《FIDIC合同清华-讲义.ppt》由会员分享，可在线阅读，更多相关《FIDIC合同清华-讲义.ppt（267页珍藏版）》请在金锄头文库上搜索。
1、FIDIC合同条款解读与应用实务 （包括对提升国内项目合约管理水平的启示）,香港中信裕联投资有限公司 田威 tianwei,一、继续教育的重要性,先提一个问题： 什么是教育？ 你的答案是什么？ 孔子：有教无类 vs Caste system 我最欣赏的答案是 ,每个企业高管都是一本书 我的原则是给大家讲故事，也就是真实案例（都是我亲自处理过的项目），再与大家分享并探讨相关思考。 所有条款原本是英文，但我给大家用中文讲，同时给出英文的原件，并提供一些常用的英文例函，供大家做第一线业务时可以直接就作为参考资料（也可安排另外就此再开一个专门的实用课程），方便拿来即用。 互动 + 启发。 身边的案例
2、，梁定邦的故事，etc.,二、什么是FIDIC？,在合同文本的选择上，业主（咨询工程师）占据主导地位是一个必须面对的客观现实，投标项目尤其如此 在实践中一定要学会主动向有经验的过来人请教，商务上是否靠谱，技术上是否可行，从而有效规避风险。 FIDIC是法文Fdration Internationale des Ingnieurs-Conseils的缩写，中文常译为“菲迪克”。1913年成立。 源于英国的ICE合同，英文是工作语言，99版第1.4款/77版和87版第 5.1款。例如，在99版第14款/77版和87版第60款中， Interim Statement, Interim Certifi
3、cate, Interim Payment 与中文“验工计价”的不同。 ICE 1945 年颁布，此后修订分別在1951 年（第二版）、1955 年（第四版）、1973（第五版）、1991 年（第六版）；JCT（房屋建筑）； FIDIC 1957（第一版，红皮书），此后修订分別在1969 年（第二版）、1977 年（第三版）、1987 年（第四版）、1988 年（第四版修订版）、1992 年（第四版再次修订版）及1999 年（第一版，First Edition 1999）。 操作层面上的“三步曲”：走出去，走进去（海外市场立足），走上去（不断提升），重要的是最终还要回得来！出世英雄 vs 全身
4、而退 走出去，要接轨 “一带一路”的机会 vs 亚洲基础设施投资银行,FIDIC约每十年会做一次大的修订，其合同内容集合工业发达国家建筑业上百年的经验以及各合约范本之大成，是把工程技术、法律、经济和项目管理等有机结合起来的一个合同条件，故又称为国际工程合同之“圣经”。 FIDIC红皮书编制过程严谨，有相当的权威性，基本上是国际工程惯例之具体反应，其特点是风险分担比较公平，故可作为比对某项工程合同是否公平合理之重要参考。 ICE pro-Employer，1818年成立，完全买方市场； FIDIC pro-Contractor，香港的真实案例。 99版的特点：把87版和77版的72个条款合并同类
5、项后变成20个条款（新红皮书、新黄皮书和银皮书都是20个条款，绿皮书是15个条款）。 FIDIC是合同的标准范本，是法律文件，不是IT，不是高科技。FIDIC受普通法的影响很深。,FIDIC vs The Vickrey Auction (Uniform Second-price),The uniform second-price auction is commonly called the Vickrey Auction, named after William Vickrey, winner of the 1996 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences, who
6、 classified it in the 1960s. It is a sealed-bid English auction（拍卖） (ascending-price; vs Dutch auction（投标）, descending price) with an important concept that the highest bidder wins but only pays at the second-highest bid price. Why is the Vickrey Auction significant? Because it is designed to induce
7、 truthful-revelation This variation over the normal bidding procedure is supposed to encourage bidders to bid the largest amount they are willing to pay. Most auctions are first-price auctions with either open-outcry or sealed bid format. The winner is the highest bidder, and correspondingly pays th
8、eir bid.,Like the first-price auction, each bidder is ignorant of other bids while the bids are sealed (instead of open-outcried, NOTE: it is imperative to seal the bid). But the item is awarded only to highest bidder at a price equal to the second-highest bid (or highest unsuccessful bid). In a sea
9、led-bid auction, bidders generally try to shade their bids slightly under their true valuation of the product, thereby creating an opportunity to win the auction and pay less than their valuation (profit-oriented). Bidders do this to avoid the problem of “winners curse”: an idea that the winner of a
10、n auction generally overvalues the product and he will be the final loser. Nonetheless, auction sellers do not wish for players to shade their bids and have developed alternative-style auctions (William Vickreys observation and Theory). In other words, a winner pays less than the highest bid. If, fo
11、r example, bidder A bids $10, bidder B bids $15, and bidder C offers $20, bidder C ($20) would win, however he would only pay the price at the second-highest bid ($15), namely bidder B.,Q and A,BUT What about changing the format just a little and having a second-price, open-outcry auction? In such a
12、 case, participants could bid in the ascending (say English way) format and the winner would ultimately pay the price of the second-highest bid. One might imagine that such an auction would have much the same results as a typical English (ascending, open-outcry) auction, but, in fact, an auction lik
13、e that would be easy to manipulate. Imagine bidder A bidding $25 for an item worth $100. Some other bidder could quite easily and safely bid $750, knowing that no one will bid more and that he will safely get it by only paying $25. It is clearly imperative to seal the bid in a Vickrey Auction instea
14、d of open-outcry.,Again expounding Example of William Vickrey Theory: Assume a Vickrey Auction for 2 Super Bowl Tickets（National Football League, USA） Your own personal valuation of these tickets is $3,000. What would happen if you place a bid greater than $3,000 (for example, $3,100) hoping to incr
15、ease your chances of winning, and knowing that you only need to pay the second highest bid if you win ? 1st scenario: the second highest bid is $2,800; you win the tickets with your bid of $3,100, and pay $2,800. This is the same outcome if you had bid $3,000. 2nd scenario: the second highest bid is
16、 $3,050; you win the tickets with your bid of $3,100, but you pay $3,050. This price is greater than your valuation and therefore is a bad outcome. 3rd scenario: the second highest bid is $3,200; you lose the tickets with your bid of $3,100. But you would have lost with a bid of $3,000 as well.,Now assume that your bid is less than $3,000 (for example, $2,900) hoping to win the tickets at a lower price. 1st scenario: the second highest bid is $2,800; you win
