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1、本科毕业论文（设计）外 文 翻 译原文二：Board Composition, Executive Remuneration,And Corporate Performance: The Case Of ReitsIntroductionStockholders in modern corporations are the residual risk bearers. As they dont have the expertise to run their firms, stockholders must rely on the firmsmanagement team. Jensen and
2、 Ruback (1983) defined the management team as the top managers as well as the board of directors of the firm. The separation between ownership and control in the modern corporation creates the incentives for managers to pursue their self-interest goals and not to maximize the shareholders wealth in
3、what is termed in the literature as the agency conflict.Researchers have suggested many mechanismsby which managers are curbed from maximizingsolely their own utilities.These mechanisms (seeAgarwal and Knoeber 1996) can be either externalones, such as market for corporate control or internalones, su
4、ch as the board of directors. The board ofdirectors is a basic element of corporate governance.The main functions of corporate boards are evaluating and approving strategies formulated by managers, providing an appropriate vehicle for stock holders desiring representation in company boards, and perf
5、orming vigorous monitoring of managers actions to make sure that decisions by top managers come in line with shareholders interests. The literature is rich with studies that have shown the positive effect of the outside board members on firm value .The theory says that the way a board of directors i
6、s formed is intended to minimize the agency conflict costs. Also, some studies have shown how the size of the board affects corporate value (Yermack 1996; Zahra et al. 1989; Eisenberg et al. 1998). Consequently, the board of directors is an important governance mechanism that ensures that the intere
7、sts of shareholders and management are closely aligned, which would have its effects on corporate performance.In addition to the internal mechanisms that mitigate agency conflicts, managerial remuneration is an important device that can be used effectively to align the interests of stockholders and
8、managers. The extent to which the remuneration package can achieve that alignment of interests is an empirical question. From a theoretical point of view, managerial remuneration should correlate weakly with corporate performance. The annual bonus usually is given in good as well as bad performance
9、times. Good performance pushes the bonus up while bad performance does not depress the bonus. However, empirically, the relationship between management remuneration and corporate performance was detected and shown to exist. Generally, studies have found that there is a positive relation between mana
10、gerial remuneration and corporate performance (Hamid 1995; Davis et al. 1994; Finnerty et al. 1993).Managerial remuneration and corporate performanceThe issue of managerial incentives has been heavily researched in financial economics. Managerial incentives, at least from a theoretical point of view
11、, have an energetic effect on mitigating the moral hazard problem inherited in individual contracts. This would have a major impact upon firms financial performance. Hamid (1995) examined the relationship between CEO compensation structure, ownership, and firm performance. He mainly focused upon the
12、 equity type of compensation not the cash compensation. His results confirmed a significant positive relationship between CEO equity compensation and firm Performance.Other types of compensation also have a positive effect on corporate performance even after considering some control variables. Davis
13、 and Shelor (1995) also documented a significant relationship between executive total compensation, firm size, and firm performance. Cannon and Vogt (1995) used Jensens measure to proxy for REITs financial performance and examined how severe the agency costs in REITs are. They find that advisor REIT
14、s with lowdirector ownership tend to underperform and pay higher advisor payments than do their counterparts with high ownership. They find no such relationship for self-administered REITs. These results show that self-administered REITs make better use of marketbased performance compensation than d
15、o advisor REITs. Lewellen, Loderer, Martin, and Blum (1992) found that there is a significant relationship between managerial compensation and firm economic performance. Their results confirmed that compensation packages are designed to mitigate the agency conflict costs. In most previous studies, t
16、he relation between managerial remuneration and corporate performance was examined and shown to be positive when using total remuneration package, which includes usually (1) base cash remuneration, (2) incentive cash remuneration, (3) stock options, and (4) relative performance remuneration. This study, however, is concerned only with cash remuneration since it represents about 80% of total remuneration package.Board composition and financial performanceThe i
