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1、STUDYJULY 2017Artificial Intelligence and National SecurityGreg AllenTaniel ChanA study on behalf of Dr. Jason Matheny, Director of the U.S. Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA)BE L F E R CENTER STUDYBelfer Center for Science and International Affairs Harvard Kennedy School 79 JF
2、K Street Cambridge, MA 02138www.belfercenter.orgStatements and views expressed in this report are solely those of the authors and do not imply endorsement by Harvard University, Harvard Kennedy School, the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, or IARPA.Design attacks can be defendedIn
3、 1945, fighter aircraft were roughly 50 times as expensive as a new civilian carBy WW2, only sophisticated orgs. could match state of the art in aero- space tech.One of the first passenger airlines used reconfigured WW1 bombersFactories appear similar to other industry and can be concealedCyberCyber
4、 can damage physical infrastruc- ture and steal key info. but less assuredEven terrorists and criminals can afford quite useful capabilitiesLow-end attacks require minimal expertise; high-end reserved for statesCommercial IT sys- tems can be used for attacks; similar skills in demand for civil/milit
5、aryEven sensitive national security systems are routinely infiltrated without detectionBiotechNatural pandemics have killed tens of millions; bioweapons could alsoEquipment is cheap, though expertise can be expensiveThough different now, at first relatively few people had needed expertiseBiopharma a
6、nd medical industries need similar equip- ment and expertise as bioweaponsWeaponization facilities difficult to distinguish from commercialLowModerateHigh44Artificial Intelligence and National SecurityGovernment Technology Management ApproachIn what is admittedly (and necessarily) a partial oversimp
7、lification, we have classified the U.S. governments management paradigm for each of the four technologies. Our goal here is to clarify how government viewed the nature of the challengeespecially in its early decadesand characterize what approach they ultimately took to meet it. A more detailed justi
8、fication of our analysis is provided in the Appendix. The four approaches are summa- rized in Table 2:Table 2: Government Technology Management ApproachNuclearAll-out effort, government-led development and utilization Extraordinary levels of spending and dedication of national resources to nuclear t
9、echnology continued for many decades after development From 1940 to 1996, 11% of total federal government spend- ing was related to nuclear weapons, even with arms control and voluntary restrictions Initially, nuclear technology was treated as classified regard- less of origin. Illegal to hold paten
10、ts on nuclear.AerospaceGovernment-led public private partnership Heavy government involvement in the aerospace sector with research and development support, acting as an anchor customer, and major regulation Tech. superiority seen as key to national power; govt. restricted access to aerospace tech.
11、using classification and export restrictions Despite predominant government role, the U.S. Aircraft industry remained within the Amerian economic model of capitalism and free enterpriseCyberGovernment “seeding and harvesting“ Govt. heavily involved in supportin R U.S. repeatedly ignores need for saf
12、ety upgrades/investmentAerospaceSuccessAside from brief periods during WW1 and WW2, U.S. was and is undisputed leader in developing and using military aerospace tech.SuccessAfter WW2, the U.S. emerged as the clear winner in building commercial aircraft for the rapidly growing market in air transport
13、ationSuccessMain risks are accidental crashes and attacks from superior air forces, both of which the U.S. has responded to effectivelyCyberSuccessThough cyber domain is not as amenable to dominance as aero- space, the U.S. clearly has leading tech and capabilities in both cyber and defensePartial S
14、uccessU.S. commercial industry leads the world in computing and internet sectors, but U.S. govt. left commer- cial too vulnerable to criminal and nation-state cyber attacksPartial FailureWhile the U.S. developed offensive cyber superiority, the govt. failed for decades to address the asymmetric vuln
15、erability it faced in espionage and attackBiotechN/AU.S. voluntarily disbanded bioweapons program, saying deterrent from nukes was suffi- cient. USSR bioweapons program continued, however.SuccessU.S. has largest biotech industry worldwide and the R Favorable government support of R most risky resear
16、ch was delayed until risks better understood, BWC helpful but had key failures (USSR)46Artificial Intelligence and National SecurityAI Technology Profile: A Worst-case Scenario?Comparing the technology profile of AI with the prior technology cases, we find that it has the potential to be a worst-case scenario. Proper pre- cautions might alter this profile in the future, but current trends
