2022年东南亚报告（英）-60页

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1、TH E STAT E O FSOUTHEAST ASIA2022SURVEY REPORTTHE STATE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA: 20221ABOUT THE SURVEYNow into its 4th edition, The State of Southeast Asia survey was launched in 2019 to gauge the views and perceptions of Southeast Asians regarding geopolitical developments affecting the region, key regio

2、nal affairs and how ASEAN has engaged with its Dialogue Partners over the preceding year. The objective of the survey is to present a snapshot of the prevailing attitudes among those in a position to inform or influence policy. The survey is not meant to present a definitive view of issues in the re

3、gion. Instead, it is designed to highlight the perceptions of the regions policymakers, academics, researchers, businesspeople, media personnel, and civil society activists towards a range of issues affecting Southeast Asia. Since 2019, it has become a reference source for scholars on Southeast Asia

4、 and ASEAN. This years survey was conducted over a period of 7 weeks from 11 November 2021 to 31 December 2021. The survey was offered in English, Bahasa Indonesia, Khmer, Lao, and Vietnamese language options. A total of 1,677 respondents from ten Southeast Asian countries took part in the survey. T

5、here are six sections in the survey. Section I covers the profile of the respondents by nationality, affiliation and age. Section II deals with questions on the regional outlook and COVID-19. Section III covers regional influence and leadership of major and middle powers. Section IV deals with ASEAN

6、s options in the changing regional political-security architecture. Section V measures perceptions of trust among Southeast Asians towards 5 countries China, United States, Japan, the European Union and India. Section VI gauges levels of soft power in the region based on travel and tertiary educatio

7、n choices. The questions and results have been reorganised for logical flow and optimal reporting. The figures in this report have been rounded up/down to the nearest one decimal point.SURVEY REPORT261.0%15.2%23.8%20211Southeast Asia continues to be preoccupied with the COVID-19 pandemic and economi

8、c recovery. The most pressing concern remains the pandemics threat to health (75.4%), followed by unemployment and economic recession (49.8%), and the impact of climate change (37.0%). Terrorism continues to rank last at 12.5%.2Southeast Asians are most concerned that ASEAN is slow and ineffective,

9、and thus cannot cope with political and economic developments (70.1%). They also share the concern that ASEAN is becoming an arena for major power competition in which its member states may become proxies of major powers (61.5%). At the same time, there remains concern that ASEAN is unable to overco

10、me the current pandemic challenges (49.0%).3Slightly more than half of the respondents (51.0%) feel that their governments have performed well or adequately in addressing the COVID-19 pandemic. 30.6% of the respondents disagree while 18.4% remain neutral.4The most trusted vaccine brands among Southe

11、ast Asians are the mRNA Pfizer and Moderna (54.8%), followed by Chinese brands Sinopharm and Sinovac (18.7%). 13.7% of the respondents feel comfortable with any vaccine available, higher than the vote share for AstraZeneca (9.2%), Indian-manufactured vaccines (1.9%), domestic vaccines (0.9%) and Spu

12、tnik-V (0.8%).SURVEY HIGHLIGHTSWellNeutralPoor2022Pfizer, Moderna54.8%Sinopharm, Sinovac18.7%Any vaccineavailable13.7%AstraZeneca9.2%Sputnik-V 0.8%Domestic vaccine brands0.9%Indian-manufactured vaccines 1.9%70.1%61.5%49.0%37.0%49.8%75.4%51.0%18.4%30.6%THE STATE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA: 20223China58.1%15.1

13、%26.8%India47.8%35.6%16.6%The EU26.1%25.4%48.5%Japan21.8%24.0%54.2%5The Myanmar crisis has put ASEANs centrality and unity to the test. 37.0% of the respondents approve of ASEANs response to the crisis, 33.1% disapprove, and 29.9% remain neutral. 42.5% of respondents who approve feel that ASEAN has

14、taken active steps to mediate in the crisis while 45.5% of those who disapprove feel that ASEAN is moving too slowly in its response to the escalating political and humanitarian crisis. 6Competing spheres of influence in the region and beyond are not far from everyones minds. 58.5% of the respondent

15、s welcome the strengthening of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) and the prospects of tangible cooperation in areas such as vaccine security and climate change. On regional security, 36.4% feel that the AUKUS arrangement will help balance Chinas growing military power, 22.5% feel that it wi

16、ll escalate the regional arms race, while 18.0% are of the view that it will weaken ASEAN centrality.7Chinas membership in the CPTPP is perceived to create both opportunities and challenges for the region. 31.0% feel that it will reduce economic tensions in the region and help to resolve the US-Chin

17、a trade war while 29.9% disagree. In the absence of the US, close to half (46.8%) are of the view that a rise in Chinas influence will fill the void. 23.2% are worried about the rise in regional tensions as the US shifts its focus of engagement to exclusive security pacts in the Indo-Pacific. 8Japan

18、 remains the most trusted major power among Southeast Asians, with 54.2% of the respondents expressing confidence in Japan to “do the right thing” to provide global public goods, followed by the US (52.8%), and the EU (48.5%). Of those who express distrust towards China (58.1%), 49.6% fear that Chin

19、a could use economic and military power to threaten their countrys interest and sovereignty.Approve & Strongly approve37.0%Disapprove & Strongly disapprove33.1%Neutral29.9%Agree58.5%Neutral28.5%29.9%31.0%Reduces regional economic tensionsIncreases regional economic tensions23.2%46.8%Rise in Chinas i

20、nfluence in the regionRise in regional tensionsChinas membership in the CPTPPMain implications of the US staying out of the CPTPPThe US29.6%17.6%52.8%No confidenceNo commentConfidenceDisagree13.0%Balance Chinas military powerEscalate regional arms raceWeaken ASEAN centralityQUADAUKUS36.4%22.5%18.0%S

21、URVEY REPORT4METHODOLOGYAPPRECIATIONThe regions challenges have become increasingly complex with each passing year and the number of questions to be surveyed have also increased in tandem. This years survey questions were carefully designed and curated with the help of a panel of experts; relentless

22、ly edited and tested to remove self-selection bias, red herring questions and so on.Putting aside branching questions, the survey comprised 50 questions in total which takes approximately 15-25 minutes to complete. It was conducted both online and offline using a mixed sampling method. A total of 1,

23、677 Southeast Asians completed the survey. Majority of the respondents 1,507 self-identified Southeast Asians took the survey online while another 170 were polled using Computer-Assisted Personal Interview (CAPI) methods in Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam with the assistance of a

24、 panel provider. Respondents came from 5 affiliation categories: (a) academia, think-tankers and researchers; (b) business or finance We would like to extend our deepest appreciation to our institutional partners Mr Julio Amador III of Amador Research Services of the Philippines and Dr Asyurah Salle

25、h and Mr Naveed Khan of Global Awareness & Impact Alliance (GAIA) of Brunei for helping us to promote this survey in their foreign policy circles. We are also grateful for the unstinting assistance from the ASEAN Studies Centre interns, Mr Muhammad Afiq Hajis and Mr Tyler Wu, in the collection, clea

26、ning and weighting of the survey data. We also want to extend our thanks to the various representatives; (c) civil society, NGO or media representatives; (d) government officials; and (e) regional or international organisations personnel.We decided to apply a different methodology this year assignin

27、g a 10% weighted average to each countrys responses to calculate the average figures for ASEAN as a whole. This is to ensure that the responses of each country are represented by equal proportion, given that ASEANs decision-making processes are based on each country having equal say, regardless of c

28、ountry or population size. Final analysis of regional sentiment was conducted on the weighted data set. For the questions that required trend analysis, we applied the same weighted average method to the 2021 data so that comparative analysis can be done. We applied a strict set of criteria during th

29、e data cleaning process to maintain data quality and integrity.Users should note that 2021 survey data may have changed moderately with the use of the 10% weightage method.ISEAS researchers who helped craft, curate, and refine earlier drafts of the Survey. In addition, we would like to give a specia

30、l shout-out to two of ISEAS most dedicated Research Officers Ms Qiu Jiahui and Ms Rebecca Neo for rendering their invaluable assistance when we needed it the most. Last but not least, we wish to extend our sincere appreciation to the 1,677 respondents for taking their time to complete this Survey. Y

31、our collective voice is demonstrative of the ASEAN Community-In-Action.THE STATE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA: 20225SECTION I: Respondents ProfileNATIONALITYThis section features the background of the survey respondents, including their nationality, affiliation and age distribution. No weighting was applied in

32、 this section. A total of 1,677 respondents from ten ASEAN member states participated in this survey. The Philippines led with the highest number of respondents at 400 (23.9%), followed closely by Myanmar at 350 (20.9%) and Singapore at 222 (13.2%). The breakdown for the rest of the countries are: V

33、ietnam (8.6%), Malaysia (8.1%), Indonesia (7.8%), Thailand (7.0%), Cambodia (4.8%), Brunei (3.2%) and Laos (2.6%).Q1 What is your nationality?3.2%2.5%15.1%6.5%12.5%3.9%11.3%15.3%12.7%17.0%3.2%4.8%20.9%23.9%7.8%2.6%8.1%13.2%7.0%8.6%20212022SURVEY REPORT6AFFILIATIONThe largest affiliation group this y

34、ear came from Government at 38.5%, followed by Academia, Think-tanks or Research Institutions at 30.4%, and Civil Society, Non-Governmental Organisations or Media at 14.3%. ASEANs private sector Q2 What is your affiliation?5.8%11.1%14.3%30.4%38.5%Civil Society, Non-Government Organisations,or MediaA

35、cademia, Think-Tanks, or Research InstitutionsBusiness or FinanceGovernmentRegional or International OrganisationsCountryAcademia, Think-Tanks, or Research InstitutionsBusiness or FinanceGovernmentCivil Society, Non-Government Organisations, or MediaRegional or International OrganisationsASEAN30.4%1

36、1.1%38.5%14.3%5.8%Brunei20.8%13.2%43.4%17.0%5.7%Cambodia22.2%24.7%25.9%18.5%8.6%Indonesia51.9%16.8%10.7%15.3%5.3%Laos22.7%11.4%63.6%2.3%0.0%Malaysia37.0%14.1%20.7%21.5%6.7%Myanmar33.1%2.6%45.1%15.1%4.0%Philippines22.0%4.0%65.3%6.0%2.8%Singapore31.1%16.2%20.7%21.2%10.8%Thailand32.5%17.1%30.8%8.5%11.1

37、%Vietnam29.2%22.2%20.8%21.5%6.3%(Business or Finance) was represented by 11.1%. The smallest representation came from respondents affiliated with Regional or International Organisations at 5.8%.THE STATE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA: 20227AGEIn terms of age distribution, the largest age group remained the 21-3

38、5 years old at 36.7%. This is followed by the 36 - 45 years old group at 28.0%. According to the ASEAN Statistical Yearbook 2021, these two age groups form more than half of ASEANs total population. The third largest group was the 46-60 years old Q3 What age group do you belong to?21 - 3536 - 4546 -

39、 60Above 60Under 215.7%5.9%28.0%36.7%23.8%CountryUnder 2121 - 3536 - 4546 - 60Above 60ASEAN5.7%36.7%28.0%23.8%5.9%Brunei5.7%56.6%24.5%13.2%0.0%Cambodia3.7%29.6%35.8%29.6%1.2%Indonesia0.8%45.0%29.8%21.4%3.1%Laos6.8%29.5%56.8%6.8%0.0%Malaysia0.7%29.6%22.2%34.8%12.6%Myanmar12.3%58.3%16.9%11.1%1.4%Phili

40、ppines8.0%27.3%31.3%30.0%3.5%Singapore1.8%18.9%22.5%37.8%18.9%Thailand0.9%30.8%31.6%23.9%12.8%Vietnam2.8%40.3%43.1%13.2%0.7%group at 23.8%, followed by those above 60 years old at 5.9%. Of note, the proportion of respondents below age 21 (Gen Z) doubled this year from 2.2% to 5.7% with the biggest p

41、roportion from Myanmar. In the above 60 years old category, Singapore dominated at 18.9%, co-related with its aging demographics.SURVEY REPORT8202237.0%202165.5%202176.7%This section examines the key challenges and main preoccupations of the region of the preceding year. Weighting was applied in thi

42、s section for both 2021 and 2022 results in order to provide trend analysis.SECTION II: Regional Outlook and DevelopmentsTOP THREE CHALLENGES FACING SOUTHEAST ASIAThe COVID-19 pandemics threat to healthUnemployment and economic recession COVID-19s threat to health continues to preoccupy Southeast As

43、ians topping the rankings at 75.4% followed by the risks of unemployment and economic recession at 49.8%. The third most important issue for Southeast Asia is the urgency in addressing climate change and the extreme weather events that have battered the region in 2021. Climate change garnered 37.0%

44、of support from respondents, overtaking the third ranked challenge last year which was widening socio-economic gaps and rising income disparity. The Philippines (52.0%) and Vietnam (53.5%) gave higher weightages to climate change as they felt the impacts of extreme weather events more keenly than th

45、e rest of the ASEAN member states. This is similar with other climate-related surveys where the Philippines and Vietnams climate concerns are more elevated compared with the rest of Southeast Asia.At the country-level, all respondents chose COVID-19s threat to public health as the regions top challe

46、nge, except for Myanmar. Deterioration of human rights was Myanmars top choice at 76.6%, a reflection of the peoples suffering amidst the ongoing crisis in the country since 1 February 2021. This is followed by COVID-19 threat at second place (58.3%) and domestic political instability closely at thi

47、rd place (58.0%). Myanmar respondents views of human rights worsened by more than ten times from 7.1% in 2021 to 76.6% in 2022. Although the question was directed at regional challenges, domestic preoccupation clearly made their way into respondents choices.202275.4%202249.8%Climate changeWidening s

48、ocio-economic gapsSURVEY REPORT8202141.7%10% weighting was applied to 2021 data resulting in a change of results.THE STATE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA: 2022920212022CountryDeteriorating human rights conditionsDomestic political instabilityIncreased military tensions arising from potential flashpointsClimate c

49、hange and more intense and frequent weather eventsTerrorismThe COVID-19 pandemics threat to healthUnemployment and economic recessionWidening socio-economic gaps and rising income disparityASEAN22.6%34.3%35.6%37.0%12.5%75.4%49.8%32.8%Brunei11.3%18.9%35.8%50.9%1.9%81.1%58.5%41.5%Cambodia14.8%42.0%42.

50、0%23.5%11.1%80.2%51.9%34.6%Indonesia20.6%35.9%29.8%49.6%7.6%67.9%51.9%36.6%Laos18.2%18.2%6.8%29.5%6.8%88.6%77.3%54.5%Malaysia20.0%50.4%28.9%26.7%11.1%78.5%57.8%26.7%Myanmar76.6%58.0%33.7%9.4%35.1%58.3%22.0%6.9%Philippines10.3%17.8%51.2%52.0%24.5%84.0%37.8%22.5%Singapore19.8%40.1%46.4%45.5%7.7%69.4%2

51、9.3%41.9%Thailand20.5%43.6%31.6%29.1%12.0%75.2%51.3%36.8%Vietnam13.9%18.1%49.3%53.5%7.6%70.8%60.4%26.4%Q4 What are the top 3 challenges facing Southeast Asia? (check 3 responses)CountryDeteriorating human rights conditionsDomestic political instabilityIncreased military tensions arising from potenti

52、al flashpointsClimate change and more intense and frequent weather eventsTerrorismThe COVID-19 pandemics threat to healthUnemployment and economic recessionWidening socio-economic gaps and rising income disparityASEAN13.8%31.8%28.2%36.7%5.5%76.7%65.5%41.7%Brunei12.1%12.1%33.3%39.4%9.1%69.7%78.8%45.5

53、%Cambodia23.1%30.8%30.8%42.3%0.0%76.9%53.8%42.3%Indonesia15.5%31.8%26.4%29.5%5.4%84.5%67.4%39.5%Laos10.0%27.5%7.5%17.5%12.5%90.0%85.0%50.0%Malaysia16.2%48.7%23.9%22.2%2.6%71.8%70.1%44.4%Myanmar7.1%45.5%13.5%29.5%9.6%87.8%69.9%37.2%Philippines13.4%11.9%37.3%59.7%3.0%80.6%65.7%28.4%Singapore6.3%36.7%3

54、3.5%45.6%7.6%63.3%55.1%51.9%Thailand31.3%52.7%16.8%19.8%3.1%64.9%55.0%56.5%Vietnam3.4%20.0%59.4%61.7%1.7%77.7%54.3%21.7%SURVEY REPORT10TOP THREE CONCERNS ABOUT ASEANSoutheast Asians continue to express their frustrations with ASEAN as a slow and ineffective organisation, unable to cope with fluid po

55、litical and economic developments at an overwhelming 70.1%. This concern overtook last years top concern which was that of ASEAN becoming an arena of major power competition and its member states being used as a proxy in major power competition. This concern became the second-ranked concern this yea

56、r at 61.5%. Concerns about ASEANs inability to overcome current pandemic challenges maintained third place this year at 49.0%. The view of ASEAN being slow and ineffective was prevalent in seven out of ten ASEAN member states, with the exception of Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia. Laos and Vietnam viewed

57、 ASEANs inability to fend off major power competition in the region as their top concern. Interestingly, Cambodia made ASEAN disunity its top choice this year at 64.2% but the biggest increase in concern registered was Indonesia where this view almost doubled from 26.4% in 2021 to 45.8% this year. W

58、e note the jump in opinion about ASEANs relevance in the new world order from 22.0% in 2021 to 32.2% this year. Concerns about ASEANs relevance saw the highest jumps from Cambodia from 15.4% (2021) to 43.2% (2022), Myanmar from 17.3% (2021) to 41.4% (2022) and Vietnam from 24.0% (2021) to 37.5% (202

