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1、LondonEconomistabGlobal Economics ResearchGlobalUBS Investment ResearchGlobal Economic PerspectivesGlobal Outlook 2013-14Generally better, but not without riskAs is our autumn custom, we launch our Global Economic Outlook, including aninitiation of 2014 forecasts. Overall, we expect a gradual improv
2、ement in globalreal GDP growth from a low point of 2.7% this year to 3.0% next year and 3.4% in2014. Although growth rates in many parts of the world economy are expected toimprove over the next two years, a key theme is US cyclical leadership. Risks toour forecasts remain in the form of the US fisc
3、al cliff, a re-escalation of theEurozone crisis, a harder landing in China, or an energy price shock.Implications for interest and exchange ratesAs recently reinforced by Fed Chairman Bernanke, the Fed is likely to remainhighly accommodative well into recovery. The implication is that policy rates w
4、illremain very low over the forecast horizon. High levels of excess capacity and astill-moderate pace of recovery suggests that bond yields, when they begin to movehigher, will do so gradually. The dollar should appreciate modestly, given betterUS fundamentals.Update on de-leveragingPrivate sector d
5、e-leveraging in the US is advanced, including in the financial,household, and non-financial corporate sectors. Headwinds of US private sectorde-leveraging are therefore lessening. The same is not true in much of peripheralEurope or the UK, which together with Eurozone structural adjustment suggestsc
6、ontinued growth restraint across much of the EU. The next big de-leveragingresides in the US and Japanese public sectors (continental Europe is generally moreadvanced in this dimension). Fiscal adjustment represents both a key risk factor forglobal growth and an enduring source of global demand rest
7、raint in the yearsahead.American revival?Lessening private-sector de-leveraging, improved competitiveness, and supply-sideinnovations (for example in energy) suggest the US economy may be poised forrevival ahead of its peer group of advanced economies, but also amid a secularslowing in the emerging
8、complex. One implication is stronger capital inflows intothe US.This report has been prepared by UBS LimitedANALYST CERTIFICATION AND REQUIRED DISCLOSURES BEGIN ON PAGE 16.31 October H+44-20-75684053Andrew CatesE+65-64952584PaulDonovanE+44-20-75683372SophieConstableE+44-20-75683105Global Economic P
9、erspectives 31October2012Global economic outlookSummaryEach autumn UBS economists review their outlook for the following year andinitiate forecasts for the year thereafter. In this note we present our 2013 globaloutlook, and extend our forecast horizon to 2014.In many respects, the outlook is famili
10、ar, perhaps distressingly so. Over the nexttwo years, the world economy will do well if it can muster trend-like growth.Headwinds of de-leveraging, balance sheet repair and structural adjustment,above all in Europe, are unlikely to lessen much in the coming quarters. Japanremains mired in deflation
11、and dependent on exports. Meanwhile, a mix ofcyclical, structural and policy impediments is likely to restrain growth inemerging economies below the high rates of the past decade. Even in the US,where growth prospects are arguably their brightest since the financial crisiserupted in 2007, a guarded
12、outlook and policy uncertainty will restrain growth tonear its potential rate, insufficient to make a rapid dent in the still-high USunemployment rate. And even that outcome depends crucially on whetherpoliticians in Washington can agree to postpone or otherwise moderate the dateof US fiscal reckoni
13、ng.Still, there are some encouraging aspects to the outlook. Moderate growth amidstill-large reservoirs of spare capacity suggests little scope for inflation, barringcommodity supply shocks. The avoidance of global recession and subdued unitlabour costs ought to support continued high levels of corp
