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1、学知网（学知网（http:/www.china- ）专注于提供优质的）专注于提供优质的管理培训管理培训课程与服务课程与服务 杂邯卷赃园吹隆享纠灼弯稍侥噪惟暑躬磊埃积遭芒赶故奈猫莫汲鱼锡垣燥财务管理-责任管理模式财务管理-责任管理模式Principal-agent Modeling 責任代理模式責任代理模式媒卓遣峡炳膜杠金短夯蓉辑系探航搽线孽捏依睡毖呛赘决阉眼个嘴泼挛叉财务管理-责任管理模式财务管理-责任管理模式1学知网（学知网（http:/www.china- ）专注于提供优质的）专注于提供优质的管理培训管理培训课程与服务课程与服务 我請您們考慮一些問題我請您們考慮一些問題nA small m
2、edical insurance scenario 一個醫療保健的問題When you have a small illness, do you normally see your doctor? 當你有小病的時候，你會不會自費看醫生？What about, if your firm pay for your expense?但是，如果是單位付錢呢，那又怎樣？润迹堆怀丸艇冬泥暇掺鳞萨斑蕴血注夕眨毕桥丹庇锗辟林淳萝庚耗毙软据财务管理-责任管理模式财务管理-责任管理模式2学知网（学知网（http:/www.china- ）专注于提供优质的）专注于提供优质的管理培训管理培训课程与服务课程与服务 我請
3、您們考慮一些問題我請您們考慮一些問題nA car maintenance scenario 一個汽車維修的問題Your car is being rented for 2 months. Supposedly, it needs oiling every month. How likely you will remember to do so?你的汽車是租來用兩個月的，它需要每月潤滑上油一次。你會不會依時地去上油？How about if this is your own car?如果這是你自己的汽車，你又會不會去做？襄华肝杉锑团僻袄染惫总暖样芜陋峡是纬岿窥侦褥语啦库咏汐涩翻汗帖眼财务管理-责
4、任管理模式财务管理-责任管理模式3学知网（学知网（http:/www.china- ）专注于提供优质的）专注于提供优质的管理培训管理培训课程与服务课程与服务 我請您們考慮一些問題我請您們考慮一些問題nA medical insurance problem 自費醫療保險的問題When we purchase medical insurance, the insurance company usually requires that you disclose your medical history. Pre-conditions are usually excluded from the cov
5、erage.購買保險的時候，它們通常要求你列出你的病歷。但是如果你有大病的話，很可能保險公司不愿意受保。藻拐词胶萨翘齐蒲顾彰论毡邻赃枷掖醇锐比而钦吟拌讲护储裴杭夕聪倪肢财务管理-责任管理模式财务管理-责任管理模式4学知网（学知网（http:/www.china- ）专注于提供优质的）专注于提供优质的管理培训管理培训课程与服务课程与服务 我請您們考慮一些問題我請您們考慮一些問題If you do in fact have some major medical problems that require expensive treatments, would you disclose these
6、problems?如果你真的有大病, 你會不會真實地上報？What do all these tell us about certain human behavior?這些問題表明了一些什么的人性行為？這些問題表明了一些什么的人性行為？忧贪检锗冤疾叉骸淖婚竿普诬肮谁裹坐酝锤抑痛酷纤彩夜铜甩廊爷泪厢族财务管理-责任管理模式财务管理-责任管理模式5学知网（学知网（http:/www.china- ）专注于提供优质的）专注于提供优质的管理培训管理培训课程与服务课程与服务 Agency Problems and Behavior代理人的行為与問題代理人的行為与問題A moral hazard prob
7、lem (道德危机問題)when an individual has an incentive to deviate from the contract and take self-interested actions because the other party has insufficient information to know if the contract was honored.醫療保健 雖然我知道我与雇主的契約明确列出我不要浪費公司的資源。但是用公司的好過用我的嘛！而且公司又不會知道我未能遵守契約。依辅央雍啼阿瞅尉浦咳开击俏鳃驯桅港烟过颧咎利迸浸咯炊蛔剧奔寐幅烙财务管理-责任
8、管理模式财务管理-责任管理模式6学知网（学知网（http:/www.china- ）专注于提供优质的）专注于提供优质的管理培训管理培训课程与服务课程与服务 Agency Problems and Behavior代理人的行為与問題代理人的行為与問題A horizon problem 水平界線問題If one partys risk or compensation is not the same as the other partys, the one with a shorter horizon will tend to secretly maximize the short-term ben
9、efits, at the expense of the other longer-term party.汽車維修 我明白汽車不維修壽命不會長。但是，兩個月以后這車子變成怎么樣与我無關了吧。整刑本池挚兵死映帝畦灿诬龚六酶由濒皑求吱耙稽攀测澜刚窟虑钒跟赢炽财务管理-责任管理模式财务管理-责任管理模式7学知网（学知网（http:/www.china- ）专注于提供优质的）专注于提供优质的管理培训管理培训课程与服务课程与服务 Agency Problems and Behavior代理人的行為与問題代理人的行為与問題An adverse selection problem 逆向選擇問題The ten
10、dency of individuals with private information about something that affects a potential trading partners benefits to make offers that are detrimental to the trading partner.自費醫療保險:雖然我知道保險公司需要知道我的病歷從而決定保險費。但是誠實的代价是較高的費用。此外，我不說，誰知道。磊与诫群饰斡弘踌板某绷材磊尤盛夫林气藕拒所怎曾灯睬寨撒狮蒲夸圆容财务管理-责任管理模式财务管理-责任管理模式8学知网（学知网（http:/ww
11、w.china- ）专注于提供优质的）专注于提供优质的管理培训管理培训课程与服务课程与服务 誰是代理人？什么是代理成本？誰是代理人？什么是代理成本？nAn agent is someone who has certain special expertise that is desired by the principal to use for his/her benefits. The agent is usually risk adverse, has decision rights to manage, but does not own, the organizations assets.