59、2). The strength of this view is also intensified in Thailand from 16.8% (2021) to 36.8% (2022). On the other hand, maritime Southeast Asian countries - Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore - maintained their ratings with slight differentials in opinion of between 5% - 7% on t

60、he issue of ASEANs relevance.70.1%ASEAN is slow and ineffective, and thus cannot cope with fluid political and economic developments.61.5%ASEAN is becoming an arena of major power competition and its member states may become major power proxies.202249.0%ASEAN is unable to overcome current pandemic c

61、hallenges.69.5%ASEAN is slow and ineffective, and thus cannot cope with fluid political and economic developments.70.8%ASEAN is becoming an arena of major power competition and its member states may become major power proxies.51.4%ASEAN is unable to overcome current pandemic challenges.202110% weigh

62、ting was applied to 2021 data resulting in a change of results and rankings.THE STATE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA: 2022112022CountryASEAN is becoming an arena of major power competition and its member states may become major power proxiesASEAN is becoming increasingly disunitedASEAN is becoming irrelevant in

63、the new world orderASEAN is elitist and disconnected from ordinary peopleASEAN is slow and ineffective, and thus cannot cope with fluid political and economic developmentsASEAN is unable to overcome current pandemic challengesASEAN61.5%48.2%32.2%39.0%70.1%49.0%Brunei60.4%52.8%30.2%39.6%71.7%45.3%Cam

64、bodia56.8%64.2%43.2%37.0%51.9%46.9%Indonesia64.9%45.8%30.5%45.8%64.9%48.1%Laos79.5%27.3%20.5%22.7%70.5%79.5%Malaysia54.8%41.5%28.1%45.9%71.1%58.5%Myanmar33.1%33.7%41.4%61.1%90.6%40.0%Philippines65.5%52.5%24.5%26.8%74.3%56.5%Singapore67.6%60.4%29.3%27.5%79.7%35.6%Thailand59.8%47.9%36.8%51.3%65.8%38.5

65、%Vietnam72.9%55.6%37.5%31.9%61.1%41.0%Q5 What are your top 3 concerns about ASEAN? (check 3 responses)2021CountryASEAN is becoming an arena of major power competition and its member states may become major power proxiesASEAN is becoming increasingly disunitedASEAN is becoming irrelevant in the new w

66、orld orderASEAN is elitist and disconnected from ordinary peopleASEAN is slow and ineffective, and thus cannot cope with fluid political and economic developmentsASEAN is unable to overcome current pandemic challengesASEAN70.8%44.9%22.0%41.3%69.5%51.4%Brunei87.9%45.5%30.3%39.4%60.6%36.4%Cambodia84.6

67、%53.8%15.4%50.0%61.5%34.6%Indonesia62.0%26.4%23.3%49.6%66.7%72.1%Laos60.0%37.5%17.5%47.5%70.0%67.5%Malaysia59.0%44.4%25.6%47.9%69.2%53.8%Myanmar71.2%26.9%17.3%43.6%75.0%66.0%Philippines76.1%34.3%25.4%40.3%68.7%55.2%Singapore72.8%60.8%24.7%24.7%74.7%42.4%Thailand53.4%52.7%16.8%51.9%77.1%48.1%Vietnam8

68、1.1%66.9%24.0%18.3%71.4%38.3%SURVEY REPORT12202161.0%15.2%23.8%GOVERNMENTS PERFORMANCE IN ADDRESSING THE COVID-19 PANDEMICPerhaps due to the Delta variant that wreaked havoc in the region in 2021, disapproval of regional governments COVID-19 handling increased from 23.8% in 2021 to 30.6% in 2022. Th

69、e share of respondents who said that their governments performed very poorly more than doubled from 7.1% to 15.9%. Those who felt that their governments performed well or adequately dropped by ten percentage points from 61.0% to 51.0%. The share of fence sitters who were neutral about their governme

70、nts handling of the pandemic saw a slight increase from 15.2% to 18.4%. Bruneians were almost unanimous in their support of their governments handling with 98.1% followed by Singaporeans of whom 87.8% thought their governments did well. Conversely, the Vietnamese governments “Poor” ratings increased

71、 dramatically from 1.1% last year to 23.7% this year. Vietnam was highly admired at the start of the pandemic for its efficient handling of the outbreak but its slow national vaccination roll-out in 2021 may have resulted in higher disapproval ratings. Vietnamese numbers for the neutral category als

72、o increased from 2.3% to 34.0% indicating that while they dont disapprove, they are not exactly satisfied with the outcome either. It goes without saying that Myanmar respondents unhappiness with their countrys political situation at this stage were unanimous in their disapproval of the State Admini

73、stration Council at 93.4%.202251.0%18.4%30.6%WellNeutralPoorQ6 How has your government performed this year in addressing the COVID-19 pandemic?CountryWellAdequateNeutralPoorVery Poor2021202220212022202120222021202220212022ASEAN28.6%23.2%32.4%27.8%15.2%18.4%16.7%14.7%7.1%15.9%Brunei72.7%66.0%21.2%32.

74、1%3.0%0.0%0.0%1.9%3.0%0.0%Cambodia26.9%34.6%53.8%33.3%11.5%21.0%3.8%4.9%3.8%6.2%Indonesia4.7%25.2%19.4%36.6%25.6%26.0%35.7%10.7%14.7%1.5%Laos22.5%15.9%32.5%20.5%22.5%38.6%17.5%18.2%5.0%6.8%Malaysia14.5%10.4%40.2%22.2%17.1%15.6%27.4%27.4%0.9%24.4%Myanmar5.8%0.6%37.2%1.4%25.0%4.6%23.1%10.3%9.0%83.1%Ph

75、ilippines6.0%12.0%19.4%29.5%20.9%19.0%35.8%26.0%17.9%13.5%Singapore43.7%40.5%48.7%47.3%5.7%6.8%1.9%4.1%0.0%1.4%Thailand13.0%14.5%31.3%24.8%19.1%18.8%21.4%26.5%15.3%15.4%Vietnam76.0%12.5%20.6%29.9%2.3%34.0%0.0%17.4%1.1%6.3%10% weighting was applied to 2021 data resulting in a change of results.THE ST

76、ATE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA: 202213Japan4.1%Australia4.7%The United States23.2%57.8%ChinaQ7 Which ASEAN Dialogue Partner has provided the most COVID-19 vaccine support to the region?ASSESSMENT OF DIALOGUE PARTNERS ASSISTANCE ON COVID-19As of January 13, nine out of the ten ASEAN member states have achieve

77、d at least 40% full vaccination of their populations according to aggregated data on the website Reporting ASEAN. The target set by the World Health Organization by the end of 2021 was for all countries to have at least 40% of their populations fully vaccinated. Due to its current crisis, Myanmar on

78、ly managed to attain 34.39% full vaccination rate (as at 5 February 2022 on Reporting ASEAN). All ASEAN countries have used either Sinopharm or Sinovac as part of their national vaccination roll-outs whether by purchase agreement or through bilateral donations.The region is of the view that China ha

79、s given the strongest COVID-19 vaccine support (57.8%). The runner up the United States was ranked at a distant second of 23.2%, followed by Australia at third place (4.7%), Japan at fourth place (4.1%), India at fifth place (3.6%) and the EU at sixth place (2.6%).A June 2021 study by ISEAS found th

80、at China donated 7.3 million doses to Southeast Asia and countries had purchased 203 million doses. According to the State Department website, the US had donated 23 million doses by August 2021. President Xi upped the game by pledging an additional 150 million doses to ASEAN in November 2021. The hi

81、gh-profile 2021 visits of members of the Biden Administration to the various countries in the region that brought COVID-19 supplies of vaccines, masks, and ventilators were overshadowed. Instead, the focus of attention was on the number of vaccines either donated or sold by China to the regional cou

82、ntries. Cambodia gave 91.4% of its vote to China. Vietnam was the only exception out of the grouping that voted the US as ASEANs top dialogue partner in vaccine diplomacy. Vice President Kamala Harris highly publicised visit in August 2021 may have given the US an edge up in Vietnams ratings (52.8%)

83、.CountryAustraliaCanadaChinaThe European UnionIndiaJapanNew ZealandRepublic of KoreaRussiaThe United StatesThe United KingdomASEAN4.7%0.3%57.8%2.6%3.6%4.1%1.1%0.7%0.4%23.2%1.5%Brunei20.8%0.0%64.2%0.0%0.0%9.4%3.8%0.0%0.0%0.0%1.9%Cambodia0.0%0.0%91.4%1.2%4.9%1.2%0.0%0.0%0.0%1.2%0.0%Indonesia2.3%0.0%68

84、.7%6.1%0.8%3.1%2.3%0.8%0.8%13.7%1.5%Laos2.3%2.3%77.3%0.0%0.0%2.3%0.0%0.0%0.0%13.6%2.3%Malaysia1.5%0.0%64.4%0.7%4.4%6.7%0.7%0.7%0.0%18.5%2.2%Myanmar1.1%0.0%40.0%2.6%22.6%4.0%0.3%2.3%1.1%25.4%0.6%Philippines1.8%0.8%46.5%1.8%0.0%3.5%0.8%0.8%2.5%40.8%1.0%Singapore3.6%0.0%45.5%5.0%1.8%1.8%1.4%0.0%0.0%40.

85、1%0.9%Thailand1.7%0.0%64.1%0.0%0.9%2.6%0.9%1.7%0.0%25.6%2.6%Vietnam11.8%0.0%16.0%8.3%0.7%6.9%0.7%0.7%0.0%52.8%2.1%India3.6%EU2.6%SURVEY REPORT14MOST PREFERRED VACCINE BRANDQ8 Which vaccine brand do you trust most?CountrySinopharm, SinovacPfizer, ModernaAstraZenecaSputnik-VIndian-manufactured vaccine

86、s (e.g. Covishield, Covaxin)Domestic vaccine brands (e.g. Nanocovax)Any vaccine availableASEAN18.7%54.8%9.2%0.8%1.9%0.9%13.7%Brunei1.9%62.3%5.7%0.0%0.0%0.0%30.2%Cambodia67.9%16.0%1.2%0.0%2.5%0.0%12.3%Indonesia35.1%34.4%9.9%1.5%0.8%1.5%16.8%Laos18.2%65.9%4.5%2.3%0.0%0.0%9.1%Malaysia23.7%48.1%11.9%0.0

87、%3.0%0.7%12.6%Myanmar5.1%68.6%4.6%0.0%11.7%0.3%9.7%Philippines9.0%54.5%6.5%4.0%0.0%0.0%26.0%Singapore4.5%90.1%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.5%5.0%Thailand17.1%52.1%23.1%0.0%0.9%0.9%6.0%Vietnam4.2%55.6%24.3%0.7%0.7%4.9%9.7%The most trusted vaccine brands among Southeast Asians selected by 54.8% of all respondents ar

88、e mRNA vaccines Pfizer and Moderna. They are most popular in Singapore (90.1%), followed by Myanmar (68.6%), Laos (65.9%) and Brunei (62.3%). Taking the second place is Chinese brands Sinopharm and Sinovac (18.7%). Chinese vaccines are most trusted in Cambodia (67.9%) and least trusted in Brunei (1.

89、9%), Vietnam (4.2%), Singapore (4.5%) and Myanmar (5.1%). Intriguingly, the option of “any vaccine available” is selected by 13.7% of all respondents, significantly higher than the vote share of specific brands of AstraZeneca (9.2%), Indian-manufactured vaccines (1.9%), domestic vaccines (0.9%) and

90、Sputnik-V (0.8%). Chinas vaccine diplomacy has proven to be most effective in Cambodia. The level of recognition of Chinese vaccine support is very high among the Cambodians (67.9%), reflecting Chinas status as Cambodias dominant vaccine supplier. However, with the clear exception of Cambodia, the r

91、ecognition of Chinese vaccine support reflected in the previous question (Q7) does not necessarily correlate with the popularity of its vaccine brands among the recipient populations. For example, though more than two-thirds of respondents in Indonesia (68.7%) and Malaysia (64.4%) identify China as

92、the country that has provided the most vaccine support to the region, only 35.1% in Indonesia and 23.7% in Malaysia prefer Chinese vaccines over others. A possible reason could be concerns about the efficacy of Chinese vaccines, especially compared to the newer mRNA vaccines. This was seen in Laos,

93、where a majority of Lao respondents (65.9%) prefer mRNA vaccines, despite the fact that China is the largest vaccine supplier to the country and 77.3% of Lao respondents think that China has provided the most vaccine support to the region (see previous question).Pfizer, Moderna54.8%Sinopharm, Sinova

94、c18.7%Indian-manufactured vaccines (e.g. Covishield, Covaxin)Domestic vaccine brands (e.g. Nanocovax)Sputnik-VAny vaccineavailable13.7%AstraZeneca9.2%1.9%0.9%0.8%THE STATE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA: 202215ASEANS RESPONSE TO THE MYANMAR CRISISQ9 Do you approve of ASEANs response to the Myanmar crisis?Country

95、Strongly approveApproveNeutralDisapproveStrongly disapproveASEAN11.3%25.7%29.9%18.7%14.4%Brunei18.9%39.6%18.9%20.8%1.9%Cambodia16.0%27.2%30.9%17.3%8.6%Indonesia15.3%29.0%35.1%16.8%3.8%Laos9.1%29.5%45.5%11.4%4.5%Malaysia16.3%18.5%31.1%14.8%19.3%Myanmar4.0%7.4%9.7%17.7%61.1%Philippines4.5%20.5%39.0%27

96、.3%8.8%Singapore11.7%32.0%19.4%19.4%17.6%Thailand11.1%24.8%24.8%28.2%11.1%Vietnam6.3%28.5%44.4%13.9%6.9%Southeast Asians are equally split in their views of ASEANs response to the Myanmar crisis with 37.0% saying they either “Approve” or “Strongly Approve”; 29.9% saying they are neutral; and 33.1% w

97、ho either “Disapprove” or “Strongly Disapprove”. At the country-level, putting Myanmars own overwhelming disapproval ratings (78.8%) aside, the country that registered the next highest level of disapproval was Thailand at 39.3%, followed by Singapore at 37.0%. Brunei was most approving of ASEANs res

98、ponse at 58.5% presumably because they were the ASEAN Chair last year and had been handed this hot-potato crisis to resolve. Indonesians were second most approving of ASEANs response at 44.3%. This could be due to the active shuttle diplomacy demonstrated by Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi

99、 in the early days of the crisis. The third most approving of ASEAN actions is Singapore at 43.7%. Approve & Strongly approve37.0%29.9%Neutral33.1%Disapprove & Strongly disapproveSURVEY REPORT16ASEAN is already going above and beyond without violating the principle of non-interference19.3%REASONS FO

100、R APPROVING ASEANS MYANMAR RESPONSEQ10 Why do you approve of ASEANs response?Answered: 517 (Respondents who chose the “Strongly approve” and “Approve” options in Q9)Of the 517 respondents who chose either “Approve” or “Strongly Approve”, 42.5% say that ASEAN had taken active steps to mediate in the

101、crisis such as by convening the Leaders Meeting in April 2021, agreeing on the Five-Point Consensus and the subsequent appointment of the ASEAN Chairs Special Envoy. The second most popular reason given is that ASEAN is doing its best given institutional limits but is unable to override intransigent

102、 attitudes of Myanmar stakeholders, thereby blaming factors that are beyond ASEANs control. Brunei CountryASEAN has taken active steps to mediate in the crisis (e.g., Leaders Meeting, Five-Point Consensus, appointment of Special Envoy)ASEAN is already going above and beyond without violating the pri

103、nciple of non-interferenceASEAN is doing the best it can within its institutional limits but is unable to override the intransigent attitudes of the Myanmar stakeholdersMajor external powers are following ASEANs lead on Myanmar and boosting ASEAN centralityASEAN42.5%19.3%30.1%8.2%Brunei35.5%9.7%51.6

104、%3.2%Cambodia37.1%34.3%20.0%8.6%Indonesia62.1%6.9%29.3%1.7%Laos29.4%29.4%23.5%17.6%Malaysia40.4%31.9%23.4%4.3%Myanmar45.0%10.0%30.0%15.0%Philippines56.0%11.0%28.0%5.0%Singapore38.1%10.3%45.4%6.2%Thailand45.2%21.4%21.4%11.9%Vietnam36.0%28.0%28.0%8.0%(51.6%) and Singapore (45.4%) are the two outlier m

105、embers citing ASEANs institutional limits and its inability to override intransigence as their top reason for their satisfaction with ASEAN. Respondents from Brunei and Singapore would have liked to see more done but are cognizant of ASEANs limitations. Cambodia, on the hand, felt that ASEAN was alr

106、eady going above and beyond its call of duty without violating the principle of non-interference (34.3%). This is Cambodias second ranked reason for approval of ASEANs actions. ASEAN has taken active steps to mediate in the crisis42.5%ASEAN is doing the best it can within its institutional limits bu

107、t is unable to override the intransigent attitudes of the Myanmar stakeholders30.1%Major external powers are following ASEANs lead on Myanmar and boosting ASEAN centrality8.2%THE STATE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA: 202217Infographic: bar chartASEAN is moving too slowly in response to the escalating political a

108、nd humanitarian crisis due to its internal disunityASEAN is breaking its own principle of non-interferenceREASONS FOR DISAPPROVING ASEANS MYANMAR RESPONSEQ11 Why do you disapprove of ASEANs response?Answered: 691 (Respondents who chose the “Strongly disapprove” and “Disapprove” options in Q9)Of the

109、691 respondents who chose either “Disapprove” or “Strongly Disapprove”, 45.5% of ASEAN respondents say that ASEAN was too slow in its response to the escalating political and humanitarian crisis due to its internal disunity. Brunei (75.0%), Indonesia (55.6%), Laos (42.9%), the Philippines (57.6%), S