14、orate profitability,particularly in developed economies. Moreover, gradual recovery accompaniedby stable inflation expectations ought to allow central banks to maintain currentaccommodative policy stances for longer (and subsequently adjust themgradually), limiting the possibility for monetary polic
15、y-induced marketdislocations in the period ahead. And technological progress continues tomanifest itself, above all in the US energy and technology sectors.Risks abound, not just to the downside. Among the more significant adverseshocks remains the possibility that politicians in Washington will not
16、 be able tofind common ground on matters of taxation and spending, sending the US andglobal economy off the much-discussed fiscal cliff. We suspect that commonsense (i.e., self-interest) will lead to a compromise that turns the cliff into a mereledge. Disruptions to energy supply are a further sourc
17、e of downside to globalgrowth, as would be a sharp re-escalation of Eurozone tensions. And Chinacould still experience a hard landing, particularly if property and externalweaknesses result in a greater degree of domestic banking stress.To the upside, the evidence suggests that US private sector de-
18、leveraging iswell-advanced. A recovering US housing market, rising bank credit, and fallingWe present our 2013 global outlook,and extend our forecast horizon to 2014The world economy will do well if it canmaintain trend-like growthEncouraging aspects to the outlookinclude the limited scope for infla
19、tionand subdued cost pressuresDownside risks concern the US fiscalcliff, Eurozone tensions and a harderlanding in ChinaUpside risks concern the possibility ofa more rapid pace of US growthhousehold sector debt servicing are all elements of that story. To the extent thatpolitical and policy uncertain
20、ties, which have restrained business spending in2012, begin to recede, the stage could be set for a more rapid pace of US growth,supported and reinforced by employment, capital expenditure, housing andcredit growth, and underpinned by easy Fed policy and higher asset prices.Coupled with improved int
21、ernational competitiveness and innovations inUBS2Global Economic Perspectives 31October2012domestic energy production and technological progress, a US revival couldwell become the big surprise of the next two years.In what follows we outline our forecasts and broader assessment of the worldeconomy i
22、n the following sections:Forecast overviewRisks to the forecastUpdate on de-leveragingAmerican revival?Forecast overviewAfter consecutive years of decelerating global GDP growth since 2010, weanticipate that both 2013 and 2014 will register modest improvement relative tothe recent low point for glob
23、al growth registered in mid-2012. Specifically,global real GDP growth this year is expected to come in at just 2.7%, down from3.2% in 2011 and 4.2% in 2010. Next year, however, we forecast a rate of globalreal GDP growth of 3.0%, followed by 3.4% in 2014.Table 1: Real GDP growth ratesNext year we fo
24、recast global real GDPgrowth of 3.0%, followed by 3.4% in2014%y/yUSJapanEurozoneG7BrazilRussiaIndiaChinaWORLD2012F2.12.2-0.41.41.53.65.57.52.72013F2.31.80.11.64.53.56.57.83.02013 Consensus2.11.30.21.54.03.76.98.12.9F2014F3.01.80.92.23.64.07.08.03.4Source:UBS/ConsensuseconomicsTo be sure, the average
25、 annual rate of forecasted growth over the next two yearsis roughly in line with the long-term average rate of world GDP growth andmost probably close to its trend rate as well (Chart 1). Above all, that means thatSwathes of excess capacity in globalproduct and labour markets will not berapidly abso
26、rbed in the next two yearsswathes of excess capacity in global product and labour markets will not berapidly absorbed in the next two years. The old adage rings true: Inflation resultsfrom too much money chasing too few goods. In its current rendition theverdict is likely to be still-low inflation.
