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1、Strategies and Organizations组织架构与公司战略定位管理经济学1The field of business strategy is to explain sustained differences in the performance of firms that compete with one another in delivering products and in developing the ability to do so more effectively over time.在剧烈竞争的市场中，企业如何获得并保持高于竞争对手的盈利管理经济学2Source:
2、 Compustat, Value Line, Marakon Associates AnalysisAverage Economic Profits of U.S. Industry Groups, 1978-19961978至至1996年美国各行业平均经济利润率年美国各行业平均经济利润率Value Line Industry Groups管理经济学3The “Five Forces Framework for Industry Analysis “五种竞争力量的行业分析框架潜在竞争对手潜在竞争对手供给商供给商行业现有竞争者行业现有竞争者替代品竞争者替代品竞争者购置者购置者管理经济学4Sou
3、rce: Compustat, Value Line, Marakon Associates AnalysisROE-Ke Spread(30%)(20%)(10%)0%10%20%30%40%$0$1$2$3$4$5$6$7$8$9$10$11$12$13$14$15Great Northern IronWorthington IndsNucorSteel TechnologiesOregon MillsCommercial MetalsCarpenterBirminghamBritish Steel PLCCleveland-CliffsQuanexLukensACME MetalsAmp
4、coUSX-US SteelInland SteelArmcoWHX BethlehemAverage Invested Equity ($B)Average Economic Profits of Individual Firms in the Steel Industry, 1978 1996 1978至至1996年美国钢铁行业中各企业的平均利润率年美国钢铁行业中各企业的平均利润率管理经济学5Source: Compustat, Value Line, Marakon Associates AnalysisROE-Ke Spread(80%)(60%)(40%)(20%)0%20%40%6
5、0%$0$5$10$15$20$25$30SmithKlineGlaxoAmericanHomeProductsAmgenMerckSchering PloughWatsonBristolMyersRhone-PoulencMylan LabsWarner LambertEli LillyPfizerPerrigoPharmacia & UpjohnForest LabsAlzaICNSchererIvaxGenetechBiogenRobertsGenzymeDuraChironCephalonGensiaCygnusImmunexAverage Invested Equity ($B)Av
6、erage Economic Profits of Individual Firms in the Drug Industry, 1978 -19961978至至1996年美国制药行业中各企业的平均利润率年美国制药行业中各企业的平均利润率管理经济学6Competitive Advantages竞争优势Competitive Advantage竞争优势竞争优势Lower Cost低成本低成本Differentiation差异化差异化管理经济学7How to achieve competitive advantages?如何获得竞争优势lA firm obtains cost advantage
7、(or achieves product differentiation) through efficient organization of activities involving units within the firm, suppliers, customers, and even competitors. l有效地组织生产，包括与公司内各部门、供给商、客户及竞争对手的关系，是竞争优势的来源管理经济学8Three examples三个例子lAirbus v. Boeing 空中客车空中客车 对 波音波音lToyota v. GM 丰田丰田 对 通用汽车通用汽车lMcDonalds 麦
8、当劳麦当劳管理经济学9Two approaches for organizing production activities两种组织生产的方式lthe organizational approach and the contractual approachl 自造及外包lWhat are the tradeoffs between the organizational approach compared with the contractual approach? l两种方法的比较管理经济学10Holdup套牢verticalIntegration纵向整合externalContractor外
9、部合同加工者moral hazardinternal monopolylack of scale economies鼓励问题内部垄断缺乏规模经济Make or buy?自造还是外包?管理经济学11Organizations and business strategies组织形式和竞争优势的关系lMake production differentiationl自造 差异化道路lBuy cost advantagel外包 低本钱优势管理经济学12Holdup套牢l Conflict of interest 利益冲突l Contractual incompleteness 不完全合同l Relati
10、onship-specific investment 专用投资l Renegotiation 重新谈判管理经济学13Resolving Holdup如何防止被套牢lavoid specific investments l 防止专用投资lwrite more detailed contracts l 合同要具体详细管理经济学14Moral Hazard鼓励问题lconflict of interest 利益冲突lasymmetric information about effort 不了解具体努力程度管理经济学15Resolving Moral Hazard如何解决鼓励问题lincentive