110、ingapore (43.9%), Thailand (52.2%) and Vietnam (33.3%) share this view. Another 26.4% say that it was not utilising harder methods in dealing with the crisis such as suspending membership and using sanctions to curtail the CountryASEAN is moving too slowly in response to the escalating political and

111、 humanitarian crisis due to its internal disunityASEAN is not engaging with all the relevant key stakeholders in Myanmar and at the international levelASEAN is not utilising harder methods (e.g., suspension, targeted sanctions) to effectively curtail the SACASEAN is breaking its own principle of non

112、-interferenceASEAN45.5%18.5%26.4%9.6%Brunei75.0%0.0%16.7%8.3%Cambodia28.6%33.3%28.6%9.5%Indonesia55.6%18.5%25.9%0.0%Laos42.9%0.0%0.0%57.1%Malaysia32.6%21.7%43.5%2.2%Myanmar33.3%22.5%39.9%4.3%Philippines57.6%23.6%17.4%1.4%Singapore43.9%22.0%32.9%1.2%Thailand52.2%19.6%26.1%2.2%Vietnam33.3%23.3%33.3%10

113、.0%45.5%ASEAN is not engaging with all the relevant key stakeholders in Myanmar and at the international level18.5%ASEAN is not utilising harder methods to effectively curtail the SAC26.4%9.6%State Administration Council. Of this second group favouring harder methods, Malaysia and Vietnam (Vietnams

114、second choice tied with ASEANs slow response) are the outliers. Myanmar respondents appear split between wanting to see harder methods employed (39.9%) and ASEANs lack of speed (33.3%). Of this grouping, Cambodias top reason for disapproval was that it wanted to see ASEAN engage with all relevant st

115、akeholders in Myanmar and at the international level (33.3%).SURVEY REPORT18All respondents, regardless of their responses made in the last two questions, were asked to select one out of five options on how to move the Myanmar issue forward. 37.8% want to see ASEAN engage in independent trust-buildi

116、ng dialogue with all key stakeholders in Myanmar. This is perhaps in recognition of the polarity in differences between different groups in the country. The second most preferred option is for ASEAN to mount a coordinated and unified response with international partners (24.4%), followed by ASEAN em

117、ploying harder methods of suspension, sanctions etc to curtail the State Administration Council (19.6%). Myanmar respondents are the strongest proponents of the third-ranked option at 43.4%. They are also the strongest in their views about expelling Myanmar from ASEAN at 21.4%. Conversely, Laos hold

118、s the strongest views among the ten countries that ASEAN should not interfere with Myanmars domestic policies (22.7%). MOVING THE MYANMAR ISSUE FORWARDQ12 To move the issue forward, ASEAN should:CountryEngage in independent dialogue with all key stakeholders in Myanmar to build trustMount a coordina

119、ted and unified response with international partnersUtilise harder methods (e.g., suspension, targeted sanctions) to effectively curtail the SACExpel Myanmar from ASEAN and re-admit it when free and fair elections have taken placeNot interfere with Myanmars domestic politicsASEAN37.8%24.4%19.6%9.8%8

120、.4%Brunei50.9%24.5%15.1%5.7%3.8%Cambodia43.2%21.0%16.0%4.9%14.8%Indonesia42.7%24.4%22.1%6.9%3.8%Laos36.4%31.8%2.3%6.8%22.7%Malaysia34.8%15.6%19.3%16.3%14.1%Myanmar22.0%9.1%43.4%21.4%4.0%Philippines38.8%38.5%11.5%4.5%6.8%Singapore33.3%23.9%23.9%14.4%4.5%Thailand39.3%26.5%21.4%10.3%2.6%Vietnam36.8%28.

121、5%20.8%6.9%6.9%37.8%Engage in independent dialogue with all key stakeholders in Myanmar to build trustMount a coordinated and unified response with international partners24.4%Utilise harder methods to effectively curtail the SAC19.6%Expel Myanmar from ASEAN9.8%Not interfere8.4%THE STATE OF SOUTHEAST

122、 ASIA: 202219Respondents are divided on how ASEAN should respond to the Mekong River issues. The largest group of respondents (26.9%) agree to work with local Mekong sub-regional frameworks and key organisations in responding to crises in the Mekong River Delta. This preference is most pronounced am

123、ong respondents from Brunei (39.6%), Singapore (30.6%), Malaysia (29.6%), Laos (29.5%), and Cambodia (28.4%). Many also think that ASEAN must collaborate closely with its Dialogue Partners and international organisations (25.4%), particularly among those from Vietnam (41.0%), the Philippines (33.5%)

124、, and Thailand (29.1%). Although only 25.2% of overall respondents prefer to see ASEAN strengthen ASEAN-led Mekong Initiatives, this view is the most popular among respondents from Indonesia (36.6%). Of note, more than half of the respondents from Myanmar think that ASEAN cannot do anything because

125、China is the paramount power in the Mekong region, signifying pessimism of ASEANs influence in the Mekong sub-region. Among this cohort, those under 21 years old (58.1%) and between 21-35 years old (54.9%) are more likely to agree with this view than the older age groups.VIEWS ON MEKONG RIVER ISSUES

126、 Q13 How should ASEAN respond to the Mekong River issues?CountryASEANs actions are sufficientStrengthen ASEAN-led Mekong InitiativesWork with local Mekong sub-regional frameworks and key organisationsCollaborate more closely with Dialogue Partners and international organisationsASEAN cannnot do anyt

127、hing because China is the paramount power in the Mekong regionASEAN6.8%25.2%26.9%25.4%15.8%Brunei3.8%22.6%39.6%22.6%11.3%Cambodia13.6%24.7%28.4%21.0%12.3%Indonesia6.9%36.6%24.4%26.7%5.3%Laos11.4%25.0%29.5%25.0%9.1%Malaysia11.1%25.9%29.6%15.6%17.8%Myanmar3.1%6.0%19.1%19.4%52.3%Philippines2.3%32.8%27.

128、8%33.5%3.8%Singapore2.3%26.6%30.6%20.3%20.3%Thailand8.5%25.6%22.2%29.1%14.5%Vietnam4.9%25.7%17.4%41.0%11.1%6.8% ASEANs actions are sufficientStrengthen ASEAN-led Mekong Initiatives25.2%Work with local Mekong sub-regional frameworks and key organisations26.9%Collaborate more closely with Dialogue Par

129、tners and international organisations25.4%ASEAN cannot do anything because China is the paramount power15.8%SURVEY REPORT20This section focuses on the strategic and economic influence of major powers in the region as well as their leadership credibility on global issues such as free trade and uphold

130、ing international law. Weighting was applied in this section for both 2021 and 2022 results in order to provide trend analysis.SECTION III: Major Powers Regional Influence and LeadershipMOST INFLUENTIAL ECONOMIC POWER IN SOUTHEAST ASIAChina continues to be highly regarded as the most influential eco

131、nomic power by 76.7% of the respondents a consistent trend since 2019. This is followed by the United States at 9.8% (an increase from 6.6% in 2021) and ASEAN (7.6%) respectively. The highest levels of recognition for Chinas economic influence are registered among respondents from Brunei (84.9%), Ca

132、mbodia (84.0%), Laos (86.4%), Myanmar (83.4%), and Singapore (81.1%).While China has consistently remained in the top rank, the US has gained significant ground in the last year from respondents across most ASEAN member states, particularly Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand

133、.The region continues to be worried about Chinas growing regional economic influence, with 64.4% of respondents expressing this view, while 35.6% welcome its growing economic influence particularly supported by Cambodia respondents. While there is generally a slight decrease in the level of anxiety

134、about Chinas growing economic influence from 2021, an increase has been recorded among respondents from Laos, Myanmar, and Singapore.On the flip side, most respondents welcome the growing regional economic influence of ASEAN (77.7%) and the US (68.1%), reflecting similar findings in 2021 and 2020.AS

135、EANThe United StatesChinaOthersASEAN20222021China20222021The US20222021100%I am worried about its growing regional economic influenceI welcome its growing regional economic influence75%50%25%0%64.4%31.9%22.3%35.6%77.7%68.1%75.5%68.0%24.5%15.7%32.0%84.3%2022202176.7%75.9%7.6%5.9%9.8%10.1%7.4%6.6%10%

136、weighting was applied to 2021 data resulting in a change of results.THE STATE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA: 202221CountryASEANAustraliaChinaThe European UnionIndiaJapanRepublic of KoreaThe United StatesThe United Kingdom202120222021202220212022202120222021202220212022202120222021202220212022ASEAN10.1%7.6%0.5%0

137、.5%75.9% 76.7%1.7%1.7%0.1%0.1%4.1%2.6%1.0%0.5%6.6%9.8%N.A.0.5%BN24.2%9.4%0.0%0.0%66.7% 84.9%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%3.0%1.9%3.0%0.0%3.0%1.9%N.A.1.9%KH3.8%9.9%3.8%0.0%80.8% 84.0%7.7%1.2%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%3.8%4.9%N.A.0.0%ID13.2% 13.7%0.0%1.5%70.5% 67.9%2.3%0.0%0.0%0.0%6.2%5.3%1.6%1.5%6.2%8.4%N.A.1.5%LA2

138、.5%2.3%0.0%0.0%87.5% 86.4%0.0%6.8%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%5.0%0.0%5.0%4.5%N.A.0.0%MY9.4%11.1%0.9%0.0%76.9% 72.6%2.6%1.5%0.0%0.0%3.4%3.0%0.0%0.0%6.8%11.9%N.A.0.0%MM5.8%2.6%0.0%0.0%83.3% 83.4%1.3%1.4%0.0%0.0%5.1%4.3%0.0%1.4%4.5%6.0%N.A.0.9%PH14.9%6.3%0.0%0.8%59.7% 65.8%1.5%2.8%0.0%0.0%13.4%5.3%0.0%0.8%10.4% 1

139、8.3%N.A.0.3%SG5.7%3.6%0.0%0.0%83.5% 81.1%0.6%1.4%0.6%0.0%2.5%1.8%0.0%0.0%7.0%12.2%N.A.0.0%TH4.6%7.7%0.8%1.7%84.7% 69.2%0.8%0.9%0.0%0.9%3.8%4.3%0.0%1.7%5.3%13.7%N.A.0.0%VN16.6%9.7%0.0%0.7%65.7% 71.5%0.0%0.7%0.0%0.0%3.4%0.7%0.6%0.0%13.7% 16.7%N.A.0.0%Q14 In your view, which country/regional organisati

140、on is the most influential economic power in Southeast Asia?Q15 What is your view of this economic powers influence on your country?Answered: 112 (Respondents who chose the “ASEAN” option in Q14), 1257 (Respondents who chose the “China” option in Q14), 195 (Respondents who chose the “The US” option

141、in Q14)CountryASEANChinaThe United StatesI am worried about its growing regional economic influenceI welcome its growing regional economic influenceI am worried about its growing regional economic influenceI welcome its growing regional economic influenceI am worried about its growing regional econo

142、mic influenceI welcome its growing regional economic influence202120222021202220212022202120222021202220212022ASEAN15.7%22.3%84.3%77.7%68.0%64.4%32.0%35.6%24.5%31.9%75.5%68.1%BN12.5%40.0%87.5%60.0%63.6%55.6%36.4%44.4%0.0%0.0%100.0%100.0%KH0.0%0.0%100.0%100.0%47.6%29.4%52.4%70.6%0.0%25.0%100.0%75.0%I

143、D0.0%33.3%100.0%66.7%65.9%60.7%34.1%39.3%50.0%45.5%50.0%54.5%LA0.0%0.0%100.0%100.0%48.6%65.8%51.4%34.2%50.0%100.0%50.0%0.0%MY9.1%0.0%90.9%100.0%63.3%55.1%36.7%44.9%25.0%37.5%75.0%62.5%MM22.2%44.4%77.8%55.6%76.9%87.3%23.1%12.7%42.9%23.8%57.1%76.2%PH20.0%4.0%80.0%96.0%77.5%76.4%22.5%23.6%14.3%13.7%85.

144、7%86.3%SG22.2%25.0%77.8%75.0%66.7%73.9%33.3%26.1%36.4%25.9%63.6%74.1%TH33.3%33.3%66.7%66.7%79.3%66.7%20.7%33.3%14.3%18.8%85.7%81.3%VN37.9%42.9%62.1%57.1%90.4%72.8%9.6%27.2%12.5%29.2%87.5%70.8%SURVEY REPORT22MOST INFLUENTIAL POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC POWER IN SOUTHEAST ASIAChina remains the most influe

145、ntial political and strategic power in Southeast Asia (54.4%), followed by the US (29.7%) and ASEAN (11.2%). Chinas political-strategic influence is perceived to be stronger by Cambodia (75.3%), Laos (75.0%), and Myanmar (70.9%) and has increased from 2021. On the other hand, the Philippines continu

146、e to be the only country that chose the US (51.0%) over China (37.0%), followed closely by Singapore (46.8%).While the percentage share of the United States strategic influence has grown, Chinas and ASEANs shares have decreased slightly.Similar to the sentiments last year, the region is generally wo

147、rried about Chinas (76.4%) growing regional political and strategic influence, albeit with a slight decrease from 86.5% last year. In contrast, respondents welcomed ASEANs (80.1%) and the US (62.6%) growing regional political and strategic influence. The greatest acceptance for Chinas influence come

148、s from Cambodia (54.1%), while Brunei, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore and Vietnam strongly support a growing US influence.Despite the anxiety about Chinas growing regional political influence, the general level of concern has dropped compared to 2021 with the exception of Laos, Myanmar and Sing

149、apore, who have expressed greater apprehension towards Chinas ascent.54.4%29.7%28.5%49.8%15.2%6.5%11.2%4.7%ASEAN20222021China20222021The US20222021100%I am worried about its growing regional political and strategic influenceI welcome its growing regional political and strategic influence75%50%25%0%8

150、0.1%80.8%86.5%47.9%52.1%13.5%76.4%37.4%62.6%23.6%19.9%19.2%ASEANThe United StatesChinaOthers2022202110% weighting was applied to 2021 data resulting in a change of results.THE STATE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA: 202223Q17 What is your view of this powers political and strategic influence on your country? Answe

151、red: 145 (Respondents who chose the “ASEAN” option in Q16), 878 (Respondents who chose the “China” option in Q16), 571 (Respondents who chose “The US” option in Q16)Q16 In your view, which country/regional organisation has the most political and strategic influence in Southeast Asia?CountryASEANAust

152、raliaChinaThe European UnionIndiaJapanRepublic of KoreaThe United StatesThe United Kingdom202120222021202220212022202120222021202220212022202120222021202220212022ASEAN15.2% 11.2%0.5%0.8%49.8% 54.4%1.7%0.8%0.1%0.2%3.5%1.4%0.6%0.6%28.5% 29.7%N.A.0.8%BN21.2% 22.6%3.0%1.9%42.4% 39.6%3.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%

153、0.0%3.0%1.9%27.3% 34.0%N.A.0.0%KH11.5%7.4%0.0%0.0%61.5% 75.3%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%26.9% 17.3%N.A.0.0%ID20.2% 16.0%0.0%3.1%44.2% 38.2%1.6%2.3%0.0%0.8%5.4%1.5%0.0%1.5%28.7% 35.1%N.A.1.5%LA12.5% 13.6%0.0%0.0%65.0% 75.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%12.5%2.3%2.5%0.0%7.5%9.1%N.A.0.0%MY16.2% 20.0%0.9%1.5%50.

154、4% 51.1%0.9%0.7%0.0%0.0%2.6%0.7%0.0%0.0%29.1% 24.4%N.A.1.5%MM12.2%2.0%0.6%0.0%51.9% 70.9%4.5%1.1%1.3%0.0%7.1%3.4%0.6%2.3%21.8% 19.7%N.A.0.6%PH22.4%8.3%0.0%0.3%29.9% 37.0%4.5%1.3%0.0%0.3%4.5%1.8%0.0%0.0%38.8% 51.0%N.A.0.3%SG10.8%4.1%0.6%0.0% 44.3% 48.2%0.6%0.0%0.0%0.0%1.9%0.0%0.0%0.0%41.8% 46.8%N.A.0

155、.9%TH9.9%7.7%0.0%0.9%58.8% 55.6%1.5%2.6%0.0%0.9%0.8%2.6%0.0%0.0%29.0% 27.4%N.A.2.6%VN15.4% 10.4%0.0%0.7%49.7% 52.8%0.6%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%2.1%0.0%0.7%34.3% 32.6%N.A.0.7%CountryASEANChinaThe United StatesI am worried about its growing regional political and strategic influenceI welcome its growing regio

156、nal political and strategic influenceI am worried about its growing regional political and strategic influenceI welcome its growing regional political and strategic influenceI am worried about its growing regional political and strategic influenceI welcome its growing regional political and strategi

157、c influence202120222021202220212022202120222021202220212022ASEAN19.2%19.9%80.8%80.1%86.5%76.4%13.5%23.6%47.9%37.4%52.1%62.6%BN0.0%16.7%100.0%83.3%85.7%81.0%14.3%19.0%22.2%27.8%77.8%72.2%KH0.0%0.0%100.0%100.0%81.3%45.9%18.8%54.1%71.4%64.3%28.6%35.7%ID19.2%33.3%80.8%66.7%86.0%66.0%14.0%34.0%59.5%50.0%

158、40.5%50.0%LA80.0%33.3%20.0%66.7%69.2%78.8%30.8%21.2%100.0%50.0%0.0%50.0%MY5.3%11.1%94.7%88.9%79.7%62.3%20.3%37.7%52.9%51.5%47.1%48.5%MM21.1%57.1%78.9%42.9%91.4%93.5%8.6%6.5%67.6%21.7%32.4%78.3%PH13.3%12.1%86.7%87.9%95.0%88.5%5.0%11.5%26.9%24.0%73.1%76.0%SG0.0%0.0%100.0%100.0%87.1%90.7%12.9%9.3%15.2%

159、21.2%84.8%78.8%TH38.5%22.2%61.5%77.8%92.2%76.9%7.8%23.1%55.3%46.9%44.7%53.1%VN14.8%13.3%85.2%86.7%97.7%80.3%2.3%19.7%8.3%17.0%91.7%83.0%SURVEY REPORT24LEADERSHIP IN CHAMPIONING GLOBAL FREE TRADEThe world economy had a rough and bumpy ride in the last year with supply chain disruptions and an unprece

160、dented energy crisis in late 2021. In all of this, the regions confidence in the United States leadership in global free trade expanded from 19.7% last year to 30.1% putting it ahead of the European Union (14.1%) who was the front-runner in 2021. China came in second place with 24.6% of the votes, u

161、p from 13.2% last year. ASEAN was ranked third at 15.5% dropping from 21.5% last year. The EU returned in the 4th place at 14.1% followed by Japan at 9.0%.Myanmar (51.1%), Singapore (43.7%), Vietnam (40.3%), Malaysia (37.8%), the Philippines (34.3%), and Thailand (28.2%) placed the US as their top c

162、hoice. Cambodia is the strongest supporter of Chinas leadership at 71.6% (highest of the three countries that chose China), followed by Laos at 61.4% and Indonesia at 25.2%. The China-Cambodia Free Trade Agreement took effect on 1 January 2022. There are also indications of a possible review of the

163、ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement sometime this year. This may have contributed to the perception of Chinese leadership in free trade. Meanwhile, Brunei (39.6%) and Indonesia (25.2% tie with China) are most confident of ASEANs role in championing free trade. The US increase from 19.7% to 30.1% is fai

164、rly surprising. In truth, there hasnt been much concrete actions taken by the US to champion free trade since the Biden Administration took over in January 2021. In fact, to the casual observer, there appears to be a continuation of Trumps America First policy in terms of trade for this major power.

