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1、 对冲基金论文：对冲基金行使股东权的自由和约束【中文摘要】对冲基金在全球金融和资本市场的活动已经引起了广泛关注。我国资本市场的发展虽然较为落后,但如何应对对冲基金的挑战已经成为一个不得不开始重视的问题。本文意在介绍和研究德国应对对冲基金的立法、司法经验和学术研究,为我国在对冲基金规制方面提供有益的素材和探讨。本文还试图进一步讨论对冲基金现象背后所蕴藏的更深层的成因,即公司作为主体与资本市场之间的张力,研究和强调公司利益这一概念在公司法上的重要意义。本文将在引言中介绍一个由对冲基金制造的轰动性案例德国证券公司案,以此作为全文的切入点。第一章中,文章将对对冲基金的含义、特征以及行为方式等基本问题进
2、行简要介绍。对冲基金以激进的行为著称,往往出其不意地迫使公司管理层改变经营方略,而从卖空等行为中投机获利。在第二章中,文章将着重分析对冲基金所引发的两个问题偶然多数问题和无关联表决问题。这两个问题看似复杂,然而实质上都可归结于同一个问题,即对冲基金与目标公司的利益冲突。对冲基金引发的利益冲突问题主要有两种解决思路,一是通过立法上的改革,加强对冲基金的披露义务;二是运用公司法上股东的忠实义务,在个案中解决股东权利滥用的问题。文章第三章将主要分析比较这两种路径各自的优势与问题。与加强对冲基金披露义务的方式相比,个案解决的方式更为灵活可行。随后,第四章将主要以德国的司法判决和学理研究为背景,着重介绍
3、股份公司股东忠实义务的理论基础、认可的必要性以及义务的内容等问题。即使股份公司作为典型的资合公司,其人合性大大弱于人合公司及有限公司,但是在股份公司中,一个股东可以通过某种途径损害其他股东的利益,这就足以成为股东忠实义务存在的理由。我国公司法中明确表述股东不得滥用股东权利损害公司或者其他股东的利益的义务。这就产生了对公司利益进行界定的必要性。第五章将回归公司利益这个主题,讨论公司利益的认可与边界问题。最后,结论部分将对本文内容进行总结并表明笔者的观点。【英文摘要】The activities of hedge funds in the global financial and capital
4、markets have aroused a great concern. It has been a question which we have to face that how should we deal with the challenge of hedge funds, although the developments of the capital markets in China still fall behind. This thesis intends to give an introduction and study on how Germany handles the
5、challenge, given by hedge funds, in aspects of the legislation and judicial experiences and academic research, in order to provide beneficial material and discussion on how China should regulate hedge funds. Besides this, this thesis tries to focus on the deep reason deprived from the phenomenon of
6、hedge funds. This reason is the tension between company and capital markets. This chapter also studies and emphasizes the importance of companys benefits on company law.As a beginning, the famous case of Deutsche Boerse AG is to present in the introduction of the thesis.Chapter: A brief introduction
7、 on the concept and characteristics of hedge funds, and the pattern of hedge fundsbehaviors is presented in Chapter. Hedge funds are famous for their radical action; They force the managers unpredictably into changing the companys business plans, so that they can benefit from shortsell and so on.Cha
8、pter: Two questions caused by hedge funds are analyzed in this chapter: occasional majorities and empty voting. Both questions seem to be complicated. Actually, the conflict of interest between hedge funds and targeted company is the common characteristic. Two main solutions to this situation will b
9、e described in this chapter. One is to enhance the duty of disclosure by improving legislation; the other is to solve the abuse of shareholdersright in each particular case using loyalty duty of shareholders. Chapter: The advantages and disadvantages will be analyzed in this chapter. Compared with e
10、nhancing the duty of disclosure, solving in each particular case is more flexible and available.Chapter: The theoretical basis, necessity of admission and contents of loyalty duty of shareholders are fully presented with a background of judicial verdict and academic research in Germany. As a capital
11、 company, a joint stock company is less peoplecombined than a personal company or a limited liability company is. However, if a shareholder in a joint stock company could harm other shareholdersbenefits, the existence of loyalty duty of shareholders would be reasonable.Chapter: The Company Law of Ch
12、ina prescribes the duty of the shareholders that they are not allowed to harm the benefits of the company and other shareholders by abusing their rights. So it is necessary to identify company benefits. The admission and boundary of company benefits are discussed in this chapter.Finally, a conclusio
13、n includes the summary of this thesis and writers opinions.【关键词】对冲基金 股东积极行动主义 股东忠实义务 公司利益【英文关键词】Hedge Funds Shareholder Activism Loyalty Duty of the Shareholder Company Benefits【备注】索购全文在线加好友：1.3.9.9.3.8848 同时提供论文写作一对一指导和论文发表委托服务【目录】对冲基金行使股东权的自由和约束摘要4-6ABSTRACT6-7引论： 案例与问题的提出10-13第一章 对冲基金基本问题13-17（一）
14、 对冲基金含义与简介13（二） 对冲基金的特征13-151、对冲基金与个人小额投资者13-142、对冲基金与传统机构投资者14-15（三） 对冲基金的积极行动主义15-171、对冲基金积极行动主义概述152、对对冲基金积极行动主义的评价15-17第二章 对冲基金与目标公司间的核心问题17-24（一） 偶然多数问题17-191、偶然多数的含义172、偶然多数与集体行动问题17-183、偶然多数问题的核心18-19（二） 无关联表决问题19-221、无关联表决的含义202、禁止分离原则20-213、无关联表决问题的核心21-22小结: 对冲基金积极主义问题的实质22-24第三章 问题的解决路径：披
15、露义务还是股东忠实义务24-31（一） 现行法律规定24-261、公司法24-252、资本市场法25-26（二） 关于对冲基金披露义务的探讨26-291、概述26-272、立法改革的必要性探讨27-29（三） 以股东的忠实义务作为个案解决的途径29-30小结: 立法的观望态度30-31第四章 忠实义务股东表决权行使的内在限制31-37（一） 忠实义务的基础31-321、股份公司与股东的忠实义务31-322、股份公司股东忠实义务的认可32（二） 忠实义务的内容32-341、注意义务32-342、支持义务34（三） 忠实义务的边界34-371、表决权自由行使原则342、法律对法官的约束34-353、忠实义务与法律安全35-37第五章 公司利益的认可与边界37-44（一） 公司利益概述37（二） 我国法律相关规定及学界观点37-39
