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1、中国地质大学（武汉）高等教育自学考试毕业论文（设计）中国地质大学（武汉）高等教育自学考试本科毕业论文（设计）企业广告竞争与决策研究 院 （系） 远程与继教学院 专 业： 市场营销 评 阅 人： 职 称： 2013 年 9 月论文原创性声明本人郑重声明：本人所呈交的本科毕业论文企业广告竞争与决策研究，是本人在导师的指导下独立进行研究工作所取得的成果。论文中引用他人的文献、资料均已明确注出，论文中的结论和结果为本人独立完成，不包含他人成果及使用过的材料。对论文的完成提供过帮助的有关人员已在文中说明并致以谢意。本人所呈交的本科毕业论文没有违反学术道德和学术规范，没有侵权行为，并愿意承担由此而产生的法
2、律责任和法律后果。 论文作者（签字）： 日期：年月日摘要今天的市场竞争变得前所未有的激烈，企业为了生存与发展，必须综合运用价格和非价格竞争手段，并且考虑各种可能的战略联盟以应对这种挑战。广告作为企业在市场营销中最重要的非价格竞争手段，受到了众多企业家的重视和学者们的关注。本文在前人研究的基础上，运用博弈论和产业组织理论的原理和方法，从横向和纵向两个角度深入研究了广告竞争与合作的有关重要问题。首先，本文引入了广告外部性，建立了双寡头博弈模型，并重点考察了广告竞争、半联盟合作与全联盟合作这三种竟合形式的绩效。研究发现，在广告竞争情形下“打广告”是每一个企业的占优战略，纳什均衡是(打广告，打广告)，
3、但这个均衡不是帕累托最优；全联盟合作下企业获得的利润最大，半联盟次之，广告竞争时企业利润最小：全联盟的社会福利最小，广告影响因子较小时，广告竞争情形下的社会福利大于半联盟情形下的社会福利，广告影响因子较大时，半联盟情形下的社会福利大于广告竞争情形下的社会福利。本文得到的启示是企业可以寻求半联盟或者全联盟合作，以获得企业间的帕累托改善，但在政府规制下，政府会禁止企业间的全联盟合作。其次，本文将产量作为内生变量，并将零售商扩大到两家，研究了一个供应链上生产商与零售商的广告不合作与合作问题，侧重探讨了生产商广告成本分担比例问题和对比分析了三种竟合模式的市场效率。结果表明，在生产商分担零售商广告成本合
4、作形式下，生产商广告成本分担率的提高将增大零售商广告投入；广告影响因子较小时，生产商分担零售商广告成本，广告影响因子较大时，生产商不分担零售商广告成本。对市场效率的对比中，本文发现生产商和零售商都是在生产商和零售商都打广告的合作方式下利润最高，而且在这种合作方式下，社会福利也最大。显然，政府应该鼓励生产商和零售商都打广告的合作方式。关键词：博弈 ；告竞争 ；广告合作； 广告决策AbstractMarket competition becomes unprecedentedly fierce todayIn order to surviveand develop，firms must wield
5、 price and nonprice competition means synthetically,and consider possible strategic alliance to answer this challengeAdvertising as themost important means of nonprice competition in marketing，has been valued bynumerous entrepreneurs and caught a lot of scholarsattentionOn the basis ofprevious studi
6、es，this paper applies the theory and methods in game theory andindustrial organization theory to study relevant important issues on advertisingcompetition and cooperation from the perspective of both horizontal and verticalFirst，the advertisement externality is introduced into this paperThen，this pa
7、perestablishes a duopoly game model and focus on the performance of advertingcompetition semi-alliance and total allianceThis paper finds that in the advertisingcompetition case，”advertising”is the dominant strategy of each firm，and Nashequilibrium is the(advertising，advertising)，but the equilibrium
8、 is not Pareto optimalThe firm gains the most profit in total alliance case，the second in semialliance case，and the least in advertising competitionThe social welfare is smallest in totalallianceWhen ads impact factor is relatively smaller,social welfare in competitioncase is larger than that in sem
9、iallianceWhen ads impact factor is relatively bigger,social welfare in semi-alliance is larger than that in competition caseThis paperobtains the enlightenment that the firms may seek half alliance or entire alliance toimprove firmsPareto Optimum，but under the government regulations，thegovernment wi
10、ll forbid entire alliance cooperation of firmsSecond，this paper takes the output as the endogenous variable，and expands theretailer to two，and studies noncooperative and cooperative advertising in a supplychainThe producerS proportional share of the cost of advertising and marketefficiency of three
11、kinds of competition and cooperation models are mainly discussedThe results show that in the cooperation cases that the producer shares the cost ofretailer advertising，when the producer shares the cost of advertising，the retaileradvertisement wilIincreaseWhen the impact factor of ads iS relatively s
12、maller,theproducer will share the cost of retailer advertising，when the impact factor of ads isrelatively bigger,the producer does not share the cost of retailer advertisingComparing efficiency of the market，the results show that when producer andretailers both advertise，producer and retailers obtai
13、n most profit，and social welfareis also the largestIt is clear that the Government should encourage producer andretailers both to advertiseFinally,the assumption that the market demand is certain is given up and thecooperative advertising issue in uncertain circumstances in a supply chain is studied
14、The main conclusions are that when the impact factor of ads increases，the producerSproportional share of the cost of advertising，the amount of advertising and orderingquantity all decline，when advertising barrier increases，the producerS proportionalshare of the cost of advertising increases，and the
15、amount of advertising and orderingquantity both decline；when the demand uncertainty declines，the retailerS profit willincreaseKeywords：Game；Competitive Advertising；Cooperative Advertising；Supply Chain；Uncertainty目录摘要31.引言81.1研究背景81.2研究意义91.3研究目的92.寡头垄断市场横向广告博弈102.1寡头垄断市场的概念102.2竞争广告博弈102.3商业企业广告行为博弈论分析102.4产品市场竞争113. 广告决策113.1广告决策的依据113.2广告决策的注意事项123.3广告决策的内容12确定广告目标123.4广告预算决策133.5广告