165、202230.1%US24.6%China15.5%ASEANNew Zealand 2.0%India 0.4%Australia 1.4%ROK 1.1%UK 1.8%9.0%Japan14.1%EU2021Australia 3.1%India 0.6%UK 1.3%ROK 0.8%New Zealand 2.8%21.5%ASEAN21.5%EU19.7%US15.5%Japan13.2%China10% weighting was applied to 2021 data resulting in a change of results and rankings.THE STATE

166、OF SOUTHEAST ASIA: 2022252021CountryASEANAustraliaChinaThe European UnionIndiaJapanNew ZealandRepublic of KoreaThe United KingdomThe United StatesASEAN21.5%3.1%13.2%21.5%0.6%15.5%2.8%0.8%1.3%19.7%Brunei36.4%3.0%15.2%3.0%0.0%24.2%3.0%3.0%0.0%15.2%Cambodia15.4%7.7%19.2%26.9%0.0%19.2%0.0%0.0%3.8%7.7%In

167、donesia19.4%0.0%20.9%29.5%0.8%8.5%2.3%2.3%2.3%15.5%Laos22.5%5.0%27.5%17.5%0.0%7.5%5.0%5.0%0.0%15.0%Malaysia19.7%3.4%11.1%23.1%0.0%13.7%5.1%5.1%0.9%21.4%Myanmar23.7%0.0%9.6%16.7%1.9%28.2%2.6%2.6%1.9%14.7%Philippines19.4%4.5%1.5%34.3%0.0%11.9%1.5%1.5%1.5%22.4%Singapore25.3%0.6%15.2%18.4%0.6%10.1%3.2%3

168、.2%1.9%24.7%Thailand17.6%5.3%9.2%22.1%2.3%14.5%5.3%5.3%0.8%20.6%Vietnam15.4%1.1%2.9%24.0%0.0%16.6%0.0%0.0%0.0%40.0%2022CountryASEANAustraliaChinaThe European UnionIndiaJapanNew ZealandRepublic of KoreaThe United KingdomThe United StatesASEAN15.5%1.4%24.6%14.1%0.4%9.0%2.0%1.1%1.8%30.1%Brunei39.6%3.8%

169、11.3%7.5%0.0%17.0%7.5%0.0%1.9%11.3%Cambodia2.5%0.0%71.6%6.2%0.0%3.7%0.0%1.2%0.0%14.8%Indonesia25.2%2.3%25.2%12.2%0.8%6.1%2.3%0.8%1.5%23.7%Laos6.8%0.0%61.4%6.8%0.0%9.1%0.0%0.0%0.0%15.9%Malaysia11.1%0.7%21.5%16.3%0.0%6.7%1.5%2.2%2.2%37.8%Myanmar5.1%1.1%3.1%18.3%0.0%10.9%1.7%5.1%3.4%51.1%Philippines25.

170、3%2.8%2.0%17.8%0.5%12.8%1.5%0.3%3.0%34.3%Singapore11.7%2.3%10.8%17.6%0.0%8.1%2.7%0.0%3.2%43.7%Thailand12.8%0.9%22.2%20.5%1.7%7.7%2.6%0.9%2.6%28.2%Vietnam15.3%0.0%16.7%17.4%0.7%8.3%0.0%0.7%0.7%40.3%Q18 Who do you have the strongest confidence in to provide leadership in championing the global free tr

171、ade agenda? SURVEY REPORT26LEADERSHIP IN MAINTAINING RULES-BASED ORDER AND UPHOLDING INTERNATIONAL LAWThe top three choices of global leadership are the United States (36.6%), ASEAN (16.8%) and the European Union (16.6%) in a surprising change from last years ranking order of the EU, US and ASEAN. T

172、he difference between ASEAN and the EU is a mere 0.2 percentage point. The US share grew from 24.5% last year to 36.6% whereas the EUs share shrank from 32.6% to 16.6%. Another surprising finding is the view of China taking leadership in maintaining rules-based order growing from 4.4% in 2021 to 13.

173、6% in 2022. At the country-level, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam chose the US as their top choice whereas Brunei, Indonesia and Laos chose ASEAN. China was Cambodias clear top choice at an overwhelming 65.4%. On the other hand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Singa

174、pore, and Thailand expressed confidence in the EU as the second most likely to provide leadership in maintaining the rules-based order and upholding international law. Laos trust in Japan as a leader increased by 7.3% this year. 202236.6%US13.6%China16.8%ASEAN7.7%Japan16.6%EUNew Zealand 2.4%India 0.

175、1%Australia 1.9%ROK 0.8%UK 3.4%2021New Zealand 3.5%India 0.4%Australia 2.4%ROK 0.3%UK 2.8%17.5%ASEAN32.6%EU24.5%US11.6%Japan4.4%China10% weighting was applied to 2021 data resulting in a change of results and rankings.THE STATE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA: 2022272021CountryASEANAustraliaChinaThe European Unio

176、nIndiaJapanNew ZealandRepublic of KoreaThe United KingdomThe United StatesASEAN17.5%2.4%4.4%32.6%0.4%11.6%3.5%0.3%2.8%24.5%Brunei18.2%6.1%3.0%24.2%0.0%12.1%9.1%0.0%12.1%15.2%Cambodia15.4%0.0%7.7%34.6%0.0%19.2%3.8%0.0%0.0%19.2%Indonesia24.0%2.3%4.7%34.9%0.0%5.4%2.3%0.8%2.3%23.3%Laos25.0%0.0%12.5%27.5

177、%0.0%20.0%5.0%0.0%2.5%7.5%Malaysia14.5%0.9%4.3%40.2%0.9%8.5%6.8%0.9%2.6%20.5%Myanmar23.1%0.6%2.6%25.0%0.6%25.0%1.3%0.6%3.2%17.9%Philippines19.4%6.0%0.0%38.8%0.0%4.5%0.0%0.0%1.5%29.9%Singapore12.7%4.4%2.5%31.6%0.6%7.6%3.2%0.0%0.6%36.7%Thailand7.6%3.1%4.6%48.1%0.8%9.2%3.1%0.8%1.5%21.4%Vietnam15.4%1.1%

178、2.3%20.6%1.1%4.6%0.0%0.0%1.1%53.7%Q19 Who do you have the strongest confidence in to provide leadership to maintain the rules-based order and uphold international law?2022CountryASEANAustraliaChinaThe European UnionIndiaJapanNew ZealandRepublic of KoreaThe United KingdomThe United StatesASEAN16.8%1.

179、9%13.6%16.6%0.1%7.7%2.4%0.8%3.4%36.6%Brunei28.3%7.5%1.9%13.2%0.0%9.4%5.7%3.8%13.2%17.0%Cambodia2.5%0.0%65.4%7.4%0.0%3.7%1.2%0.0%0.0%19.8%Indonesia32.8%1.5%11.5%22.9%0.0%7.6%2.3%0.0%1.5%19.8%Laos38.6%0.0%9.1%13.6%0.0%27.3%0.0%0.0%2.3%9.1%Malaysia9.6%3.0%14.8%18.5%0.0%3.7%1.5%0.7%0.7%47.4%Myanmar5.1%1

180、.1%1.4%16.9%0.0%5.1%1.7%2.9%4.9%60.9%Philippines23.0%3.8%0.3%16.5%0.0%7.0%2.5%0.5%3.0%43.5%Singapore6.8%0.9%4.1%18.9%0.0%2.3%0.9%0.5%4.1%61.7%Thailand9.4%0.0%16.2%27.4%0.9%6.0%7.7%0.0%2.6%29.9%Vietnam11.8%1.4%11.8%11.1%0.0%4.9%0.7%0.0%1.4%56.9%SURVEY REPORT28Q20 The strengthening of the Quad and the

181、 prospects of tangible cooperation in areas like vaccine security and climate change is positive and reassuring for Southeast Asia.VIEWS ON THE QUADRILATERAL SECURITY DIALOGUE (QUAD)CountryStrongly agreeAgreeNeutralDisagreeStrongly disagreeASEAN19.0%39.5%28.5%9.0%4.1%Brunei15.1%37.7%35.8%9.4%1.9%Cam

182、bodia9.9%18.5%30.9%25.9%14.8%Indonesia14.5%50.4%23.7%8.4%3.1%Laos25.0%50.0%22.7%2.3%0.0%Malaysia15.6%28.9%34.1%11.1%10.4%Myanmar20.3%41.1%32.9%5.1%0.6%Philippines31.3%50.3%14.8%3.5%0.3%Singapore22.5%41.0%24.8%9.9%1.8%Thailand15.4%30.8%40.2%8.5%5.1%Vietnam20.1%45.8%25.0%5.6%3.5%With greater emphasis

183、being placed on the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) between Australia, India, Japan and the United States in 2021, 58.5% of the respondents agree or strongly agree that the strengthening of the QUAD, including through practical cooperation, will be constructive for the region. This view is su

184、pported by respondents from the Philippines (81.6%), Laos (75.0%), Vietnam (65.9%), Indonesia (64.9%), Singapore (63.5%), and Myanmar (61.4%).Only 13.1% of the respondents disagree or strongly disagree, among whom, Cambodia respondents (40.7%) are the most apprehensive as compared to just 2.3% of La

185、os respondents.Strongly agreeAgreeNeutralDisagreeStrongly disagree39.5%28.5%9.0%4.1%19.0%THE STATE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA: 202229VIEWS ON THE AUSTRALIA-UK-US TRILATERAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENT (AUKUS)Q21 How will AUKUS affect regional security?A trilateral security arrangement between Australia, the United

186、Kingdom and the United States (AUKUS) was announced in September 2021. Under the arrangement, the US and UK will assist Australia to acquire nuclear-powered submarines.The new development has sparked a spectrum of responses from Southeast Asian countries. The largest group of respondents (36.4%) fee

187、l that AUKUS will help balance Chinas growing military power, while a third of the respondents feel that it will primarily escalate regional arms race (22.5%) or undermine the nuclear weapons non-proliferation regime (12.3%). Approximately a fifth of respondents (18.0%) are of the view that the AUKU

188、S arrangement will weaken ASEAN centrality. Country-level data notes that respondents from Myanmar (63.7%) and the Philippines (60.0%) have a greater tendency to view AUKUS as having the potential to balance Chinas growing military power while only 9.1% of Laos respondents share this opinion instead

189、, viewing the weakening of ASEAN centrality (36.4%) as the primary ramification of this arrangement.CountryIt will weaken ASEAN centralityIt will undermine the nuclear weapons non-proliferation regimeIt will escalate the regional arms raceIt will help balance Chinas growing military powerIt will not

190、 affect the regional balance of powerASEAN18.0%12.3%22.5%36.4%10.8%Brunei13.2%17.0%30.2%20.8%18.9%Cambodia17.3%14.8%28.4%25.9%13.6%Indonesia23.7%16.0%21.4%26.7%12.2%Laos36.4%18.2%22.7%9.1%13.6%Malaysia20.0%9.6%32.6%28.9%8.9%Myanmar12.6%2.6%8.6%63.7%12.6%Philippines11.8%6.5%15.5%60.0%6.3%Singapore11.

191、7%8.6%20.7%50.9%8.1%Thailand14.5%17.9%27.4%31.6%8.5%Vietnam18.8%11.8%18.1%46.5%4.9%40%36.4%22.5%18.0%12.3%10.8%0%It will undermine the nuclear weapons non- proliferation regimeIt will not affect the regional balance of powerIt will help balance Chinas growing military powerIt will escalate the regio

192、nal arms raceIt will weaken ASEAN centrality20%SURVEY REPORT304.3%4.9%51.0%44.6%Q22 What is your view of climate change?VIEWS ON CLIMATE CHANGE50.3% of Southeast Asians see climate change as a “serious and immediate threat to the well-being of their country”, although it decreased slightly from 51.0

193、% last year. This view is more pronounced in countries such as the Philippines (73.8%), Laos (56.8%), and Vietnam (55.6%). The Philippines and Vietnam were the two countries most affected by a series of extreme weather events in 2021, including super typhoon Rai most recently. The number of climate

194、deniers who share the view that “there is no scientific basis for climate change” and “It is a long-term challenge and will not impact me in my lifetime” has increased significantly from 4.0% last year to 9.2% this year. The view is more pronounced in Cambodia (17.2%), Vietnam (15.2%), Thailand (12.

195、0%), Indonesia (11.5%), and Myanmar (10.0%). Unsurprisingly, climate change is also a generational issue in some ASEAN countries. Respondents between 21-35 years of age in the Philippines, Indonesia, and Singapore are more likely to say that climate change is a “serious and immediate threat to the w

196、ell-being of their country” than the older age groups. For instance, 85.3% of respondents between 21-35 years old in the Philippines are aligned with this view compared to only 68.0%, 70.8%, 71.4% in the age groups of 36-45, 46-60, and above 60 years old, respectively.CountryIt is a serious and imme

197、diate threat to the well-being of my countryIt is an important issue that deserves to be monitoredIt is a long-term challenge and will not impact me in my lifetimeThere is no scientific basis for climate change20212022202120222021202220212022ASEAN51.0%50.3%44.6%40.5%3.0%4.9%1.0%4.3%Brunei18.2%45.3%7

198、8.8%54.7%3.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%Cambodia50.0%32.1%50.0%50.6%0.0%8.6%0.0%8.6%Indonesia58.9%52.7%37.2%35.9%1.6%4.6%1.6%6.9%Laos40.0%56.8%50.0%34.1%10.0%6.8%0.0%2.3%Malaysia47.0%48.1%49.6%43.7%0.9%5.9%0.9%2.2%Myanmar38.5%42.0%57.1%48.0%3.2%4.0%0.6%6.0%Philippines85.1%73.8%7.5%24.5%3.0%1.5%4.5%0.3%Singapore52.

