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1、市场研究中的非市场行为vBefore turning to nonmarket situations, let me review some developments in the study of markets that are particularly relevant for the study of nonmarket situations .v在转向非市场情形的研究之前，首先来回顾一下关于市场行为的研究中，与非市场情形有关的观点。vThe strong assumptions made about“economic man”and the emphasis on equilibri
2、um analysis, characteristic of the Anglo-American, neoclassical tradition of inquiry, has not been universally adhered to by all economists .v英美学者、古典自由主义关于“经济人”和强调均衡分析的观点并没有并所有的经济学家所接受。vThe Austrian school shares common ties with the Scottish school of moral philosophy, but has preferred to work wit
3、h assumptions of limited information and to focus on equilibrating mechanisms rather than equilibrium states.v奥地利学派和苏格兰学派更倾向于以有限信息和均衡机制而非均衡状态为前提假设，对这一行为进行分析。vThe emphasis in Austrian economics is on market structures as providing incentives for innovation and generating information that is relevant
4、to dynamically changing circumstances .v奥地利经济学强调市场结构能够促进创新和产生与动态环境变化有关的信息。vHayek is the best-known contemporary representative of this tradition .Hayek assumes that information is necessarily incomplete because the generation of new knowledge contributes to the development of new technologies and to
5、 new economic opportunities v哈耶克是这一观点的最著名代表，他认为由于新的知识的出现有助于新技术的发展，并且产生新的经济机会，因此信息必定是不完备的。vMuch of the focus in Austrian economics, then, is on entrepreneurship, as Kirzner emphasizes entrepreneurs have an incentive to search out new possibilities .vSuch activities disturb any presumed equilibrium ,
6、placing burdens on others to acquire similar capabilities in a market economy . v大部分奥地利经济学家关注企业家精神，正如Kirzner emphasizes强调，企业家具有寻找新机会的动力，这些活动就会打破预先设定的均衡，对其他人造成压力，从而迫使他们也在市场经济中获得相似的能力。vEntrepreneurship and innovation create a competitive dynamic that has to do with advances in knowledge, the extension
7、 of technological capabilities, and an opening of new economic opportunities .v企业家和创新会创造一种动态的竞争状态，这种状态关系到知识的进步、技术能力的扩展和新经济机会的创造。vThis is a form of competition that can only occur in a world of incomplete information rather than in a world of complete information .v这种形式的竞争只是出现在信息并不完整的市场中。vThe competi
8、tive dynamics associated with the Austrian school is quite different than, but not contradictory to , the traditional equilibrium analyses of Anglo-American economists .Work in the Austrian school is also consistent with Herbert Simons work on“ bounded rationality”(Simon, 1972, 1978, 1981) . v奥地利学派这
9、种动态竞争的观点与英美经济学家传统的均衡分析并不相同，但是也并不矛盾。此外，这种观点与Herbert Simong的有限理性的观点相一致。vNelson and Winter s An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change ( 1982) is built on assumptions that have to do with limited information and potentials for learning (see also Nelson, 1977 ) .v纳尔逊和温特经济变化的进化理论(1982)是建立在有限的信息和学习潜力这一假设基
10、础上的(参见尼尔森,1977)。vGiovanni Dosi ( 1984 ) , in a study of Technical Change and Industrial Transformation, is critically concerned with the place of advancing knowledge and technological innovation as a competitive process that affects market structures in different ways than would be expected to occur
11、 in competitive markets with complete information .v乔凡尼(1984)在技术变革和产业转型中主要关注知识进步和技术创新的竞争性过程，它将以不同的方式影响市场结构，而不是像预计的那样在信息完整的竞争性市场中出现。vSamuel Popkin ( 1981 ) ,whose work on The Rational Peasant (1979) is well known, is examining problems of information asymmetry that are characteristic of agricultural
