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1、本科毕业论文（设计）外 文 翻 译原文：Capital structure, dividend policy, and multinational: Theory versus empirical evidence3.1.Factors influencing capital structure and dividend policyIt is important to examine the factors that impact capital structure and dividend policy so that appropriate control variables can b
2、e included in the examination of the impact of multinational on capital structure and dividend policy. The list of these control variables must be based on extant theories and empirical evidence related to capital structure and dividend policy. Theories in these areas generally start with the well k
3、nown results presented in Modigliani and Miller (1958) note that in an efficient markets world with no taxes or bankruptcy costs, the value of a firm is invariant to its capital structure. This theory has since been modified and extended so that capital structure does matter to include not only the
4、impact of taxes and bankruptcy costs, but also the real world costs related to agency problems, asymmetric information, moral hazard, and other frictions and deviations from perfect markets.3.1.1. Operating leverage and other influencesThe operating leverage of a firm reflects its business risk. Fir
5、ms with higher operating leverage face higher bankruptcy probabilities and should have lower financial leverage. However, higher operating leverage is generally associated with higher levels of fixed tangible assets indeed the proportion of such assets is widely used in the literature as a measure o
6、f operating leverage. A firms level of fixed assets should be associated positively with leverage as high levels of such assets can be used as collateral for loans (Friend & Lang, 1988; Long & Malitz, 1985). Jensen, Solberg, and Zorn (1992) provide empirical support for the positive impact on levera
7、ge of assets available for collateral. The non-debt tax shield variable is also important as firms with high levels of non-debt tax shields are expected to have lower debt levels (Kim & Sorensen, 1986). Due to institutional practices, herding among managers, bankers, and financiers, and their influe
8、nce of firm risk, capital structure and dividend policy can also be expected to vary with firm size and industry classification.3.1.2. Trade-off theoriesIn the trade-off theory, capital structure decisions of firms depend on benefits and costs of using more debt. Less debt is used if the cost of ban
9、kruptcy is higher than the tax shield or other benefits of using debt (Kim & Sorensen, 1986; Graham, 2000). Therefore, the trade-off theory suggests a negative relationship between leverage and bankruptcy costs and a positive relationship between leverage and firms marginal tax rate(Lasfer, 1995; Cl
10、oyd, Limberg, & Robinson, 1997). According to Rozeff (1982), riskier firms pay out lower dividends indicating a negative relationship between dividends, bankruptcy costs, and the amount of debt used by a firm.3.1.3. Impact of agency costsAvailability of free cash flow creates an agency problem since
11、 managers can use some of the free cash available for their own benefit, thereby decreasing the value of the firm (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). To protect against this managerial sub-optimal behavior, firms with higher level of cash flow should use higher leverage. The asymmetric information model of R
12、oss (1977) also notes that there should be a positive relationship between use debt and the firms profitability. Agency theory also indicates that firms with higher growth opportunities will hold less debt controlling for profitability and Stulz (1990)notes that due to the under-investment problem,
13、firms with high growth opportunities should hold less debt. Chang (1992) contends that firms with high profitability use more debt in its capital structure controlling for investment opportunities.The agency issue in dividend payout decisions is similar to capital structure decisions in the presence
14、 of agency costs. In agency model of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Jensen (1986), dividends and debt help control the agency costs of overinvestment if there are conflicts of interests between managers and stockholders. Thus, agency costs predict a positive relation between firms free cash flow and
15、 payment of dividends. According to the signaling hypothesis of Ross (1977),firms with high profitability will also pay out more dividends as costly credible signals. However, firms with higher growth opportunities will pay out less dividends especially when there is an available alternative (debt)
16、as a monitoring technique (Easterbrook, 1984).3.1.4. Pecking order theoryThe pecking order model (Myers & Majluf, 1984) contends that because of transaction costs and information asymmetry, firms finance new investments first with retained earnings, then successively with safe debt, risky debt and finally with equity. According to this pecking order model, more profitable firms should have lower leverage and lower short-term, but not long-term, payout contr