27、Despite the printing prowess of centralbanks, excess global capacity is likely to act as a restraint on broad-basedincreases in most prices and wages. The intense demands for liquidity from theEuropean banking sector amidst ongoing restructuring and restraint, moreover,seems likely to constrain the
28、inflation implications of the ECBs balance sheetexpansion as well.UBS3UBSforecastsQ478 Q480 Q482 Q484 Q486 Q488 Q490 Q492 Q494 Q496 Q498 Q400 Q402 Q404 Q406 Q408 Q410 Q412 Q414Q470 Q472 Q474 Q476Global Economic Perspectives 31October2012Table 2: CPI inflation rates%y/yUSJapanEurozoneG7BrazilRussiaIn
29、diaChinaWORLD2012F2.10.02.51.85.55.17.52.82.92013F1.70.32.11.76.26.86.83.62.92013 Consensus2.00.01.91.75.35.97.43.42.9F2014F2.52.31.82.36.25.67.04.03.1Source:UBS/ConsensuseconomicsChart 1: Global GDP growth and long-term average8.06.04.02.00.0-2.0-4.0y/y%Source:UBSestimatesGlobalGDPgrowthTrendWithin
30、 the detail, the outlook is one of cyclical divergence. Among advancedeconomies, the US is likely to re-occupy its familiar position as growth leader.Next years forecasted 2.3% calendar year average US GDP growth rate masksAmong advanced economies, the US islikely to re-occupy its familiar positiona
31、s growth leaderthe underlying improving dynamic of the economy. On a Q4 2013-on-Q4 2012basis, we project a faster 2.7% US GDP growth rate. Moreover, as we detailbelow the headwinds of balance sheet repair and deleveraging in the US privatesector are lessening. In 2014 we expect US calendar year aver
32、age GDP growthto reach 3.0%. Underscoring the sense that the US economy is poised for thebetter, is the contribution to forecasted GDP growth in the next two years fromprivate sector final demand, both consumer spending and business investment(Chart 2).UBS4Q180Q282Q384Q486Q189Q291Q393Q495Q198Q200Q30
33、2Q404Q107Q209Q311Q150 Q154 Q158 Q162 Q166 Q170 Q174 Q178 Q182 Q186 Q190 Q194 Q198 Q102 Q106 Q110Global Economic Perspectives 31October2012Chart 2: Contributions to US growth 2009-2014e (in percentage points)2.502.001.501.000.500.00ContributiontorealGDPchange-0.50200920102011201220132014-1.00-1.50-2.
34、00-2.50PersonalconsumptionInvestmentNetexportsGovernmentspendingSource:UBSestimatesThat story already is unfolding. Over the past six months, the US housingmarket, retail sales and bank lending to the private sector have all perked up. Ifit were not for the restraint in business spending, reflected
35、in relatively weak UScapital goods expenditures and hiring, US growth would probably alreadyexceed the full year rate we expect for next year.The US housing market, retail sales andbank lending to the private sector haveall perked upChart 3: US debt servicing20.0019.0018.0017.0016.0015.0014.0013.001
36、2.0011.0010.00Chart 4: US debt to disposable income140.00120.00100.0080.0060.0040.0020.00UShouseholddebt-serviceratioSource:Haver,FederalReserve,UBSestimatesUSfinancialobligationsratioUShouseholddebtas%ofdisposableincomeSource:Haver,UBSestimatesNor are there significant private sector imbalances tha
37、t might impede the USrecovery. The contribution to US growth from inventories has been weak, asbusinesses have kept a close check on production relative to final demandde-There are no significant private sectorimbalances that might impede the USrecoverystocking is a small risk, per se. US household
38、sector indebtedness continues tofall relative to disposable income, as does the share of income devoted tomeeting household sector financial obligations (Charts 3-4, above). Lastly,corporate profitability, which jumped from 2009-2011, remains at high levels,helping to keep business borrowing costs l
39、ow and generating sufficient cashflows to support capital spending and hiring. Recent weakness in businessspending is not fundamentalinstead, it most probably reflects poor confidencein policy-making.UBS5Q1-86 Q4-87 Q3-89 Q2-91 Q1-93 Q4-94 Q3-96 Q2-98 Q1-00 Q4-01 Q3-03 Q2-05 Q1-07 Q4-08 Q3-10 Q2-12Q
40、1-47Q1-50Q1-53Q1-56Q1-59Q1-62Q1-65Q1-68Q1-71Q1-74Q1-77Q1-80Q1-83Q1-86Q1-89Q1-92Q1-95Q1-98Q1-01Q1-04Q1-07Q1-10laggardsGlobal Economic Perspectives 31October2012Chart 5: Contribution of inventories to US GDP growth2.52.01.51.00.50.0-0.5-1.0-1.5Chart 6: US profit share in GDP14.013.012.011.010.09.08.07
41、.06.0ContributionofUSinventoriestoy/ychangeinUSGDPgrowthSource:Haver,UBSestimatesRecessionSource:Haver,NBER,UBSestimatesUScorporateprofitsas%GDPAs we recently noted, other parts of the world economy also appear at aninflection point, with slowdowns ending, even if more rapid growth may not yetbe evi
