国际经济学作业答案第九章(2020年10月整理).pptx

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1、Chapter 9 The Political Economy of Trade Theory,95,95,Chapter 9 The Political Economy of Trade Theory,Multiple Choice Questions The efficiency case made for free trade is that as trade distortions such as tariffs are dismantled and removed, government tariff revenue will decrease, and therefore nati

2、onal economic welfare will decrease. government tariff revenue will decrease, and therefore national economic welfare will increase. deadweight losses for producers and consumers will decrease, hence increasing national economic welfare. deadweight losses for producers and consumers will decrease, h

3、ence decreasing national economic welfare. None of the above. Answer: C The opportunity to exploit economies of scale is one of the gains to be made from removing tariffs and other trade distortions. These gains will be found by a decrease in world prices of imports. the consumption distortion loss

4、triangle. the production distortion loss triangle. Both (b) and (c). None of the above. Answer: E It is argued that special interest groups are likely to take over and promote protectionist policies, which may lead to an increase in national economic welfare. This argument leads to a presumption tha

5、t in practice a free trade policy is likely to be better than alternatives. a presumption that trade policy should be shifted to Non-Governmental Organizations, so as to limit taxpayer burden. a presumption that free trade is generally a second-best policy, to be avoided if feasible alternatives are

6、 available. a presumption that free trade is the likely equilibrium solution if the government allows special interest groups to dictate its trade policy. None of the above. Answer: A,96,96Krugman/Obstfeld Seventh Edition The optimum tariff is the best tariff a country can obtain via a WTO negotiate

7、d round of compromises. the tariff, which maximizes the terms of trade gains. the tariff, which maximizes the difference between terms of trade gains and terms of trade loses. not practical for a small country due to the likelihood of retaliation. not practical for a large country due to the likelih

8、ood of retaliation. Answer: E The optimum tariff is most likely to apply to a small tariff imposed by a small country. a small tariff imposed by a large country. a large tariff imposed by a small country. a large tariff imposed by a large country. None of the above. Answer: B The prohibitive tariff

9、is a tariff that is so high that it eliminates imports. is so high that it causes undue harm to trade-partner economies. is so high that it causes undue harm to import competing sectors. is so low that the government prohibits its use since it would lose an important revenue source. None of the abov

10、e. Answer: A The existence of marginal social benefits which are not marginal benefits for the industry producing the import substitutes is an argument supporting free trade and non-governmental involvement. is an argument supporting the use of an optimum tariff. is an argument supporting the use of

11、 market failures as a trade-policy strategy. is an argument rejecting free trade and supporting governmental involvement. None of the above. Answer: D The domestic market failure argument is a particular case of the theory of the optimum, or first-best. the second best. the third best. the sufficing

12、 principle. None of the above. Answer: B,Chapter 9 The Political Economy of Trade Theory,97,97,The difficulty of ascertaining the right second-best trade policy to follow reinforces support for the third-best policy approach. reinforces support for increasing research capabilities of government agen

13、cies. reinforces support for abandoning trade policy as an option. reinforces support for free-trade options. None of the above. Answer: D The authors of the text believe that second-best policy is worse than optimal policy. special interest groups generally enhance national welfare. national welfar

14、e is likely to be enhanced by the imposition of an optimal tariff. market Failure arguments tend to support free-trade policy. there is no such thing as national welfare. Answer: E The simple model of competition among political parties long used by political scientists tends to lead to the practica

15、l solution of selecting the optimal tariff. prohibitive tariff. zero (free-trade) tariff. the tariff rate favored by the median voter. None of the above. Answer: D The median voter model works well in the area of trade policy. is not intuitively reasonable. tends to result in biased tariff rates. do

16、es not work well in the area of trade policy. None of the above. Answer: D The fact that trade policy often imposes harm on large numbers of people, and benefits only a few may be explained by the lack of political involvement of the public. the power of advertisement. the problem of collective action. the basic impossibility of the democratic system to reach a fair solution. None of the above. Answer: C,98,98Krugman/Obstfeld Seventh Edition Protectionism tends to be concentrated in two sectors:

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