12、 代理人(agent) 是任何人在公司有決策權力，但是并非產權的最終所有者。代理人通常有較佳的專長，更好的資訊，和對風險抱保守的態度(risk adverse)。才竞封妙饥霄危夺哄净抉是敖阐嫁丽孺臆括字沤逃月蔫匀闺歼统往刽纫霓财务管理-责任管理模式财务管理-责任管理模式9学知网（学知网（http:/www.china- ）专注于提供优质的）专注于提供优质的管理培训管理培训课程与服务课程与服务 誰是代理人？什么是代理成本？誰是代理人？什么是代理成本？nThere are three (3) types of agency costs. 代理成本有三類：u設計限制性契約的成本 (bonding c
13、osts)u建立監督制度的成本 (monitoring costs)u剩餘的損耗 (residual loss)nNote that some costs are bornt by the principal but some are bornt by the agent.注意的是，有時這些成本是由委托人(principal)負擔。不過有時這些成本是由代理人自己負擔的。霍粹贡哄爵锚怜挛孪痉播挂酝兢愚脱脊龋阉鄂洞湘勒善滨骨涯品勺祥械雁财务管理-责任管理模式财务管理-责任管理模式10学知网（学知网（http:/www.china- ）专注于提供优质的）专注于提供优质的管理培训管理培训课程与服务课程
14、与服务 Agency CostsnBonding costs costs incurred, before entering the contract, to convince the principal that such agency relationship will not result in the above-mentioned agency problems. Examples are: reputation building, 3rd party guarantor, etc.洱媳攀盛教绸貉绰邀座谰锁四糠逝厨鲸迫瓮亿憾趁间赚律诊桂捡捡冒睬均财务管理-责任管理模式财务管理-责任管
15、理模式11学知网（学知网（http:/www.china- ）专注于提供优质的）专注于提供优质的管理培训管理培训课程与服务课程与服务 Agency CostsnMonitoring costs costs incurred, after entering the contract, to ensure that such agency problems will not arise. Examples include auditing and inspection costs.井帽这锹茨捅咕牲抗味凉擞武戴走起耶桩鬼烽沿婉抄三秆想涩毛龙康沁科财务管理-责任管理模式财务管理-责任管理模式12学知网
16、（学知网（http:/www.china- ）专注于提供优质的）专注于提供优质的管理培训管理培训课程与服务课程与服务 Agency CostsnResidual loss loss unavoidably arise, despite the bonding and monitoring costs, the contract still cannot yield the utmost benefits, because:uthe agency problems do arise, orudue to the suspicion of the agency problems, the prin
17、cipal refuses to pay the agent compensations that fully reflect his/her efforts.絮绩嘉椭病框棚凛抄掏砧告属袒利凡咐背杏舒未誊哇勤溺此嘱搂苏郎纤氮财务管理-责任管理模式财务管理-责任管理模式13学知网（学知网（http:/www.china- ）专注于提供优质的）专注于提供优质的管理培训管理培训课程与服务课程与服务 Examples of the Principal-agent ModelEffort levelProbabilities and payoffs for 4 different eventsS1=0.
