金融专业外文翻译

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1、本科毕业论文(设计)外文翻译原文:The Determinants of Capital Structure ChoiceI. Determinants of Capital StructureIn this section, we present a brief discussion of the attributes that different theories of capital structure suggest may affect the firms debt-equity choice. These attributes are denoted asset structure

2、, non-debt tax shields, growth, uniqueness, industry classification, size, earnings volatility, and profitability. The attributes, their relation to the optimal capital structure choice, and their observable indicators are discussed below.A. Collateral Value of AssetsMost capital structure theories

3、argue that the type of assets owned by a firm in some way affects its capital structure choice. Scott suggests that, by selling secured debt, firms increase the value of their equity by expropriating wealth from their existing unsecured creditors.Arguments put forth by Myers and Majluf also suggest

4、that firms may find it advantageous to sell secured debt. Their model demonstrates that there may be costs associated with issuing securities about which the firms managers have better information than outside shareholders. Issuing debt secured by property with known values avoids these costs. For t

5、his reason, firms with assets that can be used as collateral may be expected to issue more debt to take advantage of this opportunity.Work by Galai and Masulis , Jensen and Meckling , and Myers suggests that stockholders of leveraged firms have an incentive to invest yet to expropriate wealth from t

6、he firms bondholders. This incentive may also induce a positive relation between debt ratios and the capacity of firms to collateralize their debt. If the debt can be collateralized, the borrower is restricted to use the funds for a specified project. Since no such guarantee can be used for projects

7、 that cannot be collateralized, creditors may require more favorable terms, which in turn may lead such firms to use equity rather than debt financing.The tendency of managers to consume more than the optimal level of perquisites may produce the opposite relation between collateralized capital and d

8、ebt levels. Grossman and Hart suggest that higher debt levels diminish this tendency because of the increased threat of bankruptcy. Managers of highly levered firms will also be less able to consume excessive perquisites since bondholders (or bankers) are inclined to closely monitor such firms. The

9、costs associated with this agency relation may be higher for firms with assets that are less collateralized since monitoring the capital outlays of such firms is probably more difficult. For this reason, firms with less collateralized assets may choose higher debt levels to limit their managers cons

10、umption of perquisites.The estimated model incorporates two indicators for the collateral value attribute. They include the ratio of intangible assets to total assets (INT/TA) and the ratio of inventory plus gross plant and equipment to total assets (IGP/TA). The first indicator is negatively relate

11、d to the collateral value attribute, while the second is positively related to collateral value.B. Non-Debt Tax ShieldsDeAngelo and Masulis present a model of optimal capital structure that incorporates the impact of corporate taxes, personal taxes, and non-debt-related corporate tax shields. They a

12、rgue that tax deductions for depreciation and investment tax credits are substitutes for the tax benefits of debt financing. As a result, firms with large non-debt tax shields relative to their expected cash flow include less debt in their capital structures.Indicators of non-debt tax shields includ

13、e the ratios of investment tax credits over total assets (ITC/TA), depreciation over total assets (DITA), and a direct estimate of non-debt tax shields over total assets (NDT/TA). The latter measure is calculated from observed federal income tax payments (T), operating income (OI), interest payments

14、 (i), and the corporate tax rate during our sample period (48%), using the following equation:NDT = OI-i-T/0.48which follows from the equalityT= 0.48(0I- i-NDT)These indicators measure the current tax deductions associated with capital equipment and, hence, only partially capture the non-debt tax sh

15、ield variable suggested by DeAngelo and Masulis. First, this attribute excludes tax deductions that are not associated with capital equipment, such as research and development and selling expenses. (These variables, used as indicators of another attribute, are discussed later.) More important, our n

16、on-debt tax shield attribute represents tax deductions rather than tax deductions net of true economic depreciation and expenses, which is the economic attribute suggested by theory. Unfortunately, this preferable attribute would be very difficult to measure.C. GrowthAs we mentioned previously, equity-controlled firms have a tendency to invest suboptimally to expropriate wealth from the firms bondholders. The cost associated with this agency relationshi

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