199、5%51.4%44.9%41.9%1.3%4.5%0.6%2.3%Thailand48.9%45.3%47.3%42.7%2.3%6.0%1.5%6.0%Vietnam70.9%55.6%24.0%29.2%5.1%6.9%0.0%8.3%3.0%1.0%50.3%40.5%It is a serious and immediate threat to the well-being of my countryIt is an important issue that deserves to be monitoredIt is a long-term challenge and will not

200、 impact me in my lifetimeThere is no scientific basis for climate changeNote: One option “It is not a threat to me or my country” was removed this year. 10% weighting was applied to 2021 data resulting in a change of results.20212021202120212022202220222022THE STATE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA: 202231This sec

201、tion examines ASEANs sentiments and options in the unfolding power competition in the region, especially the deepening rivalry between China and the United States and the potential benefits and downside risks of Chinese membership in the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Part

202、nership (CPTPP) as well as the key implications of the US staying out of the CPTPP. Weighting was applied in this section for both 2021 and 2022 results in order to provide trend analysis.SECTION IV: US-China Rivalry and Impact on Southeast AsiaASSESSING ASEANS “NON-CHOICE”In the midst of major powe

203、r rivalry particularly between China and the United States, ASEAN member states continue to favour the option of enhancing ASEANs resilience and unity to fend off pressure from the two major powers (46.1%). The idea of a proactive ASEAN seems to be more popular than its traditional stance of not cho

204、osing sides between China and the US (26.6%). Another option that has slightly increased in popularity is for ASEAN to seek out “third parties” to broaden its strategic space and options (16.2%), with Vietnams increase being the most significant.The least popular option of ASEAN choosing sides betwe

205、en one of the two major powers, as remaining neutral is impractical (11.1%), has gained traction since 2021 (3.4%) more than two-fold increase across ASEAN. Of the respondents who chose this option, Myanmar (30.6%), Cambodia (13.6%), Thailand (12.8%) and Malaysia (12.6%) are top of the list.Q23 ASEA

206、N is caught in the crossfire as Beijing and Washington compete for influence and leadership in Southeast Asia. How should ASEAN best respond?CountryASEAN has to seek out “third parties” to broaden its strategic space and optionsASEAN should enhance its resilience and unity to fend off presssure from

207、 the two major powersASEAN should continue its position of not siding with China or the USASEAN has to choose between one of the two major powers as remaining neutral is impractical20212022202120222021202220212022ASEAN12.9%16.2%53.1%46.1%30.6%26.6%3.4%11.1%Brunei18.2%17.0%42.4%50.9%39.4%28.3%0.0%3.8

208、%Cambodia7.7%11.1%69.2%44.4%23.1%30.9%0.0%13.6%Indonesia8.5%18.3%60.5%52.7%27.9%22.1%3.1%6.9%Laos17.5%13.6%35.0%50.0%42.5%27.3%5.0%9.1%Malaysia4.3%15.6%51.3%35.6%35.9%36.3%8.5%12.6%Myanmar18.6%16.6%36.5%25.1%36.5%27.7%8.3%30.6%Philippines17.9%13.3%62.7%63.5%17.9%17.8%1.5%5.5%Singapore14.6%18.0%51.9%

209、38.3%31.6%36.9%1.9%6.8%Thailand13.7%17.1%49.6%49.6%32.1%20.5%4.6%12.8%Vietnam8.0%21.5%71.4%50.7%19.4%18.1%1.1%9.7%2022202116.2%12.9%53.1%30.6%3.4%26.6%11.1%46.1%10% weighting was applied to 2021 data resulting in a change of results.SURVEY REPORT32ASEANS FUTURE: CHINA OR THE US? The US continues to

210、enjoy popular support with 57.0% of the respondents choosing it as compared to 43.0% who chose China. Country-level data has again revealed another shift in positions of ASEAN member states with the largest shifts in Cambodia for China (from 46.2% to 81.5%) and Myanmar for the US (from 48.1% to 92.0

211、%). Besides Cambodia, Laos (81.8%) and Brunei (64.2%) were the two countries with the majority choosing China over the US. On the flip-side of the coin, the US enjoys the greatest support from Myanmar (92.0%), the Philippines (83.5%) and Singapore (77.9%). Q24 If ASEAN was forced to align itself wit

212、h one of the two strategic rivals, which should it choose?CountryChinaThe United States2021202220212022ASEAN43.8%43.0%56.2%57.0%Brunei69.7%64.2%30.3%35.8%Cambodia46.2%81.5%53.8%18.5%Indonesia35.7%44.3%64.3%55.7%Laos80.0%81.8%20.0%18.2%Malaysia47.0%43.0%53.0%57.0%Myanmar51.9%8.0%48.1%92.0%Philippines

213、13.4%16.5%86.6%83.5%Singapore34.2%22.1%65.8%77.9%Thailand43.5%42.7%56.5%57.3%Vietnam16.0%26.4%84.0%73.6%While the US remains the preferred choice of Southeast Asian respondents, it has seen significantly weakened support from Cambodia and slighter degrees of decline from Indonesia, Vietnam, Laos, an

214、d the Philippines. However, the US has gained significant support from Myanmar respondents, with a significant increase from 48.1% in 2021 to 92.0% in 2022. Contrastingly, Myanmar respondents support for China fell from 51.9% in 2021 to only 8.0% in 2022, reflecting a considerable shift in the attit

215、ude of Myanmars respondents. 202257.0%43.0%202156.2%43.8%10% weighting was applied to 2021 data resulting in a change of results.THE STATE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA: 202233BROADENING ASEANS STRATEGIC OPTIONSQ25 If ASEAN were to seek out “third parties” to hedge against the uncertainties of the US-China stra

216、tegic rivalry, who is your most preferred and trusted strategic partner for ASEAN?CountryAustraliaThe European UnionIndiaJapanRepublic of KoreaThe United Kingdom202120222021202220212022202120222021202220212022ASEAN8.2%10.3%41.4%40.2%6.7%5.1%37.4%29.2%3.5%6.8%2.9%8.4%Brunei18.2%20.8%30.3%30.2%6.1%0.0

217、%30.3%20.8%3.0%9.4%12.1%18.9%Cambodia3.8%6.2%42.3%48.1%15.4%9.9%38.5%13.6%0.0%8.6%0.0%13.6%Indonesia7.8%10.7%55.8%40.5%3.1%3.8%23.3%31.3%7.8%6.9%2.3%6.9%Laos5.0%4.5%50.0%36.4%2.5%2.3%35.0%47.7%7.5%6.8%0.0%2.3%Malaysia7.7%5.9%43.6%49.6%6.8%6.7%30.8%23.0%5.1%6.7%6.0%8.1%Myanmar7.7%6.3%15.4%46.0%10.3%1

218、.7%62.8%26.6%0.6%11.4%3.2%8.0%Philippines13.4%19.0%43.3%34.5%3.0%3.0%35.8%34.5%4.5%1.8%0.0%7.2%Singapore6.3%9.9%44.9%39.2%5.1%5.0%38.0%35.1%3.8%5.9%1.9%5.0%Thailand6.1%8.5%47.3%41.9%8.4%7.7%35.1%25.6%2.3%6.8%0.8%9.4%Vietnam5.7%11.1%40.6%35.4%6.9%11.1%44.6%33.3%0.0%4.2%2.3%4.9%The European Union and

219、Japan continue to be in the leading positions for ASEAN member states in hedging against the uncertainties of the US-China strategic rivalry. 40.2% of respondents chose the EU, followed by Japan (29.2%). Australia remains a distant third option at 10.3%, followed by the United Kingdom (8.4%), the Re

220、public of Korea (6.8%), and India (5.1%).The EU is the top choice for Malaysia (49.6%), Cambodia (48.1%), Myanmar (46.0%), Thailand (41.9%), Indonesia (40.5%), Singapore (39.2%), Brunei (30.2%) and Vietnam (35.4%), while Japan is the top choice for Laos (47.7%). The Philippines favours both the EU a

221、nd Japan equally.Compared to 2021 findings, the number of respondents choosing Japan and India have reduced, while the number of respondents choosing Australia, the UK and the ROK have increased. The biggest increase is the UK a new Dialogue Partner of ASEAN - with a 2.5 times increase, bringing it

222、from the sixth position in 2021 to fourth position in 2022, due to a significant percentage of votes from Brunei (18.9%) and Cambodia (13.6%). Australia has seen an increase from 2021.50%25%0%29.2%10.3%40.2%37.4%8.2%41.4%EU20222021Japan20222021Australia2022202110% weighting was applied to 2021 data

223、resulting in a change of results.SURVEY REPORT3414.4%2021202211.0%20211.3%33.2%2021202144.2%20227.0%20216.8%202213.7%202226.6%41.7%2022IMPACT OF CHINAS RE-EMERGENCE AS A MAJOR POWERQ26 Which statement below most accurately reflects your view of Chinas re-emergence as a major power with respect to So

224、utheast Asia?CountryChina is a revisionist power and intends to turn Southeast Asia into its sphere of influenceChina is gradually taking over the US role as the regional leaderIt is too early to determine Chinas strategic intentionsChina is a status quo power and will continue to support the existi

225、ng regional orderChina is a benign and benevolent power2021202220212022202120222021202220212022ASEAN44.2%41.7%33.2%26.6%14.4%11.0%6.8%13.7%1.3%7.0%Brunei36.4%41.5%42.4%32.1%12.1%11.3%9.1%15.1%0.0%0.0%Cambodia26.9%16.0%46.2%17.3%11.5%14.8%11.5%25.9%3.8%25.9%Indonesia41.9%34.4%31.0%28.2%20.9%13.7%6.2%

226、16.0%0.0%7.6%Laos45.0%38.6%32.5%29.5%12.5%6.8%10.0%20.5%0.0%4.5%Malaysia45.3%35.6%28.2%30.4%15.4%13.3%9.4%15.6%1.7%5.2%Myanmar28.2%56.0%39.1%23.7%22.4%12.9%5.8%2.6%4.5%4.9%Philippines59.7%62.0%22.4%25.5%14.9%6.3%3.0%4.8%0.0%1.5%Singapore48.1%52.3%36.1%26.1%11.4%10.8%3.2%6.3%1.3%4.5%Thailand45.8%30.8

227、%35.1%35.9%9.2%8.5%9.2%15.4%0.8%9.4%Vietnam65.1%50.0%19.4%17.4%13.7%11.1%0.6%14.6%1.1%6.9%The largest group of the respondents (41.7%) continues to view China as a “revisionist power” that “intends to turn Southeast Asia into its sphere of influence”. This is the top response for eight ASEAN member

228、states, the exceptions being Cambodia and Thailand. The concern that China is revisionist is most pronounced in the Philippines (62.0%) and Myanmar (56.0%).26.6% of the respondents feel that China is gradually taking over the United States role as the regional leader, a top response for Thailand (35

229、.9%) this year. However, there is a slight decline for the two top options in 2022 compared to 2021.The options of “China is a benign and benevolent power” and “China is a status quo power and will continue to support the existing regional order”, has increased by 4.5 times and doubled respectively.

230、 Both options are equally favoured by Cambodia at 25.9%.It is too early to determine Chinas strategic intentionsChina is a revisionist powerChina is gradually taking over the US roleChina is a status quo powerChina is a benign and benevolent power10% weighting was applied to 2021 data resulting in a

231、 change of results.THE STATE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA: 202235202146.0%11.8%42.2%Q27 How do you see your countrys relations with China evolving in the next three years?THE FUTURE OF CHINAS RELATIONS WITH REGIONAL COUNTRIES CountryWorsen significantlyWorsenRemain the sameImproveImprove significantly202120222

232、0212022202120222021202220212022ASEAN2.4%8.2%9.4%12.4%42.2%32.8%30.5%31.0%15.5%15.6%Brunei0.0%0.0%6.1%5.7%36.4%20.8%42.4%52.8%15.2%20.8%Cambodia0.0%6.2%3.8%0.0%15.4%9.9%34.6%42.0%46.2%42.0%Indonesia3.1%3.1%4.7%11.5%34.1%32.1%39.5%39.7%18.6%13.7%Laos5.0%2.3%2.5%2.3%30.0%11.4%32.5%38.6%30.0%45.5%Malays

233、ia0.9%6.7%6.0%11.9%53.8%43.7%29.1%29.6%10.3%8.1%Myanmar0.6%40.6%10.3%25.4%50.6%23.7%33.3%7.7%5.1%2.6%Philippines9.0%10.0%20.9%30.8%49.3%31.5%16.4%24.3%4.5%3.5%Singapore0.6%4.1%11.4%12.2%51.9%61.7%29.7%19.8%6.3%2.3%Thailand1.5%5.1%6.1%9.4%42.0%39.3%32.8%34.2%17.6%12.0%Vietnam3.4%4.2%22.3%14.6%58.9%54

234、.9%14.3%20.8%1.1%5.6%ASEAN and China celebrated the 30th anniversary of its dialogue relations and announced the establishment of an ASEAN-China Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2021. China has also been proactive in its engagement with ASEAN member states. The largest group of the respondents

235、 (46.6%) expect their bilateral relations to improve, while 32.8% expect the status quo to remain. On the other hand, the number of respondents who chose “worsen” (12.4%) and “worsen significantly” (8.2%) have increased from 2021.At the country-level, majority of the respondents from Brunei (73.6%),

236、 Cambodia (84.0%), Indonesia (53.4%), Laos (84.1%) and Thailand (46.2%) feel that their countrys relations with China will improve or improve significantly, while Myanmar (66.0%) and the Philippines (40.8%) respondents are of the view that relations will worsen or worsen significantly. Respondents f

237、rom Malaysia (43.7%), Singapore (61.7%), and Vietnam (54.9%) feel that their bilateral relations with China will remain the same.ImproveRemain the sameWorsen202246.6%20.6%32.8%10% weighting was applied to 2021 data resulting in a change of results.SURVEY REPORT3652.5%THE FUTURE OF CHINAS RELATIONS W

238、ITH REGIONAL COUNTRIES Q28 What could potentially worsen your positive impression of China? (check 2 responses)Answered: 553 (Respondents who chose the “Improve” and “Improve significantly” options in Q27)CountryChinas use of economic tools and tourism to punish my countrys foreign policy choicesChi

239、nas mistreatment of its minorities in Tibet and Xinjiang and its handling of Hong KongChinas strong-arm tactics in the South China Sea and the MekongChinas growing economic dominance and political influence in my countryChinas interference in my countrys domestic affairs (including influence over th

240、e ethnic Chinese citizens of my country)2021202220212022202120222021202220212022ASEAN34.2%38.8%21.4%26.4%45.6%46.2%52.5%50.7%23.9%37.9%Brunei10.5%23.1%47.4%46.2%52.6%56.4%57.9%51.3%15.8%23.1%Cambodia33.3%50.0%14.3%17.6%28.6%33.8%66.7%50.0%33.3%48.5%Indonesia26.7%28.6%42.7%41.4%36.0%48.6%57.3%50.0%18

241、.7%31.4%Laos44.0%43.2%8.0%18.9%28.0%24.3%72.0%75.7%28.0%37.8%Malaysia34.8%49.0%30.4%17.6%65.2%56.9%39.1%33.3%10.9%43.1%Myanmar21.7%33.3%3.3%19.4%31.7%16.7%73.3%69.4%46.7%61.1%Philippines42.9%27.9%0.0%18.0%35.7%71.2%50.0%55.0%28.6%27.9%Singapore54.4%63.3%22.8%26.5%52.6%51.0%12.3%18.4%38.6%40.8%Thaila

242、nd33.3%40.7%30.3%24.1%51.5%48.1%59.1%53.7%7.6%33.3%Vietnam40.7%28.9%14.8%34.2%74.1%55.3%37.0%50.0%11.1%31.6%Similar to 2021 findings, more than half of the respondents (50.7%) are of the view that “Chinas growing economic dominance and political influence in my country” can potentially worsen their

243、positive impression of China. This view is the top choice for respondents from Cambodia (50.0%), Indonesia (50.0%), Laos (75.7%), Myanmar (69.4%), and Thailand (53.7%).A close second top concern (46.2%) is “Chinas strong-arm tactics in the South China Sea and Mekong”, which is the top concern for al

244、l the claimant states in the South China Sea, namely Brunei (56.4%), Malaysia (56.9%), the Philippines (71.2%) and Vietnam (55.3%).The third concern (38.8%) is “Chinas use of economic tools and tourism to punish my countrys foreign policy choices” which is the top choice for Singapore and Cambodia.

245、Slightly behind as the fourth overall concern is “Chinas interference in my countrys domestic affairs (including influence over the ethnic Chinese citizens of my country)” at 37.9% mainly driven by higher percentage of respondents from Myanmar (61.1%), Cambodia (48.5%), Malaysia (43.1%) and Singapor

246、e (40.8%).50.7%45.6%46.2%34.2%38.8%23.9%37.9%21.4%26.4%Use of economic tools and tourismStrong-arm tactics in the SCS and the MekongInterference in my countrys domestic affairs20222021Mistreatment of its minoritiesGrowing economic dominance and political influence2022202110% weighting was applied to

247、 2021 data resulting in a change of results and rankings.THE STATE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA: 202237202136.2%202155.2%202210.0%202214.8%202233.3%202264.6%THE FUTURE OF CHINAS RELATIONS WITH REGIONAL COUNTRIES 77.3% of respondents view that “China should respect my countrys sovereignty and not constrain my c

248、ountrys foreign policy choices”. This is the top choice for Brunei (100.0%), Cambodia (80.0% - on par with the second top option), Laos (100.0%), Malaysia (72.0%), Myanmar (74.0%), Singapore (80.6%), and Thailand (70.6%).Q29 What can China do to improve relations with your country? (check 2 response

249、s)Answered: 528 (Respondents who chose the “Worsen” and “Worsen significantly” options in Q27)CountryChina should resolve all territorial and maritime disputes peacefully in accordance with international lawChina should make bilateral trade truly mutually beneficial by addressing trade imbalancesDee

250、pen mutual understanding by enhancing people-to-people relationsChina should respect my countrys sovereignty and not constrain my countrys foreign policy choicesThe fault lines between my country and China cannot be bridged2021202220212022202120222021202220212022ASEAN55.2%64.6%36.2%33.3%8.3%14.8%66.

