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1、 Number 162 | April 26, 2012 Asia Pacifi c Bulletin Reluctant India, Rising China and Alliance Politics in the Asia-Pacific BY YOGESH JOSHI US President Barack Obama used his 2012 State of the Union speech to explain that evolving geopolitical realities continue to make the United States indispensab
2、le in global politics. In the Asia-Pacific this indispensability emanates, in part, from the waves caused by the rise of China. Consequently, demands for an increased US presence echo around the region. In response, the United States has renewed its commitments to Japan, South Korea and Australia, s
3、tepped up its relations with Southeast Asia, and reasserted itself as an important player in multilateral institutions including the East Asia Summit, APEC, and ASEAN. Clearly, in the 21st century, US strategic focus has shifted from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific and Indian Oceans. This new stra
4、tegic focus from Washington warrants new strategic allies. One country that has increasingly figured in the US calculus is India. US-India realignment began in earnest during the presidency of George W. Bush, when the United States offered India a civil nuclear deal, in defiance to the Non-Prolifera
5、tion Treaty. The strategic goal was to strengthen India s stature in the region as an effective US aligned counterweight to China. India s rapid economic transformation and its shared political and democratic values with the United States made this proposition extremely attractive. Since then India
6、has reserved a special place in the US plan of action throughout the Asia-Pacific. Two recent developments further verify this tendency. First is the US-Japan-India strategic dialogue which was initiated last December, and second is the importance attached to India in a new Pentagon report: Sustaini
7、ng US Global Leadership - Priorities for 21st Century Defense. The report states that “The United States is also investing in a long-term strategic partnership with India to support its ability to serve as a regional economic anchor and provider of security in the broader Indian Ocean region.” A clo
8、ser military and strategic relationship with the United States and other like- minded nations would be in India s interests. Given India s long-running boundary dispute with China, it is highly concerned with China s rapid military modernization and increasing force projection capabilities, along wi
9、th its military infrastructure build-up in Tibet. Furthermore, China s unflinching support to Pakistan including the proliferation of nuclear and missile technology continues to imperil India s security. In addition, India s granting of refuge to the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government in exile is
10、 seen as a hostile act by China. For these reasons it would be prudent for India to seek active military alliances with the United States and other like-minded countries. Moreover, India s standing as the world s largest democracy with its values and respect for the rule of law makes it a natural al
11、ly for other democracies including the United States, Japan, Australia, and others. Yogesh JoshiYogesh Joshi, Ph.D Candidate in International Politics at Jawaharlal Nehru University, explains that “Balance of power politics through military alliances neither fit India s style of foreign policy nor d
12、o they help India realize her goals vis- vis China.” More at EastWestCenter.org/APB Asia Pacifi c Bulletin Asia Pacifi c Bulletin However, India s actual behavior and actions suggest otherwise. Even though there is a lot of expectation in Washington for India to assume a more active role as a region
13、al balancer vis-vis China, New Delhi is far less eager to pursue this position against its northern neighbor. India has consistently tried to avoid getting trapped into alliance politics and military blocs targeting China initiated by the United States and others in the Asia-Pacific region. Back in
14、2007, when Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe mooted the idea of an arc of democracies involving the United States, Australia, India and Japan, New Delhi was the first to retract from any such formation lest it became the target of Chinese ire. India has also been a reluctant participant in the rece
15、ntly concluded trilateral strategic dialogue with the United States and Japan. Furthermore, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh s statement on maintaining equidistant from the United States and China during his recent visit to South Korea underlines India s reluctance to engage strategically with the Unit
16、ed States and its allies. Surprisingly, when India is itself on the cusp of being a major power in the international system, it is again embracing non-alignment as a viable foreign policy strategy: Non-Alignment Part Two. Three factors shed some light on this matter. First is the cardinal principle of complete autonomy in guiding India s foreign policy decisions. US alliance politics works through a “hub-and-spoke” system with the United States at the center and othe