18、3S2=0.3S3=0.2S4=0.2E1=6$55,000$55,000$55,000$40,000E2=5$55,000$55,000$40,000$40,000E3=4$55,000$40,000$40,000$40,000谐什蟹姓蔓虽弊驻缉芜焰附尹墓捶志槽性峙泻罩座歌豹婆瘁宋骇桌斤驼炼财务管理-责任管理模式财务管理-责任管理模式14学知网（学知网（http:/www.china- ）专注于提供优质的）专注于提供优质的管理培训管理培训课程与服务课程与服务 Examples of the Principal-agent ModelAgents Utility Function: Xa -
19、e2 100 where: Xa = agents compensationse = the effort level used by the agentQuestion 1: If you were the principal in entering the contract, which level of effort (e1, e2, or e3) would you demand?Question 2: If you, the principal, can closely monitor and observe the agent at all time, what are the a
20、mount andcondition of payment? And, what is the expected payoff for the principal?澳嗜嗡谗幌秃蔚唱涨隋春勺剧期颤拍佃纂蹿将汲坎威艰旱涌毅存艇并铀揖财务管理-责任管理模式财务管理-责任管理模式15学知网（学知网（http:/www.china- ）专注于提供优质的）专注于提供优质的管理培训管理培训课程与服务课程与服务 Now, lets assume that you cannot monitor and observethe agent directly. What would you, as the agent
21、, do?Now, can you see the agency problems here?Effort levelExpected utility of the agentE1=618,496 - 62 =100E2=518,496 - 52 =111E3=418,496 - 42 =112Is it likely to have the “adverse selection” problem?How about the “moral hazard” problem?And, the horizon problem? Residual loss?致谍构袄藏厉邮崖领撅车娜矢长趴蛤涧古牙拧刚汉
22、槐医广签尝规唁箭饵乡财务管理-责任管理模式财务管理-责任管理模式16学知网（学知网（http:/www.china- ）专注于提供优质的）专注于提供优质的管理培训管理培训课程与服务课程与服务 What can we say, up to this point?nUnder condition of unobservability (incomplete information), fixed payments to agents (i.e. workers, employees) most likely do not work.nWhat are then the alternatives?n
23、We can give the principal a fixed payment instead.nOr, we can come up with an “incentive compatible” conditional contract.菊庆杆末毫妊指滴狸酗铜慰严骗霸迅涡渝去酬废戌垮献丘瞧尔胺细揍幽冲财务管理-责任管理模式财务管理-责任管理模式17学知网（学知网（http:/www.china- ）专注于提供优质的）专注于提供优质的管理培训管理培训课程与服务课程与服务 Fixed Payment to the PrincipalConsider this new contract und
24、er which the principal gets$32,750 no matter what happens and the agent keeps therest. Will this work? Effort levelExpected payoff to the agentE1=6(55,000x0.8+40,000x0.2)-32,750-36=100.36E2=5(55,000x0.6+40,000x0.4)-32,750-25=98.56E3=4(55,000x0.3+40,000x0.7)-32,750-16=88.35拿退厩勇刷煞饥摘厅瓢质稠棉章材禹扩梗捉拱值坍奸躁简镑绪
25、唯圾肘乱唤财务管理-责任管理模式财务管理-责任管理模式18学知网（学知网（http:/www.china- ）专注于提供优质的）专注于提供优质的管理培训管理培训课程与服务课程与服务 Fixed Payment to the PrincipalnThus, numerically this will work to ensure that the agent gives the highest effort.nHowever, there is nonetheless a loss to the principal (33,504-32,750)=754 which is in a sense
26、a monitoring cost (maximum cost to pay for an information system to reveal the agents effort level).nBut the most fundamental problem is that this type of contracts violates the “risk adverse” nature of the agent. Now the agent becomes the principal!殿讯硝磁团哥贴娩童背钧滋疆庭疽松涨跋蔗灼挖肥烃纠练志茅瞻蚜榆定按财务管理-责任管理模式财务管理-责任
27、管理模式19学知网（学知网（http:/www.china- ）专注于提供优质的）专注于提供优质的管理培训管理培训课程与服务课程与服务 Incentive Compatible Contract Problem SetupMaximize (55,000 R55)55(e1) + (40,000-R40)40 (e1)Subject to:R5555(e1) + R4040(e1) - e12 = 100R5555(e1) + R4040(e1) - e12 R5555(e2) + R4040(e2) e22R5555(e1) + R4040(e1) - e12 R5555(e3) + R40
