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1、PerspectiveExpert insights on a timely policy issueC O R P O R AT I O NFor almost 70 years, the United States has been committed to security on the Korean Peninsula. It has used a range of military and diplomatic tools to underscore its commitments to its treaty ally South Korea and to deter North K
2、orean aggression. Apart from occasional crises and provocations, deter-rence appears to have been robust. The risk of large-scale conflict, while ever present, has remained relatively low.However, because of a combination of developments on the peninsulathe most important of which is North Korea s b
3、urgeoning nuclear programthis situation may be changing. Under Kim Jong-un, North Korea has dramatically hastened the pace of nuclear weapon developmentespecially delivery vehi-cles, such as long-range missiles. At the same time, the rhetoric out of the North has become even more confrontational. Ki
4、m Jong-un s regime appears stable, but a long series of arrests and killings of apparent rivals and the North Korean people s growing awareness of outside events and increasing involvement in trade point to the potential for sudden volatility. In addition, South Korea s doctrine of disproportionate
5、response to provocations and emphasis on preemption exacerbate escalatory dangers. The recent rapprochement between the two Koreas and the bilateral and multilateral summits now under way may ease these tensions. Should those talks fail to resolve key issues, however, the military situation in Korea
6、 could remain very dangerous.RAND Arroyo Center analysis of security issues in Korea high- lights areas of growing risk that may pose sudden, unexpected demands on the Army and other branches of the U.S. armed services: North Korean nuclear progress limited wars spurred by the North s recurrent mili
7、tary provocations the risk of state collapse and unsecured nuclear weapons. The United States and other regional powers are already con-fronting North Korea s nuclear progress. They may confront the The Korean Peninsula: Three Dangerous ScenariosMichael J. Mazarr, Gian Gentile, Dan Madden, Sta
8、cie L. Pettyjohn, Yvonne K. Crane每日免费获取报告1、每日微信群内分享5+最新重磅报告；2、每日分享当日华尔街日报、金融时报；3、每周分享经济学人4、每月汇总500+份当月重磅报告（增值服务）扫一扫二维码 关注公号 回复：研究报告 加入“起点财经”微信群。2state collapse challenge as well, although it is unknown whether the conditions for collapse could emerge within the medium term. Limited war scenarios rem
9、ain very possible, given North Korea s history of limited aggression, but they are hardly certainNorth Korea has generally attempted to avoid large-scale military clashes with a signifi cant potential for escalation. In short, the United States already faces a mounting nuclear weapons challeng
10、e, which will become even more daunting once North Korea proves its capability to deliver reliable nuclear warheads on ballistic missiles. Before or after that point, it might need to deal with limited war scenarios and the possibility of a regime collapse.Th is perspective summarizes more det
11、ailed analytical work, derived from a number of studies over a period of several years, in these three areas: 1. the growing operational and strategic implications of a large, survivable North Korean nuclear force2. the operational challenges of North Korean artillery and related capabilities that c
12、an threaten Seoul from the Kae-song Heights3. the operational and diplomatic issues attendant to a poten-tial mission to secure loose nuclear weapons after a North Korean collapse. In each case, we off er essential fi ndings from recent RAND work and policy recommendations.RAND work on t
13、hese three strategic issues highlights the need for fresh thinking about how the United States should deter North Korea and prepare for a possible confl ict on the peninsula. We ana-lyze the risks of each contingency on its own, as well as how they might interact with one another to create exc
14、eptionally dangerous, operationally demanding scenarios. Our work also suggests that these three major challenges are complicated by two othersthe logistical burden and local chaos of a noncombatant evacuation operation and the potential for third-party intervention, especially by China, in any cris
15、is or war. Our most important fi nding is that the United States must develop and work with regional allies to shape a wider range of potential diplomatic and military options to deal with a nuclear-armed and potentially more-belligerent and more-unstable North Korea. Th is conclusion cr
16、eates particular implications for the Army. Given the demands of these three contingencies, the core missions involvedincluding deterring a major war, conducting localized but intensive operations short of major war, and locating and securing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the event of instability in the Northwill each place massive, perhaps unsustainable, demands on Army capacity and specifi c high-demand, low-density capabili-ties. In addition, the North s nuclear arsenal demands that the Army, together wit
