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1、河北农业大学硕士学位论文信息不对称条件下的资产评估机构内部治理结构研究姓名：姚春齐申请学位级别：硕士专业：农业经济管理指导教师：王建中2009-05-27摘 要 资产评估机构是向客户提供以资产价值判断为主要内容的社会中介服务组织， 通过 向社会提供资产评估服务， 促进企业产权制度改革的顺利进行并保证社会资源的优化配 置和合理流动。 近年来， 我国资产评估机构数量迅速增长， 资产评估人员数量快速增加， 资产评估机构间的竞争也越来越激烈，并逐渐暴露出一些问题，影响了资产评估行业的 健康发展。究其原因，除了起步晚、规模小和运作环境不完善等宏观因素外，一个重要 的原因是我国的评估机构内部尚未建立起一套
2、有效的微观组织结构和运行机制，因此， 完善内部治理结构是保证评估报告质量的重要方面， 是我国评估机构发展中一个亟待解 决的问题。评估机构内部治理结构的合理性和有效性，直接影响其自身的管理效率和服 务水平；评估机构内部治理结构的整体水平，直接影响到行业形象和服务效率。完善内 部治理结构， 规范和约束货币资本、 人力资本要素投入者以及其他各利益相关者的行为， 既是评估机构自身发展的需要，也是行业发展的客观要求。 本文从资产评估机构的内部治理结构出发， 将研究范围界定为具有完整的内部组织 结构且具有独立职业能力的资产评估机构， 将评估机构内部的利益相关者建立在具有有 限理性的经济人假设的基础上，以公
3、司内部治理结构和信息不对称的相关理论为基础， 分析了我国资产评估机构内部治理结构特殊的发展历程，从评估机构的产品特征、人力 资本与非人力资本的特征以及评估机构的企业文化特征等方面探讨对于评估机构内部 治理结构的影响。 重点研究了信息不对称条件下由机构内部的利益相关者多层次的委托 代理关系所产生的“逆向选择”和“道德风险”问题，以及如何有效降低委托代理风 险，提高评估机构运行效率。 根据本文的研究思路，可以将文章内容概述为三大部分。首先，在研究范围和研究 假设限定的条件下，将信息不对称理论引入资产评估机构内部治理结构中，阐述资产评 估机构作为公司制企业而又不同于一般的公司制企业的特点， 揭示出评
4、估机构内部利益 相关者之间由于信息不对称，所导致的内部治理结构的失衡。其次，用信息经济学的相 关理论分析机构内部员工在聘任和执业过程中由于信息不对称所导致的内部治理结构 问题，即由此引发的“逆向选择”和“道德风险”问题，并用理论模型分析这些问题产 生的深层次原因。最后，结合我国评估机构内部治理结构的现实状况，通过建立信号传 递和甄别机制克服聘任过程中的逆向选择问题， 通过激励约束机制的设计解决执业过程 中的道德风险问题，并以文化建设作为优化其内部治理结构的灵魂。 关键词：资产评估机构；内部治理结构；信息不对称；利益相关者 Study on Internal Governance Structu
5、re of Asset Evaluation Agencies Based on Information Asymmetry Author: Yao Chun-qi Major: Agricultural Economics and Management Tutor: professor Wang Jian-zhong Abstract Asset evaluation agencies are intermediary organizations which provide customers asset value judgment service. Through providing a
6、ssessment services to the society, they promote the reform of enterprise property system and ensure optimized disposition and reasonable flowing of social resources. In recent years, the quantity of asset evaluation agencies in China is increasing rapidly, so does the number of evaluators. As a resu
7、lt, the competitions among the asset evaluation agencies become more and more fierce, and some questions come into being gradually, which affect the healthy development of the assets evaluation industry. Besides some macroscopic reasons such as starting to late, small scale, imperfect operation envi
8、ronment and so on, another important reason is that there is not a series of effective microcosmic organization framework and operating mechanism established in our countrys asset evaluation agencies. Therefore, the perfection of internal governance structure plays a significant role in ensuring the
9、 quality of evaluation report, which is also a question waiting to be solved urgently in the development of Chinas asset evaluation agencies. The rationality and validity of internal governance structure of asset evaluation agencies will have a direct impact on their own managerial effectiveness and
10、 service level, and the overall level of internal governance structure of asset evaluation agencies will have a direct impact on its image and service efficiency. It is the need of their own development to perfect internal governance structure, and standardize and restrain the behaviors of money cap
11、ital and human resource capital owners and other stakeholders, and it is also the objective requirement of the industry. Studying from the internal governance structure of asset evaluation agencies, the paper sets the study scope of the large asset evaluation agencies with complete internal organiza
12、tional structure and independent professional assessment, and makes the assumptions that the stakeholders in the in asset evaluation agencies are economic men. Based on the theory of internal governance structure and information asymmetry, the paper analyzes the special developing process of our cou
13、ntrys asset evaluation agencies and investigates the influences of product characteristic of asset evaluation agencies, the features of human capital and non-human capital and the enterprise culture characteristics of internal governance structure of asset evaluation agencies. The focus of this pape
14、r is to study the adverse selection problem and moral hazard problem produced in the circumstance of the principle-agent relationship among stakeholders, to be more important, and how to reduce the risk of principal-agent and improve the operating efficiency of elevation agencies. According to the l
15、ine of this paper, we can divide the paper into three major parts. First, under the conditions of the research scope and the research supposition, information asymmetry theory is introduced to internal governance structure of asset evaluation agencies, and I set forth that the asset evaluation agenc
16、ies, as company system enterprises, have their own distinguish characteristics compared with general enterprises and reveal the imbalance of the internal governance structure brought about by the information asymmetry among the stakeholders in evaluation agencies. Second, I use the relative theory on economics to analyze the internal governance structure problems caused by information asymmetry during the process of the appointment and occupat