42、dent. That appears to be true in China and other parts of Asia, where firstsigns of a bottoming in exports are visible. At the same time, Chinas propertymarket slowdown also appears to be ending, not coincidentally as economy-wide credit growth begins to pick up. In Brazil, too, solid real income fo
43、rmation,supported by credit growth, is producing a pick-up in consumer spendingweexpect growth in Brazil to move back up to 4.5% next year.Still, recoveries across the world economy are not uniformEurope and Japanremain notable laggards. In Europes case, fiscal retrenchment, structuraladjustment, an
44、d banking sector weakness in many Eurozone countries and theUK are the sources of stagnation, at best, and deep recession, at worst. Whilesome of those headwinds may lessen in the coming two years, they will remainsignificant drags on economic activity in the EU over the forecast horizon, inpart bec
45、ause of the inability or unwillingness of the healthier parts of Europe(read: Germany) to generate offsetting growth impulses. In 2013 we believeEurozone GDP growth will stagnate (0.1%), with moderate pickup projected in2014 (0.9%)In Japan, deflation, a strong yen, weak export markets, poor corporat
46、eprofitability and demographic challenges continue to restrain what potential forgrowth exists. Japans growth will be modest in the next two yearsfor each ofthe next two years we forecast Japanese real GDP growth of 1.8%. In 2014, aplanned hike in consumption taxes poses significant downside risks t
47、o activity.As a consequence of developed economy divergence, we anticipate a generallystronger US dollar over the forecast horizon. Specifically, our year-end dollarOther parts of the world economy alsoappear at an inflection pointEurope and Japan remain notableJapans growth will be modest in thenex
48、t two yearsWe anticipate a generally stronger USdollar over the forecast horizonforecasts versus the euro are 1.20 at the end of 2013 and 1.15 by end 2014. Theprofile is similar for the yen, which is expected to depreciate to USD/JPY 85 atthe end of next year and USD/JPY 90 by end 2014. After consid
49、erable realexchange rate appreciation recent years and against a more subdued growthbackdrop, we do not anticipate significant further appreciation of majoremerging economy currencies against the dollar (Table 3).UBS6Global Economic Perspectives 31October2012Table 3: FX forecasts31-Oct-12Dec-13Dec-1
50、4EUR/USDUSD/JPYEUR/JPYUSD/RMBUSD/INRUSD/RUBGBP/USDEUR/GBPUSD/CHFEUR/CHFUSD/CADAUD/USDNZD/USD1.2979.40103.006.2454.1031.501.610.810.931.211.001.040.821.2085.00102.006.3550.0031.191.560.771.001.201.031.000.791.1590.00103.506.3047.5032.321.440.801.041.201.050.950.78Source:UBSMonetary policy settings in
51、 developed economies are apt to remainaccommodative over the forecast horizon. Ongoing de-leveraging in Europe,including in the UK, and the associated deflationary impacts suggest that neitherMonetary policies in developedeconomies are apt to remainaccommodativethe ECB nor the Bank of England is lik
52、ely to lift policy rates over the next twoyears. The persistence of deflationary pressures in Japan implies the same forthe Bank of Japan. Asset purchase programmes are likely to remain in place inmost major developed economies, including the US, notwithstanding ourrelatively upbeat assessment of US
53、 economic prospects. The Fed has committeditself to a period of prolonged easing until the economy achieves meaningfulimprovement, including a substantial reduction in unemployment and a closingof the output gap.Still, by 2014, as US labour market conditions improve and the economy movescloser to it
54、s potential growth rate, the Fed may modify its language as well asthe size of its asset purchase program. At some point, perhaps by 2014, the Fedmay even allow its balance sheet to shrink by not replacing maturing securities.Such signalling would, of course, be akin to a moderate tightening of mone
55、taryconditions, including via its impact on long-term US Treasury yields.UBS7recoveryGlobal Economic Perspectives 31October2012Table 4: Interest rate forecastsUS31-Oct-12Dec-13Dec-143 month libor10 year yield0.311.720.402.400.403.00Eurozone3 month Interest Rate10 year Bond Yield0.201.450.752.000.752
56、.40UK3 month Interest Rate10 year Bond Yield0.521.810.502.600.403.00Source:UBSRisks to the viewAs noted, there are significant risks to our forecasts, including many whichwould produce outcomes for the world economy that would be considerablyweaker than we forecast. Downside risks include:The failur
