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1、编号：时间：2021年x月x日书山有路勤为径，学海无涯苦作舟页码：第1页 共1页锁定问题-最优投资和契约理论Hold-Up Problem, Optimale Investitionen und VertragstheorieHold-Up Problem, Optimal Investment and Contract Theory赖俊平 (Junping Lai)经济发展文论 Jingji fazhan wenlun Arbeitspapiere fr WirtschaftsentwicklungWorking Papers for Economic Development同济大学中德学院
2、经济发展研究所Institut fr WirtschaftsentwicklungInstitute for Econommic Development国际标准刊号：ISSN-Nr 1860220703/2006目录/Gliderung/Contents中文提要 /Chinesische Zusammenfassung /Chinese Abstract英文提要 /Englische Zusammenfassung /English Abstract1. 前言 /Einleitung /Introduction2. 基准模型 /Benchmark-Modell /Benchmark Model
3、3. 理论基础低效率的来源Theoretische Analyse der IneffizienzengruendeTheoretical Analysis of Sources of Inefficiency3.1 投资的性质 /Charakteristiken der Inverstitionen /Properties of Investment3.2 信息结构 /Informationsstruktur /Informational Structure3.3 动态情形 /Dynamische Aspekte /Dynamic Aspects4. 契约治理方法 /Vertragsmeth
4、odik /Contractual Solutions4.1 市场竞争 /Konkurrenz /Competition4.2 纵向一体化 /Vertikale Integration /Vertical Integration4.3 所有权配置 Allokation der Eigentumsrechts /Allocation of ownership4.4 机制设计 Mechanism-Design /Mechnism Design 5. 结论性评论 SchlussfolgerungenConcluding Remarks参考文献/Literaturverzeichnis/Referen
5、ces关键词：锁定问题 契约理论 投资Keywords：Hold-up problem, contract theory, investmentJEL: D23; D82; L14; L22-作者/Autor/Author: 赖俊平（Junping Lai）电子信箱/Email: 本文第一稿完成于2005年12月5日。本文的写作得到同济大学中德学院德国科学基金联合会教研室（现为德意志银行教研室）的资助，在此谨表感谢，并表示文责自负。摘 要锁定问题是现代契约理论和制度经济学最重要的领域之一。交易成本经济学关于投资专用性的分析，是最早的锁定问题模型。传统的锁定问题分析认为，专用性投资和契约的不完全
6、性是投资不足的基础。后来的分析表明，其他许多因素和假设都有可能导致锁定问题和投资不足。投资的各种性质，从投资的专用性、合作性，到投资的时序、沉淀成本、补贴投资等，都为我们重新理解锁定问题和投资不足提供了新的视角；并且投资的不同性质也使得锁定问题的许多治理方法在新的情形中不一定有效。本文试图总结锁定问题和契约理论的近期研究。本文将从投资性质、信息结构、动态模型三个方面来理解锁定问题的理论基础。首先，本文分别考察了投资的诸种性质，包括投资的专用性，投资的合作性，投资的时序，沉淀成本，渐进投资和补贴投资；这些性质为我们理解锁定问题提供了新的视角。之后，本文的分析转向锁定问题的信息结构，信息结构本身及
7、其决定因素对投资水平具有重要影响。相应地，本文对信息结构的分析主要集中在私人和不对称信息，信息的不可观察性，信息的不可验证性以及议价力量的配置。与这些分析相关的文献为我们理解锁定问题和投资水平的决定提供了很多有价值的洞见。基于锁定问题的理论基础，本文着手介绍了一些消除或者缓解锁定问题和投资不足问题的方法。主要的治理方法包括纵向一体化，所有权配置，市场竞争和再谈判设计。不同治理方法的假设是否合理决定着它们效力的大小。最后，本文列举了一些与锁定问题和投资决定相关的文献，主要包括议价理论，机制设计，实验经济学，法经济学等；基于全文的基础上，我们对锁定问题的研究提出了一些总结性的评论，并指出了将来之研
8、究方向。关键词：锁定问题 契约理论 投资ABATRACTThe hold-up problem is central to contract theory and institutional economics. Transactional cost economics (TCE) which deals with specific investment offers the first analytical model of hold-up problem.Conventional wisdom is that specificity of investment and incomplete
9、ness of contract are the sources of hold-up problem leading to underinvestment. New analysis, however, displays that some other important factors and assumptions may be critical to understand underinvestment in the framework of hold-up problem. This paper provides a survey on hold-up problem and con
10、tract theory. It comes up with theoretical foundations of hold-up problem from three different aspects: properties of investment, informational structure and dynamic model of hold-up problem. First, many properties of investment, such as specificity, cooperativeness, timing of investment, sunk costs
11、, gradual investment and subsidized investment, will be analyzed to understand hold-up problem.Then we introduce informational structure which underlies hold-up problem. Informational structure has deterministic effects on the level of investment. And we survey different informational problems, such
12、 as private and asymmetric information, unobservability and non-verifiability of information and the allocation of bargaining power. Many valuable views have been included within our analysis.However, many conclusions with hold-up are drawn from static models, and there may be some misunderstanding
13、with them. A dynamic analysis of hold-up will deepen our understanding of the relationship between hold-up problem and optimal investment. This paper reviews some contributions for dynamic hold-up analysis.Based on the introduction of theoretical foundations of hold-up problem, we put up with some s
14、olutions, which may lessen or mitigate the hold-up problem and underinvestment. Those contractual methods include vertical integration, allocation of ownership, market competition and renegotiation design. Different assumptions determine the effectiveness of them, respectively.Finally, some remarkin
15、g conclusions and prospects for future research with hold-up problem are made. Furthermore, we list some of the related literatures on hold-up problem with bargaining theory, law & economics, mechanism design, and experimental economics.Keywords: Hold-up problem, contract theory, investmentJEL Classification: D23; D82; L14; L221、引言经济参与者经常要进行事前投资，而投资的事后收益很可能被其交易伙伴占有；当他们在事后必须通过议价（bargaining）来分配事前关系性投资所带来的剩余时，锁定问题（hold-up problem）产生了。锁定问题在很多双边关系中都存在在联盟议价（union bargaining）中也存在锁定问题