11、schemel 鼓励机制lconditional payment l 有条件的付款lQuota l 指标lmonitoring system l 监督系统管理经济学16Incentive vs Risk鼓励对风险Efficient scheme balances 有效的鼓励方案会平衡:benefits of more effort 积极性的提高 costs of risk bearing 承担风险的本钱管理经济学17Motivating Dennis Rodman如何使美国职业篮球界的坏孩子变好l1996: under guaranteed contract, he played only 5
12、5 of 82 regular season contests, and got paid $2.96m for games he didnt play in.l1997: a new contract of $10.5m, but only $4.5m guaranteed / $0.5m for winning NBA rebounding title / $185,000 per game after the 59th game / In the end, he played 80 of the 1997s 82 games, and got $10.1m.管理经济学18AT&T Inc
13、entive SchemeAT&T的总裁鼓励方案l1995: AT&T awarded CEO Robert E. Allen options for 108,000 shares at $43.94 exercise price l1995年: AT&T(美国电报及 公司)奖励总裁Robert E. Allen 108000股的期权管理经济学19Relative Performance相对绩效lemployment - promote the best worker l 雇用提拔最正确雇员lsports - gold, silver, bronze l 体育金银铜牌管理经济学20Incent
14、ive Pay for Portfolio Managers at Harvard Management Company哈佛大学资产管理公司采用相对绩效鼓励方案Case Study 案例案例管理经济学21Introduction回报远远高过基准回报lFounded in 1974 to manage the endowment of Harvard UniversitylAs of the end of 2000, this endowment totaled about $19 billion. Jack Meyer, the president, oversaw 185 employees
15、, of which 45 were portfolio managerslIn the five (ten) year period ending in 2001, the annual return on Harvards endowment was 16.9% (16.5%) while the annual median performance of large institutional funds was 11.0% (11.9%).管理经济学22HMC compensation plan薪酬方案三局部：根本工资、中性奖金、浮动奖金lThe compensation structu
16、re for internal managers of public securities at HMC consisted of three components:Basic salary ($200K, not-a-risk)Neutral bonus ($100K, at-risk)Incentive bonus (at-risk,based on performance, relative to the benchmark. Could be positive or negative)管理经济学23Neutral bonus ($100,000)管理不善，中性奖金可扣除lThe neu
17、tral bonus was netted against the incentive bonus for annual payment. If the incentive bonus was zero or positive, the FULL neutral bonus would be paid. If the incentive bonus was negative, the neutral bonus would be reduced accordingly, down to a minimum of zero. 管理经济学24Incentive bonus超过基准回报一个百分点可获
18、50万美金浮动奖金lThe parameters for the incentive bonus included a pre-set, upside limit (a cap of $2,000,000) and an incentive bonus rate of $500,000 (or charged to the manager) for each 1% of performance above (or below) the specified benchmark. 管理经济学25Carryforward of incentive bonus超过上限的浮动奖金暂放在蓄水池里lIf t
19、he incentive pay earned in a particular year exceeded the cap, the excess was carried forward, i.e., invested in the endowment and payable at the end of the next fiscal year. The carryforward bonus and the endowment return on the carryforward were subject to a clawback for underperformance and were
20、also subject (along with the currently payable portion of the current years incentive) to the maximum incentive cap. 管理经济学26Withholding on incentive bonus低于上限的浮动奖金,其中30%也放在蓄水池里lThirty percentage of any positive incentive bonus (post-carryforward) was withheld, invested in the endowment, and payable