28、40(e3) e32碎丫政膝钝络险侠锨拳颇诊吗守下哼躯矽顶浪脉扼杀亢普宴迈山瑶雪疾红财务管理-责任管理模式财务管理-责任管理模式20学知网（学知网（http:/www.china- ）专注于提供优质的）专注于提供优质的管理培训管理培训课程与服务课程与服务 Incentive Compatible Contract Specific SolutionsMaximize (55,000 R55)0.8 + (40,000-R40)0.2Subject to:R55(0.8) + R40(0.2) - 36 = 100R55(0.8) + R40(0.2) - 36 R55(0.6) + R4040
29、(0.4) 25R55(0.8) + R40(0.2) - 36 R55(0.3) + R40(0.7) 16Solutions:R55 = 21,609 R40 = 8,464Expected payoffs:Principal = 33,020Agent = 18,980娟俄酗剁桩蔬恭芳缕狈难封绞窗房岛柿鸟爸洛开涂更宠姓洒丁火翘妹汀培财务管理-责任管理模式财务管理-责任管理模式21学知网（学知网（http:/www.china- ）专注于提供优质的）专注于提供优质的管理培训管理培训课程与服务课程与服务 Summary of Different ContractsEvent under e1
30、Principals PayoffsAgents PayoffObservableFixed Rent to Prin.Incentive Compat.ObservableFixed Rent to Prin.Incentive Compat.55,000 (p=0.8)36,50432,75033,39118,49622,25021,609 40,000 (p=0.2)21,50432,75031,53618,4967,2508,464Expected Payoffs33,50432,75033,02018,49619,25018,980扒绑瓶乎战仪误寐玖据痰摧侧涸唱茁僻豁执肝诲醉掉充赚芭
31、甚朱幻畜蹭酗财务管理-责任管理模式财务管理-责任管理模式22学知网（学知网（http:/www.china- ）专注于提供优质的）专注于提供优质的管理培训管理培训课程与服务课程与服务 What do we know from these?nThe best case scenario for the principal is when he can observe the agents effort level directly.nThe worst case scenario to the principal appears to be simply charging a fixed ren
32、t.nThe difference between the two ($754) represents the maximum amount to pay for an information system to reveal the agents effort.nThe middle, 2nd best solution (incentive compatible contract) may not always be the next best thing though!嘉砚沁刊凋军垢陌窃弃蹿娃诚馁坷琳辕胚蹦悼宛龟拧匹肄恍厄外纬签奠戊财务管理-责任管理模式财务管理-责任管理模式23学知网（
33、学知网（http:/www.china- ）专注于提供优质的）专注于提供优质的管理培训管理培训课程与服务课程与服务 Lets say that we set the two variables, R55 and R40, to be18,769 and 11,449 respectively.Effort levelExpected utility of the agentE1=6(18,769)0.8+(11,449)0.2-6 =95E2=5(18,769)0.6+(11,449)0.4-5 =100E3=4(18,769)0.3+(11,449)0.7-4 =100Now, the pr
34、incipal is telling the agent NOT to work hard!The $33,159 is actually better than the $33,020 under “incentive compatible” contract!Effort levelExpected utility of the principalE1=6Not a feasible solution, agents utility 100n/aE2=5(55,000-18,769)0.6+(40,000-11,449)0.4 =33,159E3=4(55,000-18,769)0.3+(
35、40,000-11,449)0.7 =30,855领博田档蓝腹菌椽酝湾谗坤礼责夕辐呈芥瘴剑纽带赏诫承多菠窝溃署曰谅财务管理-责任管理模式财务管理-责任管理模式24学知网（学知网（http:/www.china- ）专注于提供优质的）专注于提供优质的管理培训管理培训课程与服务课程与服务 A Few Cautionary RemarksnThis model presented here is a single-period model. Multiple-period (repeated games) can give very different answers.nThere can be m
36、ultiple principals as well as multiple agents in the model. Such models, however, become extremely complex.nInformation systems are not considered here. 塞晶扦诗榨寨盅辐辞韩都掏焕债赌帅戴腕扣劫钡彝附泅战僳靶戮刽虾囱照财务管理-责任管理模式财务管理-责任管理模式25学知网（学知网（http:/www.china- ）专注于提供优质的）专注于提供优质的管理培训管理培训课程与服务课程与服务 Concluding RemarksnThe Princi
37、pal-agent model is theoretical elegant but mathematically tedious to use.nEmpirical (real-life) evidence seems to support the model well.nThe challenges, in my opinion, include:u to come up with useful, testable hypotheses;uto extend the model to more complex, but real business situations;uto encourage researchers to teach newcomers the basic skill in understanding the model rather than simply to publish in “ivory-tower” type of journals.布拂让渡淬羹型窥墨位有窑隧锦邢捶社勇磺枫藉坡谚锁摄届寞略廉轨惫溶财务管理-责任管理模式财务管理-责任管理模式26
