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1、外文文献翻译译文一、 外文原文原文：Financial accounting information and corporate governance systemsAbstractWe posit that limited transparency of firms operations to outside investors increases demands on governance systems to alleviate moral hazard problems. The accounting information system is one part of the comp
2、any governs, which has a close relation with the corporate governance. The accounting information system has a reaction to the corporate governance. And the quality of the accounting information would be influenced by the corporate governance .In current society, the phenomenon that accounting infor
3、mation distortion keeps appeared all the time. However,this reasonable arrangements wouldnt be carried out effectually because the sanction for the unit principal is not enough and its range is dwindled. And therefore,this paper suggests that Accounting Law and Criminal Law should be revised,examina
4、tions on the quality of accounting information should be strengthened and the socially informing system should be set up. It is necessary to perfect corporate governance in order to make the quality of the accounting information better in this article; I explain what the corporate governance and the
5、 quality of accounting information are present now. And then I will try to analysis the relationship between the deficiency of corporate governance and the accounting information quality, the influence that the accounting information quality 。IntroductionIn the U.S. and in other economies with stron
6、g legal protection of outside shareholders rights, transparency of a firms operations and activities to outside investors disciplines managers to act in shareholders interests.1 Wepos it that limited corporate transparency increases demands on corporate governance systems to alleviate moral hazard p
7、roblems resulting from a more severe information gap between managers and shareholders, ceteris paribus. We consider two factors that limit corporate transparency to varying degrees across large public U.S. companies: (1) relatively uninformative financial accounting systems characterized by the ina
8、bility of firms GAAP earnings to explain changes in shareholder value in a timely fashion (low earnings timeliness) and, (2) firm complexity due to extensivegeographic and/or line of business diversification.Accountinginformationcanhaveasignificantimpactoneconomiclife.Realreliableaccountinginformati
9、onistheimportantbasisforcompaniestooperateday-to-daybusinessandmakecorrectdecisions,theimportantreferencefortheGovernmentstomakemacro-economicregulationandcontrol,thefavorableprotectionforthenormaloperationofmarketeconomy.AsChinasmarketeconomicsystemhasimprovedsteadily,theroleofaccountingisincreasin
10、glyimportantineconomy,itisthegreatestconcernandmustbeansweredbyaccountingprofessionthatwhetheraccountinginformationisusedtomakedecisionsforgovernment,investorsandotherusers.ButChinascurrentdisclosureofaccountinginformationshouldnotbeoptimistic,kindsofdisclosureproblemsoftenoccursuchasexcessivedisclo
11、sureofaccountinginformation,inadequatedisclosure,untruedisclosure,untimelydisclosure,abnormaldisclosure,etc.Theseproblemsseriouslyaffectscorrectdecision-makingoftheinformationusers,disruptsthedistributionofsocialresources.With respect to monitoring technology, we conjecture that inherent limitations
12、 ofirms information systems in generating information relevant for monitoringmanagerial behavior influence governance structure formation by affecting the costbenefit trade-off underlying governance mechanism configurations. Financialaccounting systems are a logical starting point for investigating
13、properties ofinformation systems important for addressing moral hazard problems. Auditedfinancial statements prepared under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) produce extensive, credible, low cost information that forms the foundation of the firm-specific information set available for a
14、ddressing agency problems. Inmonitoring top managers, boards and outside investors cannot simply rely on stockprice changes to provide necessary information about the source of changes to firmvalue. For example, agency models generally imply that managers should be held. accountable for controllable
15、 events and not uncontrollable events, while stock returns aggregate the implications of all events. The accounting system facilitates boards efforts to separate controllable from uncontrollable events. As an illustration, managers often submit budgets to the board and then make periodic reports exp
16、laining variances from budget, presumably aiding boards in separating controllable from uncontrollable events (e.g., Zimmerman, 2002, Chapter 6)Measuring governance value of accounting numbers We conjecture that the extent to which current accounting numbers capture theinfor mation set underlying current changes in v
