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1、外文文献翻译译文一、外文原文原文：原文：The Determinants of Capital Structure ChoiceThe basic approach taken in previous empirical work has been to estimate regression equations with proxies for the unobservable theoretical attributes. This approach has a number of problems. First, there may be no unique representation
2、 of the attributes we wish to measure. There are often many possible proxies for a particular attribute, and researchers, lacking theoretical guidelines, may be tempted to select those variables that work best in terms of statistical goodness-of-fit criteria, thereby biasing their interpretation of
3、the significance levels of their tests. Second, it is often difficult to find measures of particular attributes that are unrelated to other attributes that are of interest. Thus, selected proxy variables may be measuring the effects of several different attributes. Third, since the observed variable
4、s are imperfect representations of the attributes they are supposed to measure, their use in regression analysis introduces an errors-in-variable problem. Finally, measurement errors in the proxy variables may be correlated with measurement errors in the dependent variables, creating spurious correl
5、ations even when the unobserved attribute being measured is unrelated to the dependent variable.This study extends empirical work on capital structure theory in three ways. First, it extends the range of theoretical determinants of capital structure by examining some recently developed theories that
6、 have not, as yet, been analyzed empirically. Second, since some of these theories have different empirical implications with regard to different types of debt instruments, we analyze separate measures of short-term, long-term, and convertible debt rather than an aggregate measure of total debt. Thi
7、rd, a technique is used that explicitly recognizes and mitigates the measurement problems discussed above.This technique, which is an extension of the factor-analytic approach to measuring unobserved or latent variables, is known as linear structural modeling. Very briefly, this method assumes that,
8、 although the relevant attributes are not directly observable, we can observe a number of indicator variables that are linear functions of one or more attributes and a random error term. There is, in this specification, a direct analogy with the return-generating process assumed to hold in the Arbit
9、rage Pricing Theory. While the identifying restrictions imposed on our model are different, the technique for estimating it is very similar to the procedure used by Roll and Ross to test the APT.Our results suggest that firms with unique or specialized products have relatively low debt ratios. Uniqu
10、eness is categorized by the firms expenditures on research and development, selling expenses, and the rate at which employees voluntarily leave their jobs. We also find that smaller firms tend to use significantly more short-term debt than larger firms. Our model explains virtually none of the varia
11、tion in convertible debt ratios across firms and finds no evidence to support theoretical work that predicts that debt ratios are related to a firms expected growth, non-debt tax shields, volatility, or the collateral value of its assets. We do, however, find some support for the proposition that pr
12、ofitable firms have relatively less debt relative to the market value of their equity.Determinants of Capital StructureIn this section, we present a brief discussion of the attributes that different theories of capital structure suggest may affect the firms debt-equity choice. These attributes are d
13、enoted asset structure, non-debt tax shields, growth, uniqueness, industry classification, size, earnings volatility, and profitability. The attributes, their relation to the optimal capital structure choice, and their observable indicators are discussed below.A. Collateral Value of AssetsMost capit
14、al structure theories argue that the type of assets owned by a firm in some way affects its capital structure choice. Scott suggests that, by selli secured debt, firms increase the value of their equity by expropriating wealth from their existing unsecured creditor. Arguments put forth by Myers and
15、Majluf also suggest that firms may find it advantageous to sell secured debt. Their model demonstrates that there may be costs associated with issuing securities about which the firms managers have better information than outside shareholders. Issuing debt secured by property with known values avoid
16、s these costs. For this reason, firms with assets that can be used as collateral may be expected to issue more debt to take advantage of this opportunity.Work by Galai and Masulis, Jensen and Meckling, and Myers suggests that stockholders of leveraged firms have an incentive to invest suboptimally to expropriate wealth from the firms bondholders. This incentive may also induce a positive relation between debt xatios and the capacity of firms to collateralize their debt. If the debt can be
