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1、 摘摘 要要 随着知识经济和网络经济的迅速发展，企业社会责任在全球兴起。各国政府部门、民间组织、行业协会等越来越关注企业社会责任，企业利益相关者不满足于企业对他们的关注，积极参与企业治理，促使企业开始积极关注利益相关者的价值。同时，企业价值的创造越来越难以离开利益相关者。经理人不再仅仅是股东的代理人，而是多个利益相关者的代理人。经理人作为公司价值最大化的实现者和经营决策的执行者，既要实现股东价值，又要兼顾利益相关者的价值，这无论对公司还是对经理人都是挑战。不同与委托代理的激励，利益相关者的激励是个多方博弈的过程，他们以人力资本、知识资本、社会资本等各种要素形式融入企业，以公司治理、组织再造、企
2、业重组、战略联盟和虚拟经营等多种方式来创造价值，采取合作或者非合作方式来参与价值分配，来协调经理和股东以及其他利益相关者的利益冲突，最终可能使企业达到某种稳态均衡，在这个稳态均衡的状态下持续发展可能比股东价值主导的非均衡模式更有社会现实意义。因此，利益相关者对经理人的激励不仅是各国企业关注的焦点，更是转型时期我国企业改革亟待探索的全新课题。 经典委托代理机制无法系统地解决信息不对称所导致的多主体激励问题。本文由此提出了基于利益相关者的经理人激励机制的命题。本文以机制设计理论为基础，借助信息经济学和博弈论的分析方法，提出了基于利益相关者的经理人激励机制设计问题。本文对比分析了委托代理关系中的单委
3、托人的非合作博弈和利益相关者关系中的多委托人的非合作博弈；对比分析了利益相关者关系中多委托人的非合作博弈和多委托人的合作博弈；阐述了利益相关者关系中多委托人的合作博弈达到均衡的必要条件和充分条件；提出了利益相关者相机抉择的经理人激励合约模型。 激励机制要解决的核心问题是激励合约的设计和选择。经理人的激励合约与公司治理、管理行为密切相关。本文将激励合约的影响要素依次纳入参数化的激励合约进行定量分析。首先，本文对绝对业绩模型进行扩展，建立了考虑外部市场或行业影响的相对业绩模型。其次，将内生于激励合约的公司治理因素作为变量加入参数化的激励合约进行分析，侧重分析不同利益相关者参与公司治理的财务机制。最
4、后，本文对股东激励经理人所采取的委托代理和受托责任这两种管理方式进行深入比较，并将授权变量和受托责任变量加入激励合约进行分析。 经理人业绩评价是激励机制设计的前提。本文建立了非对称信息下的业绩评价机制，提出了业绩指标选择的依据，剖析了经理人的业绩信息的传递机制，介绍了利益相关者的信息披露制度设计框架；提出了不对称信息下的业绩信号甄别，建立了基于利益相关者的多人多目标博弈的经理人业绩评价模型及利益相关者协商的经理人业绩评价模型，为利益相关者激励机制的设计提供了有力的基础。 激励效果的评价是激励机制设计的反馈环节，实证研究是检验机制设计效率的途径。我国上市公司薪酬激励如何是个有待验证的问题，相关实
5、证研究之所以没有得到显著性的结论，主要原因是没有考虑经理人控制权收益、利益相关者的治理以及经理人面临的风险等因素的影响，并缺乏可靠的检验方法，本文对此提出如下改进措施：第一、对经理人的控制权收益进行科学计量；第二、考虑薪酬激励中利益相关者带来的影响；第三、考虑薪酬激励中的风险分担因素。本文先通过面板数据模型求得薪酬业绩敏感性，然后研究内生激励变量、利益相关者的治理变量、风险变量的激励效应对薪酬业绩敏感性的影响。本文实证研究发现，上市公司的薪酬激励效果不太理想，其主要原因是机制设计没有考虑激励合约的内生因素以及利益相关者对经理人的影响。本文进一步从资本市场角度对薪酬激励效果进行分类考察，发现不同
6、公司的风险分担失衡导致了公司效率和市场效率损失。 关键词： 关键词： 激励机制设计；信息不对称；利益相关者；经理人；激励合约；博弈； 业绩评价；控制权收益 Abstract In knowledge economy and network economy corporate social responsibility has prevails throughout the world. Firms begin attach importance to stakeholders, and stakeholders dissatisfy such attitude, and actively pa
7、rticipate in firms governance. Managers become stakeholders agent rather than shareholders agent, and they face the challenge to take diverse approaches and measures to balance interests between shareholders and stakeholders. Stakeholders incentive helps to coordinate interest conflict between manag
8、ers and shareholders. Practice from different countries including China tells that how to provide incentive to top managers to maximize firms value is the pioneering issue of modern enterprise management. Incentive mechanism plays positive roles to improve firms performance and how to provide incent
9、ive to managers under stakeholders common governance becomes become the challenge for all firms.Different from incentive in principal-agent, stakeholders devote human resource、knowledge resource and social resource to firms, and create value by the organization reengineering、coporate restructuring、s
10、trategy alliance、virtual operation, and distribute value to coordinate their interests to reach the stable equilibrium, such equilibrium may be more important than disequilibrium for social value. So stakeholders incentive becomes new challenge for firms reform in different countries including China
11、. The traditional principal-agent can not resolve managers incentive inefficiency by stakeholders from asymmetry information between managers and stakeholders. To order to resolve such problem, this thesis firstly put forwards basic method to incentive by stakeholders under information asymmetry. Th
12、e thesis bases its research on the mechanism design theory, and makes prescriptive studies by the method of game theory. Prescriptive analysis compares principal-agent relationship with stakeholders relationship, and compares non-cooperative game with cooperative game, and finds necessary condition
13、and sufficient condition of cooperative game between stakeholders. Then this part discusses the selection of different principal from stakeholders. The core issue of incentive mechanism design is to select incentive contracts, such contracts have close relation with corporate governance 、management
14、manners and performance methods. This thesis innovatively analyses factors that affect selection of incentive contracts with quantitative method. Firstly, the thesis deducts the basic incentive models, and designs the relative performance evaluation and multiple dimensional evaluations. Secondly, th
15、e thesis quantitatively analyses governance variables endogenetic in incentive contract, and studies the financial effects from these variables. Thirdly, this thesis compares stewardship manner with principal-agent manner, and introduces empowerment variable and stewardship variable into incentive c
16、ontract. The premise of incentive mechanism design is to gather information to evaluation managers performance. The thesis introduces performance evaluation method under asymmetry information, and provides criteria of screening such performance indexes, and analyses signaling from performance evaluation from principals and information disclosure, and designs stakeholders-based performance evaluation models for managers. The feedback of incentive mechanism design is to estimate