21、at the end of the next fiscal year. The withheld bonus and the endowment return on the withheld bonus were subject to a clawback for underperformance but were not subject to the maximum cap. 管理经济学27Negative incentive bonus假设回报低于基准回报，需从蓄水池及本年度中性奖金中扣除lNegative incentive bonuses were netted against car
22、ryforward bonuses, endowment returns on carryforward bonuses, withheld incentive bonuses, endowment returns on withheld bonuses, and the neutral bonus in the order listed. Negative incentive bonuses in excess of these bonuses and endowment returns were not carried forward.管理经济学28Multiple Responsibil
23、ities I多重责任 IExamples: high-school teachers, university professors, Hong Kong mini bus drivers例如: 中学老师, 大学教授, 香港小巴驾驶员管理经济学29Multiple Responsibilities II多重责任IIlstrong incentive induces more effort on that dimension but less effort on other dimensions l 假设有强烈的鼓励机制引导某一个方面责任, 那么其他责任会被无视lequal incentive
24、principle l 对等鼓励的原那么llow-powered contracts l 采用较弱的绩效指标lOWNERSHIP l 所有权变化管理经济学30Big Macs Pay Plans麦当劳自营店经理的薪酬方案麦当劳自营店经理的薪酬方案Case Study 案例案例管理经济学311963 Plan 1963年的薪酬方案lBonus based on sales increasel奖金基于销售额的增加lindependent of managers controll不可控制的因素llack of concern for cost controll对本钱控制的忽略管理经济学321964-
25、67 Plan 1964至1967年的薪酬方案lBonus based on subjective evaluations奖金基于主观评估管理经济学331967 Plan1967年的薪酬方案lBasic salaries tied to the satisfaction of QSC standardsl满足QSC(产品质量,优质效劳,店堂清洁)是获得根本工资的必要条件lQuarterly bonus for profit contribution, which depends more on increased revenue (volume) than on cost control. l
26、季度奖金取决于利润的增加管理经济学341972 plan 1972年的薪酬方案lThree ranges of fixed salary depending on the cost of livingl根本工资与生活本钱指数挂钩lQuarterly bonuses forllabor costs (5% of base salary)lfood and paper costs (5% of base salary)lQSC objectives (up to 10% of base salary)l2.5% of sales increase (up to 10% of base salary
27、)l季度奖金基于劳工本钱、食物及纸张本钱、lQSC指标及销售额的增加管理经济学35Questions 思考问题lWhats McDonalds business strategy? 麦当劳的经营策略对自营店经理薪酬方案的影响lcompensation based on QSC and costs alone (“cost centers)? 自营店可否成为专注于QSC的本钱中心？lcompensation for training of new managers 如何提高自营店经理培训新经理或特许经营者的积极性?lcompensation based on sales or sales inc
28、rease? 奖金是基于销售额还是销售额的增加lobjective performance valuations only? 难道奖金只能基于客观评估？ 管理经济学36The Goldman Sachs IPO高盛集团首次公开募股高盛集团首次公开募股Case Study 案例案例管理经济学37A Family Business家族业务家族业务l1869: M. Goldman/commercial paper 1869年：债券l1880: $100K capital/$30 million turnover 1880年：10万美元资本/3000万美元营业额l1882: teamed up wi
29、th Sachs (son-in-law) 1882年：与女婿Sachs合伙l1896: joined NYSE 1896年：参加纽约股票交易所l1900: $2.5 million capital 1900年：250万资本l1906: handled first IPO 1906年：第一次接手公司首次公开募股业务管理经济学38One Bad Year & 30 Good Years1年差光景与年差光景与30年好时光年好时光l1929: a mutual fund established in 28 fell from a height of $326 in Oct, 29 to $ 1.75
30、 in Nov, 29. 1928年创立的互惠基金从1929年10月326美元下跌到1929lSidney Weinberg Era: 1930-1969 Sidney Weinberg 时代：1930年-1969年lsit on more than 30 boards, and attended 250 board meetings per year for more than 20 years 坐镇30多个董事会，连续20多年每年参加250个董事会议lcultivated a first-rate client list, and landed the Ford IPO deal ($65