251、5%77.3%11.2%10.0%Brunei100.0%66.7%50.0%33.3%0.0%0.0%50.0%100.0%0.0%0.0%Cambodia0.0%80.0%100.0%20.0%0.0%20.0%100.0%80.0%0.0%0.0%Indonesia60.0%63.2%50.0%52.6%20.0%15.8%30.0%57.9%10.0%10.5%Laos33.3%50.0%33.3%50.0%0.0%0.0%33.3%100.0%33.3%0.0%Malaysia62.5%52.0%0.0%36.0%0.0%28.0%87.5%72.0%37.5%12.0%Myanma

252、r29.4%42.9%29.4%29.0%17.6%26.8%76.5%74.0%11.8%27.3%Philippines90.0%94.5%20.0%19.6%0.0%4.9%80.0%79.1%0.0%1.8%Singapore52.6%72.2%21.1%13.9%21.1%25.0%68.4%80.6%5.3%8.3%Thailand40.0%35.3%40.0%52.9%20.0%23.5%70.0%70.6%10.0%17.6%Vietnam84.4%88.9%17.8%25.9%4.4%3.7%68.9%59.3%4.4%22.2%A close second sentimen

253、t for respondents (64.6%) is that “China should resolve all territorial and maritime disputes peacefully in accordance with international law”. This is an increase from 2021 (55.2%) and is the top choice for respondents from Cambodia (80.0% - on par with the top option), Indonesia (63.2%), the Phili

254、ppines (94.5%), and Vietnam (88.9%).Resolve all territorial and maritime disputesMake bilateral trade truly mutually beneficialDeepen mutual understandingRespect my countrys sovereigntyThe fault lines between my country and China cannot be bridged202277.3%202166.5%20218.3%202111.2%10% weighting was

255、applied to 2021 data resulting in a change of results and rankings.SURVEY REPORT38ASSESSING US ENGAGEMENT IN THE REGIONQ30 The level of US engagement with Southeast Asia under the Biden Administration hasCountryDecreased significantlyDecreasedRemained unchangedIncreasedIncreased significantly2021202

256、220212022202120222021202220212022ASEAN1.0%5.6%4.9%16.1%23.5%32.5%58.2%38.9%12.4%6.9%Brunei0.0%1.9%6.1%11.3%6.1%34.0%69.7%47.2%18.2%5.7%Cambodia0.0%14.8%0.0%23.5%23.1%34.6%65.4%23.5%11.5%3.7%Indonesia0.0%4.6%3.1%17.6%26.4%40.5%55.8%32.8%14.7%4.6%Laos5.0%6.8%5.0%15.9%27.5%34.1%52.5%43.2%10.0%0.0%Malay

257、sia0.9%6.7%5.1%13.3%22.2%40.7%63.2%31.9%8.5%7.4%Myanmar0.0%3.4%3.2%12.0%21.8%28.0%67.3%45.4%7.7%11.1%Philippines1.5%6.0%1.5%22.0%34.3%37.0%41.8%30.0%20.9%5.0%Singapore0.0%2.7%5.1%9.0%17.7%27.5%66.5%47.3%10.8%13.5%Thailand0.8%4.3%3.8%12.0%16.8%29.9%64.1%41.0%14.5%12.8%Vietnam2.3%4.9%16.6%24.3%38.3%18

258、.1%36.0%47.2%6.9%5.6%45.8% of respondents perceive that the level of United States engagement with Southeast Asia under the Biden Administration has increased or increased significantly. Although this is the prevailing option, there is a decrease from the expectation in 2021. The optimism is express

259、ed by respondents from Brunei (52.9%), Laos (43.2%), Myanmar (56.5%), Singapore (60.8%), Thailand (53.8%), and Vietnam (52.8%).There is also a significant percentage of respondents (32.5%) who view that the level of US engagement with Southeast Asia has remained unchanged, an increase from 2021. Thi

260、s option is the top choice for respondents from Indonesia (40.5%), Malaysia (40.7%), and the Philippines (37.0%).On the other hand, respondents from Cambodia predominantly feel that the level of US engagement with Southeast Asia has decreased or decreased significantly at 38.3% (an increase from 0.0

261、% in 2021).IncreasedRemained unchangedDecreased2022202132.5%23.5%5.9%21.7%45.8%70.6%10% weighting was applied to 2021 data resulting in a change of results.THE STATE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA: 202239Q31 How confident are you of the US as a strategic partner and provider of regional security?IS THE US A RELI

262、ABLE STRATEGIC PARTNER? CountryNo confidenceLittle confidenceNo commentConfidentVery confident2021202220212022202120222021202220212022ASEAN4.7%6.4%20.5%26.4%20.1%24.6%48.4%34.7%6.3%7.9%Brunei6.1%5.7%18.2%43.4%15.2%24.5%57.6%24.5%3.0%1.9%Cambodia0.0%9.9%30.8%27.2%15.4%29.6%46.2%23.5%7.7%9.9%Indonesia

263、3.1%6.1%21.7%30.5%24.0%23.7%48.1%35.1%3.1%4.6%Laos12.5%11.4%22.5%27.3%40.0%50.0%17.5%11.4%7.5%0.0%Malaysia8.5%9.6%24.8%24.4%11.1%22.2%44.4%31.1%11.1%12.6%Myanmar9.0%4.3%19.2%11.1%31.4%23.4%38.5%42.3%1.9%18.9%Philippines1.5%4.0%14.9%25.3%6.0%13.3%67.2%50.0%10.4%7.5%Singapore1.3%4.5%17.1%28.4%12.7%18.

264、0%60.8%41.0%8.2%8.1%Thailand3.1%4.3%26.0%30.8%13.7%18.8%52.7%38.5%4.6%7.7%Vietnam1.7%4.2%10.3%16.0%32.0%22.2%50.9%50.0%5.1%7.6%The largest group of the respondents (42.6%) is confident or very confident of the United States as a strategic partner and provider of regional security. However, this is a

265、 slight decrease from 2021. Respondents from Indonesia (39.7%), Malaysia (43.7%), Myanmar (61.2%), the Philippines (57.5%), Singapore (49.1%), Thailand (46.2%), and Vietnam (57.6%) expressed confidence to various degrees. Contrastingly, respondents from Brunei (49.1%), and Cambodia (37.1%) expressed

266、 little or no confidence, while the majority of Laos respondents (50.0%) had no comment.ConfidenceNo commentNo confidence2022202132.8%42.6%54.7%25.2%20.1%24.6%10% weighting was applied to 2021 data resulting in a change of results.SURVEY REPORT40Q32 If Chinas application to join the CPTPP is success

267、ful, what are the main effects likely to be?VIEWS ON CHINESE MEMBERSHIP IN THE CPTPPChinese membership in the Comprehensive and Progressive Trade Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) is perceived to create both opportunities and challenges for countries in Asia and the Pacific. If Chinas

268、application is successful, 53.2% of respondents perceive that Chinese membership will provide economic and political benefits to China, the US and other CPTPP members. These benefits include reducing economic tensions in the region and resolving the US-China trade war (31.0%), and offering China an

269、opportunity to pursue difficult domestic reforms e.g. promoting transparency in state-owned enterprises (SOEs), reducing SOE subsidies, and enhancing intellectual property protection and modernising the Chinese economy (22.2%).The perceived benefits of Chinese membership vary across ASEAN countries.

270、 The benefit from the reduction of economic and political tensions ranges from 15.7% of Myanmar respondents to 42.2% of Malaysia respondents. Such benefits are perceived to be moderate in Brunei (28.3%) and Singapore (33.3%). This pattern changes when ASEAN respondents perceive the benefit of Chinas

271、 domestic reforms. It ranges from 17.1% in Singapore to 26.5% in Thailand.46.8% of respondents perceive that Chinese membership will increase economic and political downside risks for China, the US, and CPTPP members. These risks include raising economic tensions and the US-China trade war (29.9%),

272、and reducing potential trade benefits for CPTPP members as well as weakening the role of CPTPP in the multilateral trading system (16.9%).The perceived downside risks of Chinese membership also vary across ASEAN countries. The risk of escalating economic tensions ranges from 16.0% of Cambodia respon

273、dents and 18.2% in Laos to 37.7% in Brunei and 46.6% in Myanmar. Such risks are perceived to be moderate in other ASEAN-CPTPP countries such as Malaysia (26.7%), Singapore (33.8%), and Vietnam (31.9%). This pattern changes when respondents express their perception on the downside risk of weakening t

274、he CPTPP. It is low in Malaysia (8.9%), moderate in Brunei (13.2%) and Singapore (15.8%) and relatively higher in Myanmar (46.6%).CountryBy engaging China, it will reduce economic tensions in the region and help resolve the US-China trade warIt will provide China with the opportunity to pursue diffi

275、cult domestic reforms and modernise its economyIt will dilute the CPTPP and reduce its impact on the multiateral trading systemIt will increase economic tensions and exacerbate the US-China trade war by isolating the USASEAN31.0%22.2%16.9%29.9%Brunei28.3%20.8%13.2%37.7%Cambodia39.5%25.9%18.5%16.0%In

276、donesia35.1%24.4%12.2%28.2%Laos36.4%22.7%22.7%18.2%Malaysia42.2%22.2%8.9%26.7%Myanmar15.7%18.9%18.9%46.6%Philippines37.8%19.5%16.8%26.0%Singapore33.3%17.1%15.8%33.8%Thailand23.1%26.5%16.2%34.2%Vietnam18.8%23.6%25.7%31.9%31.0%29.9%16.9%22.2%2022THE STATE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA: 202241Q33 What are the main

277、 implications of the US staying out of the CPTPP?The absence of the United States from the CPTPP strengthens the impression of an ascendant China and an escalation of regional tensions. The original design intention of the CPTPP led by the US the former Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) was to counter

278、 Chinas ascendance. 46.8% of respondents perceive that the rise in Chinas influence in the region will fill the void left by the US. This may reflect the on-going process of Chinas application to join the CPTPP to support the rules-based multilateral system at a time of the US withdrawal. The percei

279、ved influence of China ranges from 36.4% of respondents in Laos and 42% in Cambodia to 51.5% in the Philippines and 54.5% in Singapore.Another 23.2% of respondents fear a rise in regional tensions as the US may shift its focus from regional trade agreements (RTAs) to security pacts in Asia and the P

280、acific. The perceived tensions range from 15.9% of respondents in Laos and 16.7% in Vietnam to 26.4% in Brunei and 29.8% in Indonesia. In addition, 11.0% of respondents express their concerns over the deterioration in the rules-based trading order in the region. The remaining 19.0% of respondents pe

281、rceive that the CPTPP without the US has no discernible effect as the US position on RTAs became clear even before it officially withdrew from the TPP.CountryNo discernible effect as the US position on mega trade deals became clear even before it officially withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnershi

282、pA rise in Chinas influence in the region, filling the void left by the USA deterioriation in the rules-based trading order in the regionA rise in regional tensions as the US shifts its focus of engagement from inclusive trade deals to exclusive security pactsASEAN19.0%46.8%11.0%23.2%Brunei15.1%50.9

283、%7.5%26.4%Cambodia22.2%42.0%11.1%24.7%Indonesia14.5%49.6%6.1%29.8%Laos38.6%36.4%9.1%15.9%Malaysia21.5%44.4%8.9%25.2%Myanmar12.0%44.3%18.3%25.4%Philippines16.8%51.5%5.8%26.0%Singapore13.5%54.5%10.8%21.2%Thailand16.2%44.4%18.8%20.5%Vietnam20.1%50.0%13.2%16.7%ABSENCE OF THE UNITED STATES FROM THE CPTPP

284、46.8%19.0%23.2%11.0%2022SURVEY REPORT42202159.6%21.4%19.0%202258.1%15.1%26.8%CHINAThis section measures the levels of trust in the major powers to “do the right thing” in the wider interests of the global community. Weighting was applied in this section for both 2021 and 2022 results in order to pro

285、vide trend analysis.SECTION V: Perceptions of TrustThe majority of respondents (58.1%) have either “little confidence” (33.3%) or “no confidence” (24.8%) in China to “do the right thing” to contribute to global peace, security, prosperity and governance. Only 26.8% are either “confident” or “very co

286、nfident” that China will step up to the plate. Overall, the percentage of distrust of China has waned from 59.6% in 2021 to 58.1% this year. Levels of distrust towards China are higher than levels of trust in all ASEAN member states, except Cambodia. The distrust levels are most palpable in Myanmar

287、(88.8%), the Philippines (82.0%), Singapore (69.8%), Brunei (67.9%), and Vietnam (64.6%). Meanwhile, the share of distrust towards China in Cambodia is only 17.2%, significantly lower than the ASEAN average of 58.1%.Among those who distrust China, 49.6% think that Chinas economic and military power

288、could be used to threaten their countrys interest and sovereignty. This view is shared strongly in Cambodia (71.4%), the Philippines (70.7%), Vietnam (50.5%), Brunei (50.0%), and Malaysia (49.3%). Also, among this group, 23.0% think that China is not a reliable power. Among those who trust China, 43

289、.8% attribute this to Chinas “vast economic resources and strong political will to provide global leadership”. 15.7% agree that their countries political views are compatible with Chinas. Meanwhile, around 13.8% agree that they respect Chinas civilisation and culture, military power, and ability to

290、champion international law.Q34 How confident are you that China will “do the right thing” to contribute to global peace, security, prosperity, and governance?CountryNo confidenceLittle confidenceNo commentConfidentVery confident2021202220212022202120222021202220212022ASEAN22.0%24.8%37.6%33.3%21.4%15

291、.1%17.2%20.1%1.8%6.7%Brunei6.1%7.5%39.4%60.4%30.3%15.1%24.2%17.0%0.0%0.0%Cambodia7.7%8.6%34.6%8.6%30.8%8.6%23.1%44.4%3.8%29.6%Indonesia23.3%12.2%37.2%38.9%23.3%19.8%15.5%21.4%0.8%7.6%Laos15.0%4.5%32.5%36.4%22.5%34.1%27.5%22.7%2.5%2.3%Malaysia16.2%20.0%41.9%31.1%16.2%11.9%22.2%28.9%3.4%8.1%Myanmar26.

292、3%77.1%33.3%11.7%28.2%9.4%11.5%1.7%0.6%0.0%Philippines34.3%31.5%47.8%50.5%7.5%9.3%7.5%8.8%3.0%0.0%Singapore12.7%35.6%44.3%34.2%19.6%14.0%21.5%14.9%1.9%1.4%Thailand26.7%21.4%41.2%26.5%16.0%17.9%14.5%24.8%1.5%9.4%Vietnam51.4%29.9%24.0%34.7%20.0%11.1%4.6%16.0%0.0%8.3%No confidenceNo commentConfidence10

293、% weighting was applied to 2021 data resulting in a change of results.THE STATE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA: 202243Answered: 320 (Respondents who chose the “Confident” and “Very confident” options in Q34) Q35 Why do you trust China? CountryChina has vasteconomic resourcesand strong politicalwill to provide gl

294、oballeadershipMy countrys politicalculture and worldvieware compatible with ChinasChina is a responsiblestakeholderthat respectsand championsinternational lawChinas militarypower is an assetfor global peace and securityI respect China andadmire its civilisationand culture2021202220212022202120222021

295、202220212022ASEAN64.9%43.8%8.6%15.7%7.1%13.6%3.0%13.1%16.5%13.8%Brunei100.0%88.9%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%11.1%Cambodia57.1%30.0%28.6%18.3%0.0%23.3%14.3%18.3%0.0%10.0%Indonesia61.9%26.3%4.8%5.3%14.3%15.8%4.8%21.1%14.3%31.6%Laos83.3%27.3%8.3%45.5%8.3%9.1%0.0%9.1%0.0%9.1%Malaysia63.3%42.0%16.7%6.0%

296、3.3%30.0%3.3%10.0%13.3%12.0%Myanmar73.7%50.0%5.3%33.3%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%21.1%16.7%Philippines57.1%62.9%0.0%5.7%0.0%5.7%0.0%2.9%42.9%22.9%Singapore62.2%50.0%8.1%19.4%13.5%11.1%2.7%5.6%13.5%13.9%Thailand52.4%35.0%14.3%12.5%19.0%15.0%4.8%30.0%9.5%7.5%Vietnam37.5%25.7%0.0%11.4%12.5%25.7%0.0%34.3%50.0%2.9%

297、Answered: 1147 (Respondents who chose the “Little confidence” and “No confidence” options in Q34)Q36 Why do you distrust China? CountryChina does nothave the capacityor political will forglobal leadershipMy countrys politicalculture and worldvieware incompatible with ChinasI am concerned thatChina i

298、s distractedwith its internalaffairs and thuscannot focus onglobal concerns and issuesChinas economic andmilitary power couldbe used to threatenmy countrys interestsand sovereigntyI do not considerChina a responsible or reliable power2021202220212022202120222021202220212022ASEAN9.1%8.4%6.4%7.6%10.7%

299、11.4%54.5%49.6%19.3%23.0%Brunei13.3%2.8%0.0%11.1%13.3%8.3%73.3%50.0%0.0%27.8%Cambodia0.0%7.1%9.1%0.0%9.1%14.3%63.6%71.4%18.2%7.1%Indonesia14.1%4.5%11.5%13.4%11.5%28.4%48.7%40.3%14.1%13.4%Laos15.8%16.7%5.3%11.1%26.4%16.7%36.8%38.9%15.8%16.7%Malaysia11.8%11.6%8.8%7.2%11.8%8.7%50.0%49.3%17.6%23.2%Myanm

300、ar8.6%14.1%7.5%7.1%10.8%5.5%57.0%47.9%16.1%25.4%Philippines1.8%4.0%5.5%4.9%3.6%2.7%74.5%70.7%14.5%17.7%Singapore6.7%8.4%8.9%3.9%2.2%5.8%58.9%38.1%23.3%43.9%Thailand12.4%10.7%5.6%10.7%16.9%16.1%37.1%39.3%28.1%23.2%Vietnam6.8%4.3%1.5%6.5%1.5%7.5%45.5%50.5%44.7%31.2%SURVEY REPORT44202129.0%21.3%49.7%20

301、2226.1%25.4%48.5%THE EUROPEAN UNIONThe European Unions trust rating has remained strong although the ratings declined this year. The number of respondents having confidence in the EU to “do the right thing” has declined from 49.7% in 2021 to 48.5% this year while the share of distrust has also decre

302、ased. The highest levels of trust towards the EU are shared strongly by respondents from the Philippines (59.8%), Cambodia (59.2%), Myanmar (58.5%), Malaysia (57.8%), and Vietnam (55.5%). Myanmar, in particular, sees a big jump in its trust towards the EU from 37.2% in 2021 to 58.5% this year. Meanw

303、hile, Brunei is the only country where the distrust level (37.7%) outstripped the trust level (30.2%). The regions positive view towards the EU is largely attributed to its leadership in championing human rights and climate change which is considered an asset for global peace and security (38.4%). T

304、his view is more pronounced in Brunei (62.5%), Thailand (44.2%), and the Philippines (37.7%). Among this cohort, 30.9% also think that the EU is a responsible stakeholder that respects and champions international law. Q37 How confident are you that the EU will “do the right thing” to contribute to g