57、e of US politicians to address the fiscal cliff. That outcome woulddeliver a significantly greater degree of fiscal tightening (circa 3.5% of USGDP) than implied in our baseline forecast, with clear negative repercussionsfor confidence and spending. The broader world economy would beadversely impact
58、ed via trade and financial market linkages. Additionalmonetary easing from the Fed and other central banks would be probable, butwould be unlikely to provide much offset to the macroeconomic dislocationof aggressive US fiscal consolidation. A US and world recession would mostlikely ensue.A European
59、disintegration scenario could re-surface in the course of the nexttwo years if the economic, social and political costs of fiscal austerity andstructural adjustment become unbearable in Greece, Spain or otherperipheral Eurozone economies. Political and social instability is already adeep-seated issu
60、e and there is a non-negligible probability that Eurozone exitfears could recur. The impact of rising exit probabilities via debt defaults,financial stress, deposit outflows, and collapsing confidence on jobs andspending could meaningfully destabilize the European economy and couldgenerate significa
61、nt adverse spill-over effects for global growth.China could experience a hard landing, particularly if property and externalweaknesses result in a greater degree of domestic banking stress. Theresulting impact on credit growth, investment and more broadly onconfidence and spending could generate a m
62、uch greater degree of domesticweakness in Chinas economy with particularly strong adverse effects viatrade and financial linkages for Asia and commodity producers.On the other hand, the key upside risk to our baseline scenario resides in thepotential for a more self-sustaining global recovery to tak
63、e hold, led by the US.The world economy remains vulnerable,above all to policy failureThe US fiscal cliff is one suchchallengeA European disintegration scenariocould re-surfaceChina could experience a hard landingThe key upside risk resides in thepotential for a more self-reinforcing USAs we noted a
64、bove, private sector balance sheet repair is relatively advanced inthe US. Many of the downside risks (e.g., the fiscal cliff) are known andUBS8WorldGDP%differencefrombaselineattrough/peak-2Global Economic Perspectives 31October2012arguably have already had a restraining impact on consumer and parti
65、cularlycorporate spending during 2012. As a consequence, if those risks do notmaterialize there may be upside potential to our growth forecasts next year asconfidence effects unwind and pent-up consumer and corporate demand isunleashed.Quantifying the degree to which risks might impact global growth
66、 is fraughtwith analytical complications. Simulations of risk scenarios via the OxfordEconomic Forecasting (OEF) global econometric model suggest that the fiscalcliff poses the least risk to global growth. A severe European disintegrationscenario would pose a bigger downside threat with a hard landi
67、ng in China lyingsomewhere between the two. Those results, however, must be taken with somecaution. If the US were to enter recession as a result of fiscal tightening, theconfidence impacts could be significant, given the very limited ability of the Fedand other central banks to offset that shock.Ch
68、art 7: Impact of risk scenarios on global GDP and inflation levels3Simulation results210BaselineUpside-6-4-2-1024US fiscal cliffChina hardlanding-3Eurozone Multipleexits-4-5-6World CPI % difference from baseline at trough/peakSource:OEF/UBSA word on de-leveragingDe-leveraging has had a profound impa
69、ct on global economic activity andTracking de-leveragingpolicy making since the financial crisis erupted in 2007. The need to restorebalance sheet health and improve cash flows in the financial, household and thenon-financial corporate sector of many advanced economies led to the collapseof output (
70、great recession) in 2008-09, and also dictated the subdued recoverythereafter. Out of de-leveraging was born the notion of the new normal,characterized by below-trend growth, swathes of un- or under-utilized resources,low inflation, and extraordinary monetary and fiscal policy responses.Yet it is ea
71、sy to overlook the fact that the financial crisis erupted a half decadeago. The forces of de-leveraging that it unleashed were initially abrupt, and inrecent years have remained a significant restraint on global aggregate demand.UBS9changedGlobal Economic Perspectives 31October2012But with the passa
