审计质量、审计代理问题与财务信息质量的关系

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1、本科毕业论文(设计)外 文 翻 译外文题目 Audit quality and the relationship between auditees agency problems and financial information quality 外文出处 Department of Accounting and Finance University of Vaasa 外文作者 Johanna Miettinen 原文:Audit quality and the relationship between auditees agency problems and financial inform

2、ation qualityAbstract This study examines the role of audit quality on the relationship between auditees agency problems and financial information quality. It contributes to the existing literature by considering agency theory and audit research concerned with audit quality. The following hypotheses

3、 are tested based on the underlying literature: 1) Auditees agency problems are positively associated with audit quality, 2) Audit quality is positively associated with financial information quality, and 3) Audit quality mediates the relationship between auditees agency problems and financial inform

4、ation quality. To provide insight on the above hypotheses a path analysis is employed for a sample of 932 S&P 1500 firms. Auditees agency problems are measured by leverage, management ownership and free cash flow. Moreover, audit quality is measured by audit fees and non-audit services fees (i.e. to

5、tal fees) paid to the incumbent auditor. Finally, financial information quality is measured by absolute discretionary accruals. The results reveal that auditees agency problems are positively associated with audit quality. In addition, it is found that audit quality increases financial information q

6、uality. Finally, it is documented that audit quality is a potential mediator in the relationship between auditees agency problems and financial information quality. These findings imply that auditees agency problems explain the demand for a high quality auditor. Furthermore, these results suggest th

7、at high audit quality successfully fulfils its role as a monitoring mechanism which purpose is to assure financial information quality. 1. INTRODUCTION This study investigates the role of audit quality on the relationship between auditees agency problems and financial information quality. Audit qual

8、ity is one of the most important issues in audit practice today. The quality of the financial information is dependent, among other things, on audit quality (ISB 2000). Several individuals and groups have an interest in the quality of audited financial information. External financial statement users

9、, including current and potential investors, creditors, and others need reliable financial information on which to base their resource allocation decisions. Auditees, including management, audit committees, and boards of directors have an interest in quality audits, for example, to help to reduce th

10、e cost of capital. In addition, regulators and standard setters can increase the effectiveness of capital markets by promulgating rules and regulations that help ensure that audits improve financial information quality (ISB 2000). However, there have been concerns about audit quality in the present

11、audit environment, where severe audit failures have come to light. It has been found that the perceived reliability of audited financial information has declined. In contrast, the perceived relevance of audited financial information has increased (Hodge 2003). Thus, it is evident that there is a nee

12、d for further research on audit quality and how it is related to financial information quality. Audit quality has received considerable interest in both agency and audit research. According to agency literature one implication of agency problems is management propensity to produce substandard financ

13、ial information (e.g. Warfield, Wild & Wild 1995; Chung, Firth & Kim 2005; Richardson 2006). Auditing provides assurance about the quality and credibility of companys financial information and thus, is considered a means to mitigate agency problems (Jensen & Meckling 1976). Consequently, studies on

14、agency issues have focused on the demand side of auditing and examined how the level of auditees agency problems affects the demand for audit quality (e.g. Jensen et al. 1976; DeFond 1992; Parkash & Venable 1993; Nikkinen & Sahlstrm 2004; Lennox 2005). On the other hand, audit research has concentra

15、ted on the supply side of audit quality and investigated how audit quality is reflected in financial information quality (e.g. Frankel, Johnson & Nelson 2002; Geiger & Rama 2003; Larcker & Richardson 2004).No previous research, however, has attempted to adapt both agency and audit research to invest

16、igate audit quality. Thus, the objective of this research is to combine the demand and supply side perspectives of audit quality. More specifically, this study produces an integrated model of the determinants of financial information quality which includes variables concerning agency problems and audit quality. The modeldepicts relationships

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