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1、外文翻译Ownership Structure and Firm Performance: Evidence from Israel Material Source: Journal of Management and Governance Author: Beni Lauterbach and Alexander Vaninsky 1.IntroductionFor many years and in many economies, most of the business activity was conducted by proprietorships, partnerships or
2、closed corporations. In these forms of business organization, a small and closely related group of individuals belonging to the same family or cooperating in business for lengthy periods runs the firm and shares its profits.However, over the recent century, a new form of business organization flouri
3、shed as non-concentrated-ownership corporations emerged. The modern diverse ownership corporation has broken the link between the ownership and active management of the firm. Modern corporations are run by professional managers who typically own only a very small fraction of the shares. In addition,
4、 ownership is disperse, that is the corporation is owned by and its profits are distributed among many stockholders.The advantages of the modern corporation are numerous. It relieves financing problems, which enables the firm to assume larger-scale operations and utilize economies of scale. It also
5、facilitates complex-operations allowing the most skilled or expert managers to control business even when they (the professional mangers) do not have enough funds to own the firm. Modern corporations raise money (sell common stocks) in the capital markets and assign it to the productive activities o
6、f professional managers. This is why it is plausible to hypothesize that the modern diverse-ownership corporations perform better than the traditional “closely held” business forms.Moderating factors exist. For example, closely held firms may issue minority shares to raise capital and expand operati
7、ons. More importantly, modern corporations face a severe new problem called the agency problem: there is a chance that the professional mangers governing the daily operations of the firm would take actions against the best interests of the shareholders. This agency problem stems from the separation
8、of ownership and control in the modern corporation, and it troubled many economists before (e.g., Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen 1983). The conclusion was that there needs to exist a monitoring system or contract, aligning the manager interests and actions with the
9、 wealth and welfare of the owners (stockholders)Agency-type problems exist also in closely held firms because there are always only a few decision makers. However, given the personal ties between the owners and mangers in these firms, and given the much closer monitoring, agency problems in closely
10、held firms seem in general less severe.The presence of agency problems weakens the central thesis that modern open ownership corporations are more efficient. It is possible that in some business sectors the costs of monitoring and bonding the manager would be excessive. It is also probable that in s
11、ome cases the advantages of large-scale operations and professional management would be minor and insufficient to outweigh the expected agency costs. Nevertheless, given the historical trend towards diverse ownership corporations, we maintain the hypothesis that diverse-ownership firms perform bette
12、r than closely held firms. In our view, the trend towards diverse ownership corporations is rational and can be explained by performance gains.2. Ownership Structure and Firm PerformanceOne of the most important trademarks of the modern corporation is the separation of ownership and control. Modern
13、corporations are typically run by professional executives who own only a small fraction of the shares.There is an ongoing debate in the literature on the impact and merit of the separation of ownership and control. Early theorists such as Williamson (1964) propose that non-owner managers prefer thei
14、r own interests over that of the shareholders. Consequently, non-owner managed firms become less efficient than owner-managed firms.The more recent literature reexamines this issue and prediction. It points out the existence of mechanisms that moderate the prospects of non-optimal and selfish behavi
15、or by the manager. Fama (1980), for example, argues that the availability and competition in the managerial labor markets reduce the prospects that managers would act irresponsibly. In addition, the presence of outside directors on the board constrains management behavior. Others, like Murphy (1985)
16、, suggest that executive compensation packages help align management interests with those of the shareholders by generating a link between management pay and firm performance. Hence, non-owner manager firms are not less efficient than owner-managed firms. Most interestingly, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) conclude that the structure of ownership varies in ways that are consistent with value maximization. That is, diverse ownership and non-owner ma