72、ge of time, de-leveraging has also become more advanced,above all in the US. That progress is evident in the three primary private sectors,as follows:Financial sector. Courtesy of accounting treatment, bank losses owing toexposures in US real estate were quickly recognized, forcing write-downs ofbad
73、 debts and necessitating rapid recapitalization of the banking sector. Incontrast to Spain today or Japan for much of the past two decades, US bankshave been quickly stabilized.Non-financial corporate sector. Similarly, during the great recessionfirms in the non-financial corporate sector were quick
74、 to recognize the needto pare costs, restructure operations and restore profitability. USmacroeconomic data, as well as much bottom-up listed company data,indicate that profitability from a given unit of sales has rarely been as high asit is today. The same is true for capital efficiency. Balance sh
75、eets, too, aremore liquid. Overall, de-leveraging in most the non-financial corporatesector has been rapid and is largely complete.Household sector. Developments in the household sector have been lessrapid, partly given greater rigidities in property markets and legal structures.Globally, developmen
76、ts are also uneven, with more evidence of de-leveraging in the US than in parts of Europe or the UK. For example, fromits peak, the nominal stock of US household debt has fallen by about $1trillion, including via foreclosure and bankruptcy, but aided by a higherpersonal savings rate and efforts by h
77、ouseholds to repay debt. This has led tonotable decline in the US household debt-to-disposable income ratio (ofabout 20 percentage points to below 110%). Coupled with lower interestrates, lower debt levels have enabled the US financial obligations ratiotheamout of disposable income allocated by hous
78、eholds to meet debt, rent andinsurance paymentsto decline to levels last seen in the early 1990s. Oncurrent trends, the ratio is set to fall to its all-time lows.As a consequence of all three forms of de-leveragingfinancial, non-financialcorporate and householdthe US economy, which leads other advan
79、cedFive years on, some things haveUS banks are lending, households areborrowingeconomies in this respect, ought to be in a position to grow faster. There is someevidence to support that notion. Banks are once again lending (US bank lendingto the private sector is up 5% year-on-year), the US housing
80、market isrecovering in terms of activity and prices, and US households are willing to takeon more credit (consumer credit has been rising, on average, for the past year).So, why then, has the US economy languished in 2012, particularly givendeclining real energy prices? The answer, it seems, resides
81、 in policy uncertainty,which has weighed on business decisions to invest and hire. Here, too, the dataare indicative. Despite decent consumer spending (for example, recent strengthin US retail or auto sales), business outlays on durable goods and overall hiringhave languished since Q2 2012.All of wh
82、ich brings us to the aforementioned fiscal cliff, as well as to regulatoryuncertainty. If the US political outcomes from next weeks election delivergreater certainty (and less risk) regarding fiscal and regulatory policies, thencombined with an ebbing of de-leveraging headwinds increased businessUBS
83、10GeneralGovernmentGrossDebtas%GDPFrancerestraintGlobal Economic Perspectives 31October2012spending and hiring could galvanize a stronger US economy over the next twoyears.Finally, no discussion of de-leveraging would be complete without reference tothe public sector, where the challenge remains out
84、standing and immense. AsChart 8 indicates, the current state of public finances in many parts of the worldeconomy is unsustainable. Alongside familiar data on debt-to-GDP ratios, wehave plotted in the chart the IMFs estimates of general government structuralbalances as a percentage of GDP. In other
85、words, that axis depicts the size ofbudget deficits that would prevail in the countries shown in Chart 8 even if theyreturned to full employment.The figures are staggeringIndia, Japan, the US, the UK and Spain are allestimated to have structural budget deficits in excess of 6% of GDP (in somecases m
86、uch higher). Even worse, the figures dont account for the hugecontingent liabilities that many of these countries face in terms of un- or under-funded pensions and rising healthcare costs in the coming decades associatedwith ageing populations.Chart 8: Debt-to-GDP versus structural budget deficitsPu