305、lobal peace, security, prosperity, and governance?CountryNo confidenceLittle confidenceNo commentConfidentVery confident2021202220212022202120222021202220212022ASEAN3.4%4.9%25.6%21.2%21.3%25.4%43.6%42.0%6.1%6.5%Brunei3.0%9.4%27.3%28.3%33.3%32.1%36.4%28.3%0.0%1.9%Cambodia0.0%3.7%30.8%12.3%26.9%24.7%4

306、2.3%58.0%0.0%1.2%Indonesia3.1%6.1%20.9%24.4%16.3%26.0%51.2%40.5%8.5%3.1%Laos10.0%2.3%15.0%20.5%30.0%45.5%42.5%27.3%2.5%4.5%Malaysia1.7%4.4%32.5%20.7%10.3%17.0%41.9%43.7%13.7%14.1%Myanmar8.3%3.4%31.4%16.3%23.1%21.7%35.3%49.4%1.9%9.1%Philippines1.5%3.5%22.4%24.3%13.4%12.5%50.7%50.8%11.9%9.0%Singapore1

307、.9%5.4%33.5%25.7%19.0%24.8%38.0%35.6%7.6%8.6%Thailand3.1%7.7%20.6%23.1%19.1%24.8%47.3%38.5%9.9%6.0%Vietnam1.7%2.8%21.7%16.7%21.7%25.0%50.3%47.9%4.6%7.6%In the group of EU sceptics, 30.1% are concerned that the EU is distracted with its internal affairs thus cannot focus on global concerns and issues

308、. This view is shared strongly by respondents from Cambodia (46.2%), the Philippines (38.7%), Thailand (36.1%), and Indonesia (32.5%). No confidenceNo commentConfidence10% weighting was applied to 2021 data resulting in a change of results.THE STATE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA: 202245Answered: 430 (Respondent

309、s who chose the “Little confidence” and “No confidence” options in Q37)Q39 Why do you distrust the EU?Answered: 887 (Respondents who chose the “Confident” and “Very confident” options in Q37)Q38 Why do you trust the EU?CountryThe EU hasvast economicresources and thepolitical will toprovide globallea

310、dershipMy countryspolitical cultureand worldvieware compatiblewith the EUsThe EU is aresponsiblestakeholderthat respectsand championsinternational lawThe EUs stanceon environment,human rights, andclimate changeis an asset forglobal peace and securityI respect Europeand admire itscivilisation and cul

311、ture2021202220212022202120222021202220212022ASEAN13.8%19.4%1.9%4.5%35.7%30.9%44.1%38.4%4.4%6.8%Brunei0.0%25.0%0.0%0.0%58.3%6.3%41.7%62.5%0.0%6.3%Cambodia18.2%22.9%0.0%10.4%36.4%31.3%45.5%31.3%0.0%4.2%Indonesia14.3%21.1%1.3%3.5%24.7%29.8%53.2%42.1%6.5%3.5%Laos33.3%21.4%5.6%7.1%16.7%28.6%38.9%35.7%5.6

312、%7.1%Malaysia9.2%12.8%1.5%2.6%40.0%44.9%46.2%29.5%3.1%10.3%Myanmar24.1%27.3%3.4%4.4%22.4%18.5%41.4%36.6%8.6%13.2%Philippines9.5%20.5%0.0%2.5%31.0%35.6%52.4%37.7%7.1%3.8%Singapore2.8%9.2%1.4%2.0%47.2%49.0%44.4%34.7%4.2%5.1%Thailand8.0%15.4%4.0%9.6%30.7%25.0%54.7%44.2%2.7%5.8%Vietnam18.8%18.8%2.1%2.5%

313、50.0%40.0%22.9%30.0%6.3%8.8%CountryThe EU does nothave the capacityor politicalwill for globalleadershipMy countryspolitical cultureand worldvieware incompatiblewith the EUsI am concernedthat the EU isdistracted withits internal affairsand thus cannotfocus on globalconcerns and issuesThe EUs stanceo

314、n environment,human rights, andclimate changecould be usedto threaten mycountrys interestsand sovereigntyI do not considerthe EU a responsible or reliable power2021202220212022202120222021202220212022ASEAN22.7%26.7%10.4%12.4%39.3%30.1%15.5%17.7%12.1%13.1%Brunei10.0%25.0%10.0%10.0%30.0%25.0%40.0%5.0%

315、10.0%35.0%Cambodia12.5%0.0%12.5%0.0%50.0%46.2%0.0%38.5%25.0%15.4%Indonesia19.4%25.0%12.9%12.5%38.7%32.5%19.4%17.5%9.7%12.5%Laos30.0%20.0%10.0%50.0%30.0%20.0%10.0%10.0%20.0%0.0%Malaysia20.0%35.3%10.0%2.9%47.5%26.5%15.0%20.6%7.5%14.7%Myanmar22.6%33.3%17.7%14.5%12.9%30.4%24.2%2.9%22.6%18.8%Philippines1

316、2.5%18.9%18.8%9.0%37.5%38.7%18.8%19.8%12.5%13.5%Singapore44.6%59.4%0.0%2.9%44.6%27.5%5.4%4.3%5.4%5.8%Thailand38.7%11.1%9.7%11.1%35.5%36.1%12.9%33.3%3.2%8.3%Vietnam17.1%39.3%2.4%10.7%65.9%17.9%9.8%25.0%4.9%7.1%SURVEY REPORT46202152.0%30.0%18.0%INDIAClose to half of the respondents have a high level o

317、f distrust towards India (47.8%) although this view dwindled slightly from last year (52.0%). Doubts about India are most prevalent in Singapore (67.1%), Brunei (56.6%), Malaysia (56.2%), Myanmar (54.9%), Indonesia (54.2%), and Thailand (52.2%). Meanwhile, the strongest support for India is found am

318、ong respondents from the Philippines (35.3%) and Vietnam (29.9%). Myanmar has the most drastic shift in perceptions towards India. Myanmars trust level dropped from 37.1% in 2021 to 8.6% this year. Among those who distrust India, 38.0% believe that India does not have the capacity or political will

319、for global leadership. This view is more pronounced in Vietnam (51.1%), Cambodia (45.5%), Thailand (41.0%), and Indonesia (40.8%). A third (32.4%) also raise a concern that India is distracted with its internal and sub-continental affairs and thus cannot focus on global concerns and issues. In the c

320、ohort who has trust in India, 37.1% believe that it is a responsible stakeholder that respects and champions international law. This view is shared strongly in Cambodia (57.1%), Singapore (43.8%), and Laos (40.0%). Q40 How confident are you that India will “do the right thing” to contribute to globa

321、l peace, security, prosperity, and governance?CountryNo confidenceLittle confidenceNo commentConfidentVery confident2021202220212022202120222021202220212022ASEAN15.0%20.0%37.0%27.8%30.0%35.6%16.4%16.0%1.6%0.6%Brunei9.1%20.8%51.5%35.8%30.3%35.8%9.1%7.5%0.0%0.0%Cambodia15.4%21.0%42.3%19.8%26.9%42.0%11

322、.5%17.3%3.8%0.0%Indonesia20.2%20.6%40.3%33.6%29.5%35.9%10.1%9.9%0.0%0.0%Laos22.5%25.0%27.5%4.5%37.5%59.1%12.5%11.4%0.0%0.0%Malaysia26.5%28.1%41.0%28.1%19.7%23.7%10.3%17.8%2.6%2.2%Myanmar5.1%22.9%27.6%32.0%30.1%36.6%36.5%7.7%0.6%0.9%Philippines7.5%6.5%35.8%28.8%26.9%29.5%25.4%33.5%4.5%1.8%Singapore19

323、.6%26.1%44.9%41.0%25.3%25.7%8.9%6.8%1.3%0.5%Thailand16.0%23.1%32.1%29.1%40.5%29.1%10.7%17.9%0.8%0.9%Vietnam8.6%5.6%26.9%25.7%33.1%38.9%29.1%29.9%2.3%0.0%202247.8%35.6%16.6%No confidenceNo commentConfidence10% weighting was applied to 2021 data resulting in a change of results.THE STATE OF SOUTHEAST

324、ASIA: 202247Answered: 315 (Respondents who chose the “Confident” and “Very confident” options in Q40)Q41 Why do you trust India?CountryIndia has vasteconomic resourcesand the political willto provide globalleadershipMy countrys politicalculture and worldvieware compatible with IndiasIndia is a respo

325、nsiblestakeholderthat respectsand championsinternational lawIndias military poweris an asset for globalpeace and securityI respect India andadmire its civilisationand culture2021202220212022202120222021202220212022ASEAN24.5%20.2%13.0%17.1%25.6%37.1%14.2%6.6%22.6%19.0%Brunei66.7%50.0%0.0%25.0%0.0%25.

326、0%33.3%0.0%0.0%0.0%Cambodia50.0%21.4%0.0%14.3%0.0%57.1%0.0%0.0%50.0%7.1%Indonesia30.8%7.7%15.4%38.5%15.4%38.5%7.7%0.0%30.8%15.4%Laos0.0%20.0%20.0%0.0%0.0%40.0%40.0%0.0%40.0%40.0%Malaysia20.0%14.8%13.3%7.4%33.3%37.0%13.3%14.8%20.0%25.9%Myanmar22.4%23.3%31.0%20.0%24.1%23.3%3.4%3.3%19.0%30.0%Philippine

327、s15.0%13.5%10.0%11.3%25.0%34.8%20.0%20.6%30.0%19.9%Singapore0.0%12.5%12.5%6.3%75.0%43.8%6.3%0.0%6.3%37.5%Thailand33.3%18.2%13.3%27.3%20.0%36.4%6.7%13.6%26.7%4.5%Vietnam7.3%20.9%14.5%20.9%63.6%34.9%10.9%14.0%3.6%9.3%Answered: 811 (Respondents who chose the “Little confidence” and “No confidence” opti

328、ons in Q40) Q42 Why do you distrust India?CountryIndia does nothave the capacityor political will forglobal leadershipMy countrys politicalculture and worldvieware incompatible with IndiasI am concerned thatIndia is distractedwith its internal andsub-continental affairsand thus cannot focuson global

329、 concernsand issuesIndias economic andmilitary power couldbe used to threatenmy countrys interestsand sovereigntyI do not considerIndia a responsible or reliable power2021202220212022202120222021202220212022ASEAN41.1%38.0%3.3%6.5%35.6%32.4%2.8%1.9%17.2%21.1%Brunei25.0%20.0%0.0%3.3%50.0%36.7%5.0%0.0%

330、20.0%40.0%Cambodia60.0%45.5%0.0%15.2%13.3%18.2%0.0%3.0%26.7%18.2%Indonesia48.7%40.8%1.3%5.6%41.0%29.6%0.0%2.8%9.0%21.1%Laos40.0%38.5%5.0%7.7%20.0%38.5%15.0%0.0%20.0%15.4%Malaysia34.2%34.2%1.3%7.9%46.8%26.3%1.3%1.3%16.5%30.3%Myanmar45.1%36.5%3.9%8.9%31.4%25.0%3.9%4.7%15.7%25.0%Philippines37.9%33.3%17

331、.2%5.7%34.5%44.0%0.0%2.8%10.3%14.2%Singapore25.5%39.6%1.0%0.7%52.0%38.9%0.0%0.0%21.6%20.8%Thailand46.0%41.0%1.6%8.2%28.6%29.5%1.6%1.6%22.2%19.7%Vietnam48.4%51.1%1.6%2.2%38.7%37.8%1.6%2.2%9.7%6.7%SURVEY REPORT48202115.3% 16.5%68.2%JAPANJapan remains the most trusted major power in the region with the

332、 overall trust level of 54.2%, although this number declined significantly from 68.2% in 2021. Japan is most trusted in the Philippines (82.3%), Vietnam (63.9%), and Myanmar (58.0%). The largest swing in trust towards Japan is found in Cambodia. Cambodias trust level dropped significantly from 84.6%

333、 to 32.1%. Among those who believe in Japan, 46.6% think that Japan is a “responsible stakeholder that respects and champions international law.” This perception is widely shared among respondents from Singapore (69.3%), Malaysia (57.4%), and Laos (55.0%). A proportion (25.8%) in this cohort also be

334、lieve that “Japan has vast economic resources and the political will to provide global leadership”, particularly among those from Brunei (30.0%), Laos (30.0%), and Vietnam (29.3%). 41.0% of the Japan sceptics argue that “Japan does not have the capacity or political will for global leadership”. This

335、 is true among respondents from Laos (75.0%), Singapore (57.4%), Brunei (46.2%), Myanmar (42.6%), and Thailand (42.3%). Among Q43 How confident are you that Japan will “do the right thing” to contribute to global peace, security, prosperity, and governance?CountryNo confidenceLittle confidenceNo com

336、mentConfidentVery confident2021202220212022202120222021202220212022ASEAN1.6%6.0%13.7%15.8%16.5%24.0%53.2%44.5%15.0%9.7%Brunei0.0%1.9%15.2%22.6%18.2%18.9%63.6%49.1%3.0%7.5%Cambodia0.0%19.8%3.8%19.8%11.5%28.4%53.8%24.7%30.8%7.4%Indonesia3.9%4.6%18.6%15.3%20.9%24.4%51.2%48.9%5.4%6.9%Laos2.5%4.5%12.5%4.

337、5%25.0%45.5%40.0%40.9%20.0%4.5%Malaysia2.6%9.6%23.9%21.5%14.5%18.5%48.7%43.0%10.3%7.4%Myanmar2.6%4.9%8.3%14.6%12.8%22.6%57.7%46.3%18.6%11.7%Philippines0.0%0.3%9.0%9.5%10.4%8.0%58.2%57.3%22.4%25.0%Singapore1.3%4.5%17.7%23.0%22.2%21.2%47.5%42.8%11.4%8.6%Thailand2.3%7.7%19.8%14.5%13.0%31.6%51.1%40.2%13

338、.7%6.0%Vietnam1.1%2.1%8.6%12.5%15.4%21.5%60.6%52.1%14.3%11.8%202221.8%24.0%54.2%this cohort, 27.2% also think that “Japan is distracted with its internal affairs and relations with its Northeast Asian neighbours (i.e. China and ROK) and thus cannot focus on global concerns and issues”.No confidenceN

339、o commentConfidence10% weighting was applied to 2021 data resulting in a change of results.THE STATE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA: 202249Answered: 1009 (Respondents who chose the “Confident” and “Very confident” options in Q43)Q44 Why do you trust Japan?Answered: 332 (Respondents who chose the “Little confiden

340、ce” and “No confidence” options in Q43)Q45 Why do you distrust Japan?CountryJapan has vasteconomic resourcesand the political willto provide globalleadershipMy countrys politicalculture and worldvieware compatible with JapansJapan is a responsiblestakeholderthat respectsand championsinternational la

341、wJapans militarypower is an assetfor global peace and securityI respect Japan andadmire its civilisationand culture2021202220212022202120222021202220212022ASEAN24.0%25.8%5.5%6.3%52.1%46.6%1.5%2.6%17.0%18.7%Brunei18.2%30.0%0.0%0.0%77.3%50.0%0.0%0.0%4.5%20.0%Cambodia27.3%26.9%4.5%19.2%45.5%30.8%0.0%3.

342、8%22.7%19.2%Indonesia23.3%31.5%6.8%9.6%38.4%41.1%2.7%4.1%28.8%13.7%Laos33.3%30.0%8.3%0.0%41.7%55.0%0.0%0.0%16.7%15.0%Malaysia18.8%16.2%5.8%4.4%59.4%57.4%2.9%2.9%13.0%19.1%Myanmar31.1%26.1%8.4%6.4%37.8%37.4%0.8%1.0%21.8%29.1%Philippines25.9%27.7%3.7%3.3%44.4%45.3%3.7%3.6%22.2%20.1%Singapore12.9%12.3%

343、7.5%5.3%73.1%69.3%1.1%0.9%5.4%12.3%Thailand25.9%27.8%5.9%7.4%45.9%42.6%2.4%1.9%20.0%20.4%Vietnam22.9%29.3%3.8%7.6%57.3%37.0%1.5%7.6%14.5%18.5%CountryJapan does nothave the capacityor political will forglobal leadershipMy countrys politicalculture and worldvieware incompatible with JapansI am concern

344、ed thatJapan is distractedwith its internalaffairs and relationswith its NortheastAsian neighbours (i.e.China, Korea and Taiwan), and thus cannot focus on global concernsand issuesJapans economic andmilitary power couldbe used to threatenmy countrys interestsand sovereigntyI do not considerJapan a r

345、esponsible or reliable power2021202220212022202120222021202220212022ASEAN43.5%41.0%1.5%8.3%31.9%27.2%1.8%7.2%21.2%16.3%Brunei60.0%46.2%0.0%0.0%40.0%30.8%0.0%15.4%0.0%7.7%Cambodia0.0%21.9%0.0%3.1%0.0%25.0%0.0%21.9%100.0%28.1%Indonesia48.3%26.9%0.0%7.7%27.6%38.5%0.0%7.7%24.1%19.2%Laos66.7%75.0%0.0%25.

