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1、原文：原文：Pay Enough,Dont Pay Too Much or DontPay at All?The Impact of Bonus Intensity on Job SatisfactionKonstantinosPouliakasThe principal-agent model, with its convincing illustration of the trade-off that arises between risk and incentive provision when attempting to align the Conflicting interests
2、of two contracting parties,remains central for our under- standing of the compensation strategies employed by firms (Mirlees, 1976; Holmstrom, 1979). According to the standard model of agency theory, the introduction of financial incentives as part of an agents remuneration package will increase his
3、/her productivity,as it is assumed that individuals derive utility from income whilst the exertion of effort entails a utility cost.Importantly, if the additional disutility of higher e?ort is compensated byan adequate wage premium ,anim placation of the theoryis that them arginalutilitiesof workers
4、 under fixed and variable compensations chemes should be equalized in the long-run.What this implies is that there should be nodi?erenc ebetweenthejobsatis faction of employees receiving monetary incentives and those on noncontingent payment arrangements,other things equal.The above conclusion has b
5、een disputed by a psychological (and, increas- ingly,economics)literature,which has stressed that the incorporation of nonpecuniary motives into the economic paradigm, such as the desire for reciprocation or for engaging in interesting tasks, has important implications for an individuals motivation
6、and job satisfaction (Deci,1971; Lepperetal. 1973; Deci and Ryan, 1985; Frey, 1986, 1997; Kreps, 1997; Frey and Jegen, 2001). In addition, it has been argued that wrong monetary incentives may ncite dysfunctional behavioural responses by employees (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991; Baker, 1992; Prenderga
7、st, 1999), or have a detrimental effect on employee morale and job security via the inequitable and risky pay distributions that arise as a consequence(Bakeretal.,1988).Once these mechanisms are taken into consideration,it becomes clear that the theoretical impact of monetary incentives on worker ef
8、fort and job satisfaction can be ambiguous. As corroborated in a number of economic experiments (Falk and Kosfeld, 2006; Eriksson and Villeval, 2008), the incentive effects of monetary rewards are likely to becompromised in a world of imperfect labour mobility populated by heterogeneous agents with
9、varying psychological dispositions. To the extent that incentive schemes allow for optimization of effort, facilitate worker autonomy and enhance self-determination they should increase job satisfaction,othe rthings equal.Yet increasing earnings risk, crowding out of the inherent pleasantness in per
10、forming ones job and lower morale can lead to disgruntled employees.The study of the effect of monetary rewards on job satisfaction is therefore an empirical issue, which has only until recently received any attention. In particular, a number of studies have shown that in Britain bonuses result in h
11、igher job satisfaction, although the effect of individual-based performancerelated pay (PRP) systems is not as clear-cut once unobserved heterogeneity is taken into account (Drago et al., 1992; McCausland et al., 2005, Artz, 2008, Green and Heywood,2008;Pouliakas and Theodossiou,2009).Using US data,
12、 Heywood and Wei(2006)have also confirmed that all types of PRP(bar piece rates)yield greater job satisfaction relative to time rates.A potential deficiency of the above-mentioned studies is that they only focus on the discrete difference in job satisfaction between workers receiving PRP and those o
13、n alternative schemes. Thus, they ignore the fact that worker performance and satisfaction may vary according to the magnitude of incentives.As suggested by a series of field experiments performed by Gneezy and Rustichini(2000a,p.802),for all positive but small enough compensaions, there is a reduct
14、ion in performance as compared with the zero compensation, or, better, with the lack of any mention of compensation. Nevertheless,once the extrinsic motivation is large enough,it results in better performance than in the no-incentive case. This non-monotonicity in the reaction of worker effort to bo
15、th positive and negative incentives(e.g.bonuses or fines, respectively) has consequently been termed the W effect of incentives (Gneezy, 2004). By contrast, the recent experimental study of Pokorny (2008) finds an inverse U-shaped relationship between effort levels and incentive intensity.This paper
16、 attempts to test the above contrasting hypotheses by looking beyond the mere incidence of incentive pay and examining the impact of the intensity of incentives (i.e. the proportion of workers salary that is tied to bonuses) on job satisfaction instead.Specifically,10 waves(19982007)of the British Household Panel Survey(BHPS)are used to investigate the association between the power of bonus payments and the utility derived from work, holding the incidence of individual-based P