87、blic sector de-leveraging: The nextbig challengeEye-popping numbersJapan250200150ItalyIndiaUSSpainUKCanadaBrazil10050Germany0ChinaRussia-12-10-8-6-4-202General Government Structural Balance as % GDPSource:IMFWEO,UBSestimatesBy comparison, most Eurozone countries appear in far better fiscal shape (at
88、least as concerns deficits). That includes much-maligned Italy.Two broad macroeconomic conclusions can be drawn from Chart 8:First, it would be unwise for all large economies to engage in fiscaltightening simultaneously. As recent IMF work has shown, fiscal multipliersare magnified in a world of alr
89、eady low (even negative) real interest rates.Crowding in is an illusion in the new normal. The world economy willsurely be better off if countries that have the ability to postpone fiscaltightening do so, at least until their private sectors are strong enough toprovide a sufficient growth offset to
90、fiscal austerity.Second, even if a return to fiscal stability can be properly sequenced, the sizeof the countries involved and the size of the adjustment they require imply aSequencing required, but even so, asource of long-term aggregate demandlengthy period of global aggregate demand restraint, qu
91、ite possibly lastingthe remainder of this decade. If so, then the new normal of low growth, butUBS11Global Economic Perspectives 31October2012also low inflation and low interest rates, is likely to persist for considerablylonger. Barring supply-side shocks to commodity markets, it remainsdifficult t
92、herefore to see much inflationary pressure in the world economy.American revival?1In our final section, we consider the prospects for and implications of Americanrevival.As we noted on several occasions, the US economy is likely to be a keycontributor to improvements in the world economy over the ne
93、xt few years. Thatis significant. De-leveraging headwinds, credit restraint, and an under-performing housing sector have kept US growth at a sub-trend pace for severalyears now. If those restraints are now lesseningas we believethe impactcould signal a key change in global growth leadership for the
94、remainderof this decade.Above-trend growth in the US would, for example, support higher capitalequipment expenditures and improved job formation, thereby reducing marketconcerns over the sustainability of the current recovery. It could also re-energizefinancial market activity, including strategic c
95、orporate decisions such as mergersand acquisitions and cross-border foreign direct investment (FDI), including intothe US. Relative FDI flows could prove more supportive for the US dollarconsistent with our forecastsand would allow the US currency more generallyto re-establish a link with the US eco
96、nomys domestic fundamentals. Lastly, asustained recovery would eventually lift interest rates in the US and worldeconomy, even if as we envisage, inflation rates remain subdued.Can the US economy de-couple itself completely from developments elsewherein the world? Not entirely. Global trade and fina
97、ncial flows are too inter-connected nowadays to allow a major economy such as the US to fully divorceitself from developments in Europe or Asia. We believe instead that the USeconomy has the capacity to act more as a leader for global growth in the periodahead, but to also beat consensus forecasts,
98、which otherwise suggest a continuedperiod of sluggish US activity.Importantly, an American revival may not simply be a balance sheet adjustmentstory. Supply-side and competitiveness factors also play important roles.Innovations in energy supply (fracking and the greater exploitation of shale oiland
99、tar sands) will lessen US dependence on imported fossil fuels and willThe US economy is likely to be a keycontributor to the improvement in theworld economyAbove-trend growth in the US wouldsupport higher capital equipmentexpenditures and improved jobformationThe US is unlikely to de-couple itselfco
100、mpletely from developmentselsewhere in the worldAn American revival may not simply bea balance sheet adjustment story -supply-side and competitivenessfactors may play key rolesprovide cheaper energy to US businesses and households. Innovation ininformation technology and manufacturing may also prove
101、 to be areas ofsupply-side impetus for the US economy. On the manufacturing side, support isalso offered in the form of a more competitive US economy, courtesy of asteady depreciation of the US dollar in trade-weighted terms over most of thepast decade, coupled with gains in productivity (Chart 12).