31、0m) in 1956 赢得了一流客户，1956年帮助福特成功首次公开募股6.5亿美元管理经济学39Gus Levy Era: 1969-1976 Gus Levy 时代：时代：1969年年-1976年年lRisk taker 爱冒风险lone-hour management committee meetings reduced to 15 minutes 管理委员会会议从一小时缩短到15分钟lPenn Central Railways default on $87 million commercial paper/45 law suits for not disclosing the cli
32、ents financial information/unlimited liability for 45 partners/settlements Penn Central Railway8700万美元债券拖欠/高盛因不披露客户财务信息而收到45项起诉/45个合伙人负担无限责任/庭外解决管理经济学40John Weinberg/John Whitehead: 1976-1990lmanagement committee 恢复管理委员会lshort-term profit/long-term relations 不是考虑短期利润而是长期关系lreckless risk-taking (maki
33、ng bridge loans, buying junk bonds, and putting capital in takeovers)/cautious business development l 莽担风险过桥贷款，购置垃圾债券，公司资金直接参与兼并业务/谨慎地开展业务lwhite-knight strategy in M&A l 在企业并购中扮演救难英雄的角色管理经济学41Partnership合伙人制度合伙人制度lHiring quality people/internal promotion not lateral hires/low turnovers/first 10 year
34、s of 14-18 hours with salaries lower than rival public firms for the elusive prize of a partnership (8-figure compensation)/partner selection every two years/partner compensation based on seniority not performance/teamwork and loyalty 聘用高素质的员工/高管人员主要来自公司员工的内部提拔/低人员流动率/开始10年每天工作14-18小时而工资却低于同行水平，为的是成
35、为合伙人后难以置信的薪酬/每两年挑选一次合伙人/合伙人的薪金基于资历而非业绩/强调团队精神和对公司的忠诚度管理经济学42Friedman and Rubin Era: 1990-1994lNot competitive compensation/exodus of talented people/lateral hiring/grading partners/emotional toll/performance pay 93/360 degree review/no risk no return and hence principal transaction (Rubins idea)/$88
36、6 m profit in 90, $1b in 91, and $1.46b by 11/92 薪水不具有竞争力/高素质员工大量流失/开始从外部招募高管人员/对合伙人进行评估/士气低弱/1993年全面使用绩效工资/360度的评估/没有风险没有回报，公司进行直接投资/1990年8.86亿美元利润，1991年10亿美元，1992管理经济学43Substantial losses in 19941994年巨额亏损年巨额亏损ldeparture of 30% of the partnership by 11/94/Goldmans assets dropped from $115b end of 9
37、3 to $95b end of 94 截止1994年11月，30%的合伙人离开公司，带走了大量资金/ 高盛集团资产从1993年底的1150亿美元跌至1994年底的950亿美元l“You cant run a multinational global business on partnership capital. “不能仅依靠合伙人资金来经营一个全球化的业务管理经济学44Corzine on Partnership Corzine对合伙人制的看法对合伙人制的看法lAn economic system in which 1.5-1.75% of the people capture a hig
38、h percentage of the upside in good times and adjust the other 98.5% of the participants compensation and jobs on the downside is selfish. 1.5-1.75% 的人在年景好时占有大局部盈利，效益差时那么对其他98.5%的员工减薪或解雇，这种制度太自私lThe number of partners increased from 120 in 90 to 180 in 95/the average share per partner decreased signi
39、ficantly. 合伙人数目从1990年的120人增长到1995年的180人/ 每个合伙人的平均股权份额大幅下跌管理经济学45Mary Kay Cosmetics:Sales Force Incentives美琳凯传销团队的鼓励机制美琳凯传销团队的鼓励机制Case Study 案例案例管理经济学46An Overviewlset up in 1963 with a unique concept /listed, and then management buyout ($315m) by Mary Kay and her son in 12/85 /headquartered and manu