12、productivity and how information asymmetries yield different institutional arrangements, such as those involved in sharecroping, piecework, fixed-fee wages, or fixed-fee rental arrangements .v塞缪尔波普金(1981),在理性的农民一书中考察了农业生产中信息不对称的特点，并且研究了信息不对称如何产生了不同的制度安排，例如关于计件工资、固定工资、固定租赁费的安排。vCoase ( 1937 ) in an e
13、ssay on“ The Nature of the Firm” concerned with why firms, organized more on hierarchical principles, occur in market economies that rely on buying and selling among individuals having equal standing in relation to one another .v科斯在企业的本质一文中关注为什么公司,以多层次的原则进行组织,但在个人之间买卖的市场经济中却拥有平等的竞争关系。vTo account for
14、 this apparent anomaly, Coase conjectured that organizing transactions across markets entails costs .These costs might reflect the costs of getting information about going prices, costs of negotiation, and so forth .There might then be costs of transactions across markets which could yield savings b
15、y having recourse to other patterns of organization .v科斯推测，这种异常现象是因为组织跨市场交易需要成本。这些成本可能反映在获取市场价格信息的成本或谈判的成本上等等。市场交易的成本可能通过获得其他形式的组织结构节省下来。vThe basic structure of transactions within a firm would be altered to include reference to a long-term employment contract where an employer in the new relationsh
16、ip could assign and reassign an employee to a variety of different tasks .A superior-subordinate relationship was established within the operation of a firm subject to the longer-term employment contract . v这种基本的交易结构在一个公司将被改变,变成引入长期劳动合同,在新的关系中雇主可以将不同的任务分配给不同的雇员，甚至由雇员进行再分配。这样由于长期雇佣合同的签订公司内部就形成了从属关系。v
17、We have an explanation, then, for why hierarchies would arise within firms that operate in market structures .v这样我们就可以解释,为什么在市场结构中会在公司内部出现层级结构。vAlchian and Demsetz offer team work as an explanation for the development of firms in a market .Individuals working together as teams can accomplish tasks t
18、hat cannot be accomplished by individuals acting alone .v阿曼阿尔钦和德姆塞茨以团队合作来解释市场中公司的发展。但单个人无法完成一些任务时，他们就会组成团队共同完成任务。vTeamwork implies, then, that joint effort has potentials for yielding increased productivity .In these circumstances a puzzle arises .When each worker receives a fixed share of the joint
19、 effort as wages, a temptation arises for each worker to enjoy more leisure on the job, and the yield from teamwork declines .v因此，团队合作意味着，共同努力提高生产率。在这种情况下一个难题出现。当如果每个工人都接收一个固定比例的工资,那么就会出现工人都愿意做更加清闲的工作的情况，这样团队合作的收益就会下降。vThis circumstance suggests that limits on information exist even in regard to the
20、 contribution of each participant to the joint product .v这种情况表明,即使是联合生产，对每一位参与生产的人而言，信息有限的情况也是存在的。vIt becomes necessary, then, to make provisions for someone to monitor performance, and reduce shirking, in order to maintain the productive potential derived from teamwork .v因此就有必要，专门派人对工人的行为进行监督，但为了保持
21、团队合作产生的生产潜力，又要减少这种监督。vThis can be done by having recourse to a single contracting party who assumes proprietary responsibility for organizing the enterprise, monitoring performance, and receiving the residual earnings that derive from joint productivity . v这一问题可以通过只有一个单一缔约方的方式来解决，它专门负责专有负责组织、监督并且获得这
22、种联合生产带来的剩余价值。vThe form of enterprise that Alchian and Demsetz characterize with reference to a single contracting party is a sole proprietorship .They demonstrate, however, that the structure of incentives in different forms of organization will be affected by the way that the residual earnings derived from increased productivity are distributed, and responsibility is allocated for monitoring performance in order to reduce shirking and enhance productivity .v这种企业形式即一个人独资，然而，这种不同的组织形式会受到剩余的影响。剩余价值来自于生产力的增长，为了增加生产力所进行的监督，所带来的责任也将随之进行分配。