102、1Thissectionbuildsonimportantworkfromourcolleaguesineconomicsandstrategy.Referencestotheirrelatedworkareprovidedintheappendixattheendofthisdocument.UBS12Jan-00Jan-01Jan-02Jan-03Jan-04Jan-05Jan-06Jan-07Jan-08Jan-09Jan-10Jan-11Jan-12165155Global Economic Perspectives 31October2012Chart 12: Real exchan
103、ge rate levels in the US, China and the EurozoneRealeffectiveexchangerate,Jan2000=100145135125115105958575A weak dollar will also helpBRICsEurozoneUSSource:BIS/HaverUBS13Global Economic Perspectives 31October2012Economic forecastsGDP growth%y/yUSCanadaJapanWestern EuropeWeight*0.230.020.070.222012F2
104、.12.22.2-0.22013F2.32.21.80.32014F3.02.91.81.0of which:EurozoneUKSwitzerlandAsia *0.170.040.010.23-0.40.01.15.70.11.10.96.20.91.21.36.5of which:ChinaIndiaLatin America0.100.040.087.55.53.27.86.54.48.07.04.0of which:BrazilEmerging EMEA0.030.071.52.94.53.53.63.5of which:RussiaRest of worldAdvanced eco
105、nomiesDeveloping economiesWORLD0.030.080.600.401.003.63.31.24.52.73.53.51.55.13.04.03.92.15.23.4Source:UBScalculationsandestimates*Basedonpurchasing-power-parity-adjustedGDPlevels;*includesAustraliaandNewZealand.Inflation%y/yUSCanadaJapanWestern EuropeWeight*0.230.020.070.222012F2.12.00.02.42013F1.8
106、2.30.32.02014F2.52.12.31.8of which:EurozoneUKSwitzerlandAsia *0.170.040.010.232.52.7-0.63.72.12.30.64.11.81.81.14.4of which:ChinaIndiaLatin America0.100.040.082.87.55.53.66.85.84.07.05.5of which:BrazilEmerging EMEA0.030.075.55.56.25.36.24.2of which:Russia0.035.16.85.6Source:UBScalculationsandestimat
107、es*Basedonpurchasing-power-parity-adjustedGDPlevels;*includesAustraliaandNewZealand.UBS14Global Economic Perspectives 31October2012Interest rate forecasts%31-Oct-12Dec-13Dec-14USFed Funds Rate10 year yield0.131.720-0.252.400-0.253.00CanadaBank of Canada Rate10 year yield1.001.791.502.602.003.30Japan
108、Call Rate10 year yield0.050.780-0.11.350-0.11.60GermanyRepo Rate10 year yield0.751.450.752.000.752.40SwedenRepo Rate10 year yield1.251.521.002.401.002.40UKRepo Rate10 year yield0.501.810.502.600.503.00Switzerland3 month rate10 year yield0.030.490.001.200.001.50AustraliaCash Rate10 year yield3.253.17
109、3.504.204.004.60New ZealandCash Rate10 year yield2.503.533.254.903.504.90Source:UBScalculationsandestimatesForeign exchange forecasts31-Oct-12Dec-13Dec-14EUR/USDUSD/JPYEUR/JPYUSD/RMBGBP/USDEUR/GBPUSD/CHFEUR/CHFUSD/CADAUD/USDNZD/USDEUR/SEKEUR/DKKEUR/NOK1.2979.40103.006.241.610.810.931.211.001.040.828
110、.637.467.461.2085.00102.006.351.560.771.001.201.031.000.798.307.467.301.1590.00103.506.301.440.801.041.201.050.950.788.507.467.30Source:UBScalculationsandestimatesUBS15Global Economic Perspectives 31October2012Appendix: Selected readingsUBS US Economic Research Q-Series, Will unemployment keep falli
111、ng morethan expected?, 21st February 2012, Maury Harris and teamUBS US Economic Research Q-Series Shale Boom and Economy, Could naturalgas & oil fuel next US boom?, 3rd June 2012, Maury Harris and teamUBS Global FX Strategy, Sizing Up Americas Energy Revolution, 20thFebruary 2012, Mansoor Mohi-uddin
112、UBS Global Economic Perspectives: Can US housing revive the worldeconomy? 31st August 2012, Andrew CatesUBS Global Economic Perspectives: Is the world economy hitting a BRIC wall?,6th September 2012, Larry Hatheway and Andrew CatesAnalyst CertificationEach research analyst primarily responsible for
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