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1、Philosophy for ChildrenFirst published Thu May 2, 2002; substantive revision Mon Jun 8, 2009Stanford Encyclopedia of philosophyhttp:/plato.stanford.edu/entries/children/In the United States, philosophy typically makes its formal entry into the curriculum at the college level. A growing number of hig
2、h schools offer some introduction to philosophy, often in special literature courses for college bound students. In Europe and many other countries, it is much more common to find philosophy in the high school curriculum. However, philosophy prior to high school seems relatively uncommon around the
3、world. This may suggest that serious philosophical thinking is not for pre-adolescents. Two reasons might be offered for accepting this view. First, philosophical thinking requires a level of cognitive development that, one may believe, is beyond the reach of pre-adolescents. Second, the school curr
4、iculum is already crowded; and introducing a subject like philosophy will not only distract students from what they need to learn, it may encourage them to become skeptics rather than learners. However, both of these reasons can be challenged. They will be addressed in turn. 1. Are Children Capable
5、of Philosophical Thinking? 2. Philosophy in a Crowded Curriculum 3. The Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children (IAPC) 4. Philosophizing With Others? 5. Philosophy For Children Around The World Bibliography Books and Articles Periodicals Other Internet Resources Related Entries1. Ar
6、e Children Capable of Philosophical Thinking?Jean Piagets (1933 ) well-known theory of cognitive development suggests that prior to age 11 or 12, most children are not capable of philosophical thinking. This is because, prior to this time, children are not capable of “thinking about thinking,” the s
7、ort of meta-level thinking that characterizes philosophical thinking. This “formal operational” level of cognitive development includes analogical reasoning about relationships, such as: “Bicycle is to handlebars as ship is to rudder, with ”steering mechanism“ being the similar relationship” (Goswam
8、i, p. xxi). However, there is a growing body of psychological research suggesting that Piagets account seriously underestimates childrens cognitive abilities (Astington, 1993; Gopnik, et al.).Philosopher Gareth Matthews goes further and argues at length that Piaget failed to see the philosophical th
9、inking manifest in the very children he studied. Matthews (1980) provides a number of delightful examples of very young childrens philosophical puzzlement. For example: TIM (about six years), while busily engaged in licking a pot, asked, “Papa, how can we be sure that everything is not a dream?” (p.
10、 1) JORDAN (five years), going to bed at eight one evening, asked, “If I go to bed at eight and get up at seven in the morning, how do I really know that the little hand of the clock has gone around only once? Do I have to stay up all night to watch it? If I look away even for a short time, maybe th
11、e small hand will go around twice.” (p. 3) One day JOHN EDGAR (four years), who had seen airplanes take off, rise, and gradually disappear into the distance, took his first plane ride. When the plane stopped ascending and the seat-belt sign went out, John Edgar turned to his father and said in a rat
12、her relieved, but still puzzled, tone of voice, “Things dont really get smaller up here.” (p. 4)Matthews acquired many of his anecdotes from friends who knew of his interest in the philosophical thinking of children. It is not uncommon for attentive adults to encounter such examples.However, it migh
13、t be objected that more than such anecdotes are needed to show that children are capable of serious philosophical thinking. What is needed is evidence that children are capable of sustained philosophical discussion. Matthews (1984) provides illustrations of this, too. Meeting with a group of 811 yea
14、r olds, he used the following example to develop a story for discussion:Ian (six year old) found to his chagrin that the three children of his parents friends monopolized the television; they kept him from watching his favorite program. “Mother,” he asked in frustration, “why is it better for three
15、children to be selfish than one?” (Matthews 1984, 923)This generated a lively discussion in which children commented on the inconsiderateness of the three visiting children, the desirability of working out a solution that would satisfy all four children, the importance of respecting peoples rights,
16、and how one might feel if he or she were in Ians place. Matthews then posed a possible utilitarian approach: “What about this argument, that if we let the three visitors have their way, three people will be made happy instead of just one?” One reply was that it would not be fair for three people to get what they want at the expense of a fourth. This triggered a discussion of fairness that addressed more specific concer
