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1、公司治理與高階經營團隊,ISU 企四B 策略管理 Lecture 10 2009.12.02,公司治理定義,The relationship among stakeholders that is used to determine and control the strategic direction and performance of organizations Mechanisms by which stakeholders of a corporation exercise control over corporate insiders and management such that
2、 their interests are protected (John & Senbet, 1998) 使企業體透過法律的制衡管控與設計，在企業所有權與經營權分離的組織體系當中，有效監督其組織活動，以及如何健全其組織運作，防止脫法行為之經營舞弊，以實現企業社會責任之高度目標（OECD）,Implications from Definitions (1),Protect whos interest? Stakeholder （利害關係人) or Shareholder (股東） What are the purposes for board? Identifying ways to ensur
3、e that strategic decisions are made effectively Reflecting and enforcing the company values Ensuring that the interest of top-level managers are aligned with the interests of the shareholders,Implications from Definitions (2),Separation of Ownership and Management Agency theory （代理理論） Managers are t
4、he agent of firms owners (principle) Managerial opportunism The mechanism of aligning the interest of managers and firms owners Agency cost & Governance mechanism The control role of directors Imperfect means of controlling managerial opportunism,Implications from Definitions (3),代理理論 代理理論討論的是當主理人（p
5、rinciple）必須委託代理人（agent）執行特定事務時，代理人因為投機主義或自己利益考量，可能與主理人利益發生不一致現象，進而可能造成主理人利益的損失 大型現代公司因為所有權與經營權分離，造成經理人員（代理人）與股東（主理人）之間可能存在代理問題，是多數代理理論所討論的代理關係。,Implications from Definitions (4),利害關係人 利益會受到企業營運所影響的成員 內部利害關係人：如股東、員工、管理者、董事會成員 外部利害關係人：顧客、供應商、政府、社區、銀行、特定社會大眾 確認誰是利害關係人，並且以其重要性，加以管理 各國法令保護利害關係人的規定與程度均有所不
6、同,Corporate Governance Mechanisms: Ownership Concentration,Large-block shareholders Own at least 5% of a corporate shares Family, Founder, Institution, Managers Ownership and Monitoring 股權愈分散，監督力愈薄弱，經理人員會愈傾向採取投機行為 進行高度非相關多角化 盲目擴大企業的規模 在職消費 股權集中，監督力就比較好嗎？ 利益收斂觀點 V.S. 掠奪觀點,Corporate Governance Mechani
7、sms: Ownership Concentration,Institutional Owners （機構股東，或法人股東） The active role for institutional owners The incentives of institutional owners The attitude of institutions in takeover Managerial Owners （經營權與所有權集中） Link the managerial pay with the performance of a firm The attitude of managers in age
8、ncy theory and stewardship theory（管家理論） 當經營權與所有權集中時，經理人員就好像股東的管家一樣，切實守護公司資產,Corporate Governance Mechanisms: Board of Directors （董事會）,A group of elected individuals Act in the owners interests by formally monitoring and controlling the corporations TMT Classifications of Directors Insiders, related
9、outsiders, outsiders The compositions of directors The Effectiveness of the Board The collective function of board,董事會特質,Composition（組成） Inside & outside directors, Male & female Characteristics （特徵） Age variation, Background diversity Process （董事會運作過程） How the board is held? Trust & conflict among
10、directors Structure （董事會結構） Specialization, formality, centrality,董事會角色,Service Service for Stakeholder or shareholder Strategic Contribution Establish the Major Strategic Directions Control Monitor TMT, CEO succession, CEO Compensation Business Ethics Maintain the ethics and Corporate Value,Corpora
11、te Governance Mechanisms: 高階經理人薪酬設計,A kind of Governance Mechanism Based on the argument of agency theory Seeks to align the interests of managers and owners through salaries, bonuses, and long-term incentive compensation Compensation committee Level of pay vary by regions Deficit of compensation ba
12、sed on stock or stock options,Corporate Governance Mechanisms: 市場治理機制,Market for Corporate Control Takeover, merger and acquisition Often Trigger by poor performance Deficiency of external corporate control 管理者抵抗惡意收購的技巧 Golden parachute （金色降落傘） Poison pill （毒藥丸） Greenmail （綠色郵件）,International Corpor
13、ate Governance: Germany,No Agency Problem The owner and the manager are the same Bank is at the center: Monitoring & Controlling Two-tiered Board Structure Management board: Executive the function of direction & management Supervisory tier: Appointment to the management board, executed by union memb
14、ers, employees,International Corporate Governance: Japan,The Importance of Obligation, Family and Consensus Keiretsu （經連） as a system of relationship investments（和台灣的集團企業類似） Employee is one member of the company family Consensus among TMT or Board of directors Bank plays important role Bank-based fi
15、nancing and monitoring The changing of corporate governance in Japan,International Corporate Governance: America,The Separation of Ownership and Management The agency problem The Important Role of CEO Individualism culture The Committee in Board of Directors The Restricted Role of Bank in Corporate
16、Governance,International Corporate Governance: Comparison,Corporate Governance in Taiwan,The Family-owned structure The non-separation of Ownership and management The monitoring and controlling role of board of directors is restricted CEO succession is restricted on the family membership The relationship among shareholders, directors and managers is different from America Stewardship theory is useful or not?,Corporate Governance in Taiwan,The Dominance of the Family in the business is totally de
