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1、南京财经大学 硕士学位论文 终极控制人视角的现金持有量影响因素与价值分析 姓名：赵卫斌 申请学位级别：硕士 专业：会计系 指导教师：王玉春 2008-12-23 IV 摘摘 要要 国内外学者主要从权衡理论、 信息不对称理论和公司治理结构理论展开对现 金持有量影响因素的研究。在总结国内外学者相关文献的基础上，本文对权衡理 论、信息不对称理论和公司治理结构理论进行了简要分析，认为在我国应用相关 理论解释企业现金持有量，必须考虑制度背景的差异。 从企业多元化的产权主体出发，本文引入企业终极控制人进行分析。通过分 析比较终极控制人与控股股东的区别，得出终极控制人性质不同，企业日常经营 机制存在显著不同
2、，导致公司的财务特征、公司治理环境呈现巨大差异。按照权 衡理论、信息不对称理论和公司治理结构理论，当公司的财务特征、公司治理环 境不同时，企业现金持有量影响因素也不同。 本文以沪深两市 A 股制造业上市公司作为研究样本，以 2006 年全年为研究 区间，按终极控制人性质，将上市公司分为中央政府控制、地方政府控制和非政 府控制三类。通过实证研究发现，公司现金持有水平的影响因素和相关性因终极 控制人性质不同而不同。 中央政府控制上市公司现金持有量的影响因素有现金流 量、融资成本和代理成本，地方政府控制上市公司的影响因素有现金流量、融资 成本、现金替代物、财务杠杆和银行债务比重，非政府控制上市公司的
3、影响因素 是现金流量、投资机会、融资成本、现金替代物、财务杠杆、债务期限结构和独 立董事比例。 现金流量和融资成本对不同性质终极控制人的上市公司具有相同方 向的影响，但变量回归系数存在较大差异，显示其对现金持有量的影响力度是不 同的。 而融资成本与现金持有量负相关， 则是与经典理论研究的结论完全相反的， 这也体现了我国制度环境的特殊性。 不同性质终极控制人上市公司现金持有量影响因素不同， 其市场价值也有显 著差异。对于中央政府、地方政府和非政府控制上市公司，现金持有量的边际价 值差异明显，中央政府控制上市公司现金持有边际价值最高，地方政府控制上市 公司次之，非政府控制上市公司最小。本文分析认为
4、这一价值的差异，与企业财 务特征、公司治理环境有关，也与我国当前国有资本的战略调整与布局有关。 关键词：终极控制人 现金持有量 现金持有价值 V ABSTRACT Scholars around the world reseached the determines of firm cash holdings mainly from three theories fields: trade-off theory, information asymmetry theory and corporate governance theory.This paper sums up the relative
5、 literatures and analyses these theories in brief, believes that discoversthe determints of cash holdings in China cant apply to these theories simply instead integrates the countrys unique institutional background. Since there are plural property subjects in China economy system, its necessary draw
6、 to the concept of ultimate controller to analyse the determints of firm cash holdings. The ultimate controller is different with the the controlling shareholder.For listed companies, if the ultimate controller are different, copanies financial character and corporate governance are different. In th
7、e light of trade-off theory, information asymmetry theory and corporate governance theory, while financial characteristic and corporate governance are different, determining factors for cash holdings are not same. This paper selects listed companies in manufacturing industry which issuing A share an
8、d went public before Dec 31,2005 as sample companies, the whole year of 2006 as research period.All sample companies were traded normally in the research period. Sample companies are classified according to the characteristic of the ultimate controller.That is to say, sample companies belong to cent
9、ral government controller,local government controller or non-govermental controller.Empirical research suggest that determining factors for cash holdings are different because the ultimate controller are different.For sample companies controlled by central government, determining factors are cash fl
10、ow, financing cost and agency cost. If sample companies controlled by local government, determining factors are cash flow, financing cost, cash substitution, the proportion of bank debt and financial leverage. In contrast, for sample companies controlled by non-governmental controller, determining f
11、actors are cash flow, financing cost , cash substitution,financial leverage, invest opportunity, maturity structure of debt and the ratio of independent director in the board. Although some factors have same influence direction on companies controlled by different ultimate controller, the difference
12、 of variables regression coefficient imply that influencing factors magnitude is different. But the financing cost is negatively associated with cash holdings for all sample companies that is opposite to the traditional conclusion illusrates that companies in China face special VI institutional envi
13、ronment. This paper also shows that companies controlled by different ultimate controller, the value of cash holdings is different.For companies controlled by central government, local government and non-governmental controller, the marginal value of cash reserve is different distinctly.The conclusi
14、on indicates that marginal value of cash holdings for sample companies controlled by central government is highest, followed by sample companies controlled by local government, marginal value of cash holdings for sample companies controlled by non-governmental controller is least. After analysis, th
15、is paper attributes it to the firms financial characteristic and corpotate governance as well as the current strategic adjustment and deployment for state-own capital. KEY WORDS: ultimate controller，cash holdings, value for cash holdings III 学位论文独创性声明学位论文独创性声明 本论文是我个人在导师指导下进行的研究工作及取得的研究成果。 论文 中除了特别加
16、以标注和致谢的地方外， 不包含其他人或其它机构已经发表或 撰写过的研究成果。 其他同志对本研究的启发和所做的贡献均已在论文中作 了明确的声明并表示了谢意。 作者签名： 日期： 学位论文使用授权声明学位论文使用授权声明 本人完全了解南京财经大学有关保留、使用学位论文的规定，即：学校有权 保留送交论文的复印件，允许论文被查阅和借阅；学校可以公布论文的全部或部 分内容，可以采用影印、缩印或其它复制手段保存论文。保密的论文在解密后遵 守此规定。 作者签名： 导师签名： 日期： 南京财经大学硕士学位论文 1 第 1 章 绪论 1.1 问题提出和研究意义问题提出和研究意义 现金是公司中流动性最强的资产，如果公司缺乏足够的现金储备，其流动性 就会面临巨大冲击，但现金同时也是企业所拥有的获利水平最低的资产。现金管 理的基本目标是力求做到既要保证企业在生产经营活动中有足够的现金， 使得企 业的生产经营活动能正常地进行，以降低企业的经营风险、财务风险，又要加快 资金周转，使闲置的现金余额最少，最大限度地降低持有现金的成本，提高企业