40、factured in Dallas, plus 5 regional distribution centers (1,436 employees) /175,000 independent salespersons in U.S. in 88 /$406m sales in 88l1988年公司员工仅1,436人，而独立销售人员传销人员高达175,000人；销售额为亿美元管理经济学47Sales Force Incentives独立销售人员的鼓励机制lEntry-level: difference between retail and wholesale prices /a 4-12% co
41、mmission on the sales of personal recruits/sales director: 9-13% on the entire unit, extra bonuses for total sales and recruits/senior directors: 4% on offsprings and 5% for more than 8 offsprings/national directors: 5-8% and 2% on first-line and second-line offsprings, respectively 层层剥削管理经济学48Car P
42、rograms 汽车奖励方案lPink Cadillac (69) and Pink Buick (lower standards) for directors/VIP for non-directors/1,000 Cadillacs, 1,000 Buicks, and 3,000 leased cars for VIP program (89)管理经济学49Questions 思考问题lMultiple responsibilities (sales and recruiting) 多重责任销售及招募独立销售人员ldifference between Mary Kays incentiv
43、e system from Goldman Sachs partnership 美琳凯鼓励机制与高盛合伙人制度的差异lwhy car programs 为何引入汽车鼓励方案管理经济学50The debate Over Unbundling General Motors:关于分拆通用汽车的讨论关于分拆通用汽车的讨论The Delphi Divesture and Other Possible Transactions剥离剥离Dephi及其他运作及其他运作Case Study 案例案例管理经济学51Undervalued GMGMGM股票被低估股票被低估l90 years of vertical
44、integration: GM (70%), Ford (50%), and Chrysler (30%) 长达90年的垂直一体化：GM(70%), Ford (50%), Chrysler (30%) lThe difference between benchmark investment strategy and actual value created is equal to $89 billion between 12/31/89 and 12/31/98 1989年12月31日到1998年12月31日之间，实际创造的价值比投资基准少890亿美元。管理经济学52A Breakup of
45、 GMGMGM的分拆的分拆l1996: GM decided to spin off its shares in Electronic Data Systems (a computer business acquired in 1984 for $2.5 billion) to independent GM pension fund. 1996年：GM决定把它在电子数据系统公司的股份半卖半送给GM养老基金The gift was worth $8.5 billion to the fund. The value of the transaction for GM shareholders wa
46、s a $500 million sum that EDS paid GM for its freedom. EDS为取得卖身契，付给GM的股东5亿美元lGM sold the aerospace and defense electronics unit of its Hughes Electronics subsidiary to the Raytheon Company in 1997 1997年，GM将其下属Hughes Electronics公司的航空及国防电子业务出售给Raytheon Company管理经济学53Delphi in 1998lSales just under US$
47、32 billion / Over 200 lines of business / 200,000 employees located in 36 countries l销售额:略低于320亿美元 / 200多种经营工程 20万名员工分布于36个国家lAugust 3, 98: GMs board decided to completely divest itself of Delphi Automotive Systems l 98年8月3日,GM董事局决定完全剥离Delphi 管理经济学54Expected Gain for GM预计预计GMGM的收益的收益lP/e ratio of 16
48、.6 for auto parts suppliers for 1988-95, p/e ratio of 9 in 1997 for automobiles/$7b difference 1988-95年汽车零部件供给商市盈率为16.6 / 1997年汽车整车市盈率为9/GM分拆Delphi: 即刻创造70亿美元管理经济学55Questions 问题问题lWhat explains the huge value created from the breakup? 什么因素导致什么因素导致GM分拆分拆Delphi所带来的巨所带来的巨额价值？额价值？ lWhat players and whos
49、e interests are involved in unbundling decisions at GM? 在在GM分拆决策制定中，涉及到的人与利分拆决策制定中，涉及到的人与利益有哪些？益有哪些？管理经济学56Airbus: owned by its suppliers空中客车：外包但供给商持股AirbusSpanish SupplierFrench SupplierBritish SupplierGerman Supplier管理经济学57Toyota: owning its suppliers丰田：外包并持有供给商的股份ToyotaSupplier 1Supplier 2Supplier 4Supplier 3管理经济学58Hybrid Vertical Relations混合组织形式lOutsourcing for other companies自造加代工lBi-sourcing 自造加外包管理经济学59
