 2b: In the presence of CEOs with longer tenure, the association between corporate performance and CEO compensation will be weaker.Hypothesis 3a: Board size is positively associated with the value of total CEO compensation.Hypothesis 3b: In the presence of larger boards, the association b
11、etween corporate performance and CEO compensation will be weaker.Hypothesis 4a: The percentage of independent directors is negatively associated with the value of total CEO compensation.Hypothesis 4b: At higher levels of board independence, the relationship between corporate performance and CEO comp
12、ensation will be stronger.Ownership CharacteristicsVariables：concentrated ownership, institutional ownershipHypothesis 5a: Higher levels of concentrated ownership is negatively associated with the value of total CEO compensation.Hypothesis 5b: At higher levels of concentrated ownership, the associat
13、ion between corporate performance and CEO compensation will be stronger.Hypothesis 6a: Higher levels of institutional ownership is negatively associated with thevalue of total CEO compensation.Hypothesis 6b: At higher levels of institutional ownership, the association between corporate performance a
14、nd CEO compensation will be stronger.四、研究设计Model:where Ri is the partial correlation between firm performance and CEO total compensationy0 is the constant term, D is a vector of whether a particular variable is included in a regression ornot, S is a vector of measurement artifacts, R is a vector of
15、study characteristics, and ui is the random component.we included in the D vector a set of dummy variables indicating whether the following variables were included in the regression (0) or not (1): CEO duality, CEO tenure, board size, board independence, ownership concentration, and institutional ow
16、nership.we included in the S vector several control variables. To control for the influence of measurement artifacts on effect sizeswe included in the R vector three other control variables. To control for theinfluence of study artifacts五、研究结果：1.CEO Total CompensationTable 4Mom-Analytic Striictuml Eqiianon Modilin ResultsPredictorCEO Tbml PayPiCBD duality.02*.K2CEO i