346、0%33.3%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%Malaysia48.4%33.3%0.0%4.8%32.3%23.8%0.0%7.1%19.4%31.0%Myanmar52.9%42.6%5.9%7.4%11.8%22.1%5.9%2.9%23.5%25.0%Philippines16.7%30.8%0.0%12.8%66.7%35.9%0.0%10.3%16.7%10.3%Singapore43.3%57.4%0.0%0.0%40.0%24.6%6.7%1.6%10.0%16.4%Thailand51.7%42.3%3.4%7.7%37.9%38.5%0.0%0.0%6.9%11.5

347、%Vietnam47.1%33.3%5.9%14.3%29.4%33.3%5.9%4.8%11.8%14.3%SURVEY REPORT50202131.1%21.9%47.0%Q46 How confident are you that the US will “do the right thing” to contribute to global peace, security, prosperity, and governance?THE UNITED STATESUnder the Biden Administration, the United States garnered mor

348、e trust among Southeast Asians. The level of trust moved from 47.0% in 2021 to 52.8% this year while the share of US sceptics dropped from 31.1% in 2021 to 29.6% this year. Confidence in the US is shared widely among respondents from Myanmar (74.6%), Vietnam (72.2%), and the Philippines (66.5%), whi

349、le US sceptics abound in Brunei (50.9%) and Laos (50.0%). The largest swing in trust towards Washington is found in Myanmar and Thailand. Myanmars trust towards the US moved from 39.7% in 2021 to 74.6% this year while the level of distrust dwindled from 34.0% to 11.5%. Similarly, the perception of t

350、rust in Thailand improved from 39.0% in 2021 to 53.9% this year while the level of distrust plummeted from 45.0% to 26.5%. Among those who trust the US, 45.5% believe that “the US has vast economic resources and the political will to provide global leadership”. This view is widely shared among those

351、 from Laos (66.7%) and Vietnam (56.7%). 25.1% of this group also believe that “the US military power is an asset for global peace and security”. Among those who distrust the US, 36.7% are concerned that the US is distracted with its internal affairs and thus cannot focus on global concerns and issue

352、s. This is true particularly among those from Vietnam (55.6%), Singapore (52.2%), the Philippines (45.5%), and Myanmar (45.0%).CountryNo confidenceLittle confidenceNo commentConfidentVery confident2021202220212022202120222021202220212022ASEAN6.1%7.4%25.0%22.2%21.9%17.6%42.5%39.9%4.5%12.9%Brunei9.1%9

353、.4%27.3%41.5%15.2%18.9%48.5%28.3%0.0%1.9%Cambodia0.0%8.6%15.4%19.8%38.5%16.0%42.3%43.2%3.8%12.3%Indonesia6.2%11.5%26.4%18.3%19.4%23.7%44.2%42.0%3.9%4.6%Laos10.0%15.9%30.0%34.1%35.0%29.5%25.0%20.5%0.0%0.0%Malaysia12.8%11.1%27.4%23.0%12.0%12.6%39.3%29.6%8.5%23.7%Myanmar7.1%2.6%26.9%8.9%26.3%14.0%36.5%

354、48.3%3.2%26.3%Philippines1.5%3.0%19.4%19.0%16.4%11.5%50.7%50.7%11.9%15.8%Singapore3.2%5.0%27.2%26.1%17.7%13.5%48.1%41.4%3.8%14.0%Thailand9.9%6.0%35.1%20.5%16.0%19.7%35.9%38.5%3.1%15.4%Vietnam1.1%1.4%14.9%11.1%23.4%15.3%54.3%56.9%6.3%15.3%202229.6%17.6%52.8%No confidenceNo commentConfidence10% weight

355、ing was applied to 2021 data resulting in a change of results.THE STATE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA: 202251Answered: 1020 (Respondents who chose the “Confident” and “Very confident” options in Q46)Q47 Why do you trust the US?Answered: 403 (Respondents who chose the “Little confidence” and “No confidence” opti

356、ons in Q46)Q48 Why do you distrust the US?CountryThe US has vasteconomic resourcesand the political willto provide globalleadershipMy countrys politicalculture and worldvieware compatible with the USThe US is aresponsiblestakeholderthat respectsand championsinternational lawThe US militarypower is a

357、n assetfor global peace and securityI respect the US andadmire its civilisationand culture2021202220212022202120222021202220212022ASEAN50.9%45.5%2.8%5.2%16.1%19.5%28.4%25.1%1.7%4.7%Brunei50.0%43.8%0.0%0.0%12.5%18.8%37.5%37.5%0.0%0.0%Cambodia58.3%42.2%0.0%11.1%16.7%28.9%25.0%8.9%0.0%8.9%Indonesia56.5

358、%44.3%3.2%3.3%16.1%19.7%24.2%27.9%0.0%4.9%Laos50.0%66.7%0.0%0.0%10.0%11.1%40.0%22.2%0.0%0.0%Malaysia48.2%43.1%3.6%2.8%32.1%22.2%14.3%23.6%1.8%8.3%Myanmar51.6%43.7%1.6%3.4%9.7%17.6%35.5%25.3%1.6%10.0%Philippines47.6%43.6%9.5%9.8%16.7%15.4%21.4%28.2%4.8%3.0%Singapore35.4%36.6%8.5%4.1%19.5%25.2%32.9%28

359、.5%3.7%5.7%Thailand54.9%34.9%0.0%12.7%13.7%22.2%31.4%27.0%0.0%3.2%Vietnam56.6%56.7%1.9%4.8%14.2%13.5%21.7%22.1%5.7%2.9%CountryThe US does nothave the capacityor political will forglobal leadershipMy countrys politicalculture and worldvieware incompatible withthe USI am concerned thatthe US is distra

360、ctedwith its internalaffairs and thuscannot focus onglobal concerns and issuesThe US economic andmilitary power couldbe used to threatenmy countrys interestsand sovereigntyI do not consider the US a responsible or reliable power2021202220212022202120222021202220212022ASEAN4.9%3.9%6.9%9.9%40.5%36.7%2

361、7.6%23.5%20.0%26.0%Brunei0.0%7.4%0.0%7.4%66.7%25.9%8.3%33.3%25.0%25.9%Cambodia0.0%0.0%0.0%13.0%0.0%30.4%75.0%34.8%25.0%21.7%Indonesia4.8%5.1%7.1%12.8%28.6%28.2%47.6%41.0%11.9%12.8%Laos12.5%4.5%12.5%18.2%31.3%22.7%25.0%27.3%18.8%27.3%Malaysia4.3%2.2%10.6%2.2%40.4%32.6%23.4%26.1%21.3%37.0%Myanmar9.4%0

362、.0%28.3%20.0%13.2%45.0%17.0%10.0%32.1%25.0%Philippines7.1%2.3%0.0%4.5%57.1%45.5%21.4%28.4%14.3%19.3%Singapore4.2%5.8%0.0%1.4%77.1%52.2%8.3%5.8%10.4%34.8%Thailand3.4%6.5%0.0%19.4%47.5%29.0%28.8%22.6%20.3%22.6%Vietnam3.6%5.6%10.7%0.0%42.9%55.6%21.4%5.6%21.4%33.3%SURVEY REPORT52TRUST AND DISTRUST RANKI

363、NGS OF MAJOR POWERS IN THE REGIONThe “trust” and “distrust” rankings of five powers who can most potentially influence Southeast Asia are based on a consolidated five-point Likert scale of negative and positive responses (“no confidence” to “very confident”). The “no comment” responses are removed f

364、rom this analysis. A proportionate 10% weightage was applied in the analysis. Japan squeaked through by a slim margin of 1.4% to remain the most trusted major power in Southeast Asia. 54.2% of regional respondents say that Japan is most trusted, followed by the US (52.8%), the EU (48.5%), China (26.

365、8%) and India (16.6%). Japan suffered a drop in its trust ranking from 68.2% to 54.2% this year. At the country-level, the most drastic drop came from Cambodia whose trust in Japan went from 84.6% to 32.1%. Other perceptible drops were from Thailand (from 64.8% to 46.2%) and Myanmar (from 76.3% to 5

366、8.0%). In terms of distrust, the view that Japans economic and military power was a threat increased from 1.8% to 7.2%. The view that Japan was distracted with internal and Northeast Asia affairs decreased slightly from 31.9% to 27.2%. Japans strategic engagement with Southeast Asia has not changed

367、in the last year except that the high-level face-to-face engagement between Southeast Asian and Japanese leaders may have been limited due to COVID-19 as compared to the higher-level touch-point that ASEAN has had with China, in large part due to President Xi Jinping making his first ever attendance

368、 at the ASEAN-China special commemorative summit (Note: ASEAN-China Summits are usually attended at the Premier level). Southeast Asians reflected a boost in confidence on the United States anticipated return to the region under the Biden Administration by 5.8% over last years results. Myanmars trus

369、t increased almost doubled from 39.7% to 74.6%, much of it can be explained in light of its own political crisis and hopes for resolution and leadership that might come from external powers like the US. What is surprising, at the country-level, is Bruneis precipitous drop in trust for the US from 48

370、.5% in 2021 to 30.2%. Interestingly, while we have seen an increase in the regions view of the US leadership in multilateral rules-based order, the view of the US having the political will to provide global leadership actually declined from 50.9% to 45.5%. The European Union dropped from second to t

371、hird place this year with 48.5% of Southeast Asians sticking to reasons that the EU is a responsible international law stakeholder and that it has the ability to provide leadership. Distrust levels of the EU dipped slightly from 29.0% to 26.1%. What is curious is that Cambodias view of the threat th

372、at the EUs stance on the environment, human rights and climate change posed to national interest and sovereignty went from 0.0% to 38.5%. Similarly, Thailand went three-fold in the strength of this view from 12.9% to 33.3%. The regions trust in China has improved from 19.0% to 26.8% with Cambodia sh

373、owing a 47.1% increase in trust. Conversely, the greatest drop in trust rankings of China came from Myanmar which saw a trust drop from 12.1% to 1.7%. The proportion of distrust in China has also dropped slightly from 59.6% in 2021 to 58.1% in 2022. Among those who trust China, the view of China as

374、a responsible stakeholder in international law went from 7.1% to 13.6% and its military as an asset for global peace from 3.0% to 13.1%. Among those who distrust China, the majority (49.6%) are concerned that Chinas economic and military might may be a tool to threaten their country. Although levels

375、 of distrust in India declined from 52.0% to 47.8%, the regions level of trust also decreased from 18.0% to 16.6%. Among those who distrust India, 38.0% say that India does not have the capacity or political will to demonstrate global leadership. Among those who trust India, 37.1% say that India is

376、a responsible stakeholder in international law. ASEAN and India will celebrate the 30th anniversary of ASEAN-India relations with the theme “ASEAN-India Friendship Year in 2022. It remains to be seen if these perceptions will change. One thing is obvious this year: the region remains preoccupied wit

377、h the tone and tenor of the US-China geo-political rivalry that affected all areas of politics, trade, defence and security. Japan and the EUs trust rankings suffered not due to lack of engagement with the region but due to Southeast Asians attention on the US and Chinas actions.Trust (2021, 2022)Di

378、strust (2021, 2022)US47.0%52.8%Japan68.2%54.2%China26.8%19.0%India18.0%16.6%China59.6%58.1%India52.0%47.8%29.0%26.1%EUJapan15.3%21.8%US31.1%29.6%49.7%EU48.5%10% weighting was applied to 2021 data resulting in a change of results and rankings.THE STATE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA: 202253PREFERENCE FOR TERTIARY

379、 EDUCATIONThis final section gauges the extent of soft power in the region based on tertiary education and travel choices. Weighting was applied in this section for both 2021 and 2022 results in order to provide trend analysis.SECTION VI: Soft PowerThe United States remains the regions top preferenc

380、e for tertiary education (25.6%), followed by the UK (20.8%), the EU (12.0%), Australia (9.9%), and Japan (9.6%). Only 5.8% chose an ASEAN member state, although the number slightly increased from 5.2% last year. The US is the most popular destination for tertiary education among five ASEAN member s

381、tates: Singapore (45.9%), Myanmar (35.1%), Vietnam (34.0%), the Philippines (29.5%), and Malaysia (26.7%). The EU is most popular in Indonesia (19.1%). The UK is most popular in Brunei (60.4%) and Thailand (26.5%). Japan is the top choice in Laos (27.3%). Meanwhile, Cambodia sees a significant rise

382、in those who chose China (34.6%) compared to last year (3.8%).Q49 Which country would be your first choice if you (or your child) were offered a scholarship to a university?CountryAn ASEAN member stateAustraliaChinaIndiaAn EU member stateJapanRepublic of KoreaNew ZealandThe United KingdomThe United

383、StatesASEAN5.8%9.9%8.8%0.2%12.0%9.6%2.0%5.4%20.8%25.6%BN9.4%0.0%1.9%0.0%1.9%9.4%3.8%5.7%60.4%7.5%KH12.3%9.9%34.6%0.0%12.3%3.7%2.5%1.2%6.2%17.3%ID8.4%7.6%10.7%0.0%19.1%10.7%6.1%7.6%11.5%18.3%LA6.8%15.9%6.8%0.0%9.1%27.3%0.0%6.8%11.4%15.9%MY7.4%13.3%5.9%0.7%9.6%5.2%1.5%8.9%20.7%26.7%MM2.3%12.9%0.0%0.0%

384、11.1%11.4%3.4%5.1%18.6%35.1%PH4.0%13.0%1.0%0.0%19.3%14.2%1.0%6.3%11.8%29.5%SG2.3%5.4%2.7%0.0%8.1%2.7%0.0%4.5%28.4%45.9%TH0.9%12.0%13.7%0.9%11.1%3.4%0.0%6.0%26.5%25.6%VN4.2%9.0%11.1%0.0%18.1%8.3%1.4%1.4%12.5%34.0%2021202225.6%12.0%20.8%The UnitedStatesAn EU member stateThe UnitedKingdom27.1%11.8%20.1

385、%The UnitedStatesAn EU member stateThe UnitedKingdom10% weighting was applied to 2021 data resulting in a change of results.SURVEY REPORT54Q50 Which country is your favourite holiday destination?MOST PREFERRED COUNTRY TO VISITJapan remains the most popular destination to visit among Southeast Asians

386、 (22.8%), followed by the European Union (19.2%), and an ASEAN member state (14.0%). Japan tops the list of travel destinations among respondents from six ASEAN member states: Laos (40.9%), Singapore (31.1%), Thailand (24.8%), the Philippines (24.5%), Indonesia (23.7%), and Malaysia (18.5%). The EU

387、is most preferred in Vietnam (25.0%) and Myanmar (20.9%). Meanwhile China is an overwhelmingly popular choice among Cambodian respondents (29.6%).CountryAn ASEAN member stateAustraliaChinaIndiaAn EUmember stateJapanRepublic of KoreaNew ZealandThe United KingdomThe United StatesASEAN14.0%5.1%7.2%0.3%

388、19.2%22.8%8.5%9.5%5.0%8.4%BN20.8%5.7%3.8%0.0%11.3%18.9%17.0%3.8%15.1%3.8%KH17.3%6.2%29.6%0.0%18.5%4.9%6.2%4.9%6.2%6.2%ID22.1%3.1%4.6%0.0%22.9%23.7%6.1%11.5%0.0%6.1%LA11.4%6.8%2.3%0.0%18.2%40.9%2.3%9.1%4.5%4.5%MY17.0%5.9%7.4%0.7%13.3%18.5%11.9%17.0%3.7%4.4%MM8.3%2.0%0.0%1.1%20.9%17.7%19.7%16.9%4.9%8.

389、6%PH14.0%5.5%0.5%0.5%21.5%24.5%7.8%6.3%3.5%16.0%SG14.4%7.7%2.7%0.0%21.2%31.1%5.9%4.1%7.7%5.4%TH6.0%5.1%11.1%0.9%18.8%24.8%3.4%12.8%2.6%14.5%VN8.3%3.5%10.4%0.0%25.0%22.9%4.9%8.3%2.1%14.6%22.8%Japan19.2%An EU member state14.0%An ASEAN member state10% weighting was applied to 2021 data resulting in a c

390、hange of results.THE STATE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA: 202255MOST PREFERRED COUNTRY TO VISIT IN THE REGIONAnswered: 218 (Respondents who chose the “An ASEAN member state” option in Q50)Q51 Among ASEAN member states, which one is your favourite destination to visit?Among the respondents who chose an ASEAN mem

391、ber state as their favourite destination, Singapore is the top choice with a share of 27.9%, followed by Thailand (27.5%), and Indonesia (11.4%). Singapore is the top choice among respondents from Cambodia (71.4%), Laos (60.0%), the Philippines (32.1%), and Indonesia (31.0%). Interestingly, some ASE

392、AN respondents turned to domestic tourism as international travel activities reeled from the COVID-19 pandemic restrictions in 2021. For instance, most of the respondents from Thailand (57.1%) prefer to travel in their own country. Similarly, respondents from Indonesia (27.6%) and the Philippines (2

393、5.0%) chose their own countries respectively as their second favourite destination in the region. CountryBrunei DarussalamCambodiaIndonesiaLaosMalaysiaMyanmarPhilippinesSingaporeThailandVietnamASEAN1.0%2.5%11.4%2.8%8.4%4.1%5.6%27.9%27.5%8.8%BN0.0%0.0%9.1%0.0%45.5%0.0%0.0%18.2%27.3%0.0%KH0.0%7.1%0.0%

394、0.0%7.1%0.0%0.0%71.4%7.1%7.1%ID3.4%0.0%27.6%3.4%10.3%0.0%0.0%31.0%13.8%10.3%LA0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%60.0%20.0%20.0%MY4.3%0.0%21.7%4.3%0.0%0.0%8.7%21.7%39.1%0.0%MM0.0%3.4%10.3%0.0%0.0%10.3%6.9%13.8%37.9%17.2%PH1.8%0.0%5.4%0.0%3.6%0.0%25.0%32.1%21.4%10.7%SG0.0%0.0%9.4%3.1%9.4%21.9%15.6%0.0%34.4%

395、6.3%TH0.0%14.3%14.3%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%14.3%57.1%0.0%VN0.0%0.0%16.7%16.7%8.3%8.3%0.0%16.7%16.7%16.7%27.9%27.5%11.4%SingaporeThailandIndonesia10% weighting was applied to 2021 data resulting in a change of results and rankings.SURVEY REPORT56THE STATE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA: 202257SURVEY REPORT58This report is printed on FSC-certified paper.