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1、April 19, 1951Mr. President, Mr. Speaker and distinguished members of theCongress:I stand on this rostrum with a sense of deep humility and great pride - humility in the wake of those great architects of our history who have stood here before me, pride in the reflection that this home of legislative
2、 debate represents human liberty in the purest form yet devised.Here are centered the hopes and aspirations and faith of the entire human race.I do not stand here as advocate for any partisan cause, for the issues are fundamental and reach quite beyond the realm of partisan considerations. They must
3、 be resolved on the highest plane of national interest if our course is to prove sound and our future protected.I trust, therefore, that you will do me the justice of receiving that which I have to say as solely expressing the considered viewpoint of a fellow American.I address you with neither ranc
4、or nor bitterness in the fading twilight of life, with but one purpose in mind: to serve my country.The issues are global, and so interlocked that to consider the problems of one sector oblivious to those of another is to court disaster for the whole. While Asia is commonly referred to as the gatewa
5、y to Europe, it is no less true that Europe is the gateway to Asia, and the broad influence of the one cannot fail to have its impact upon the other.There are those who claim our strength is inadequate to protect on both fronts, that we cannot divide our effort. I can think of no greater expression
6、of defeatism.If a potential enemy can divide his strength on two fronts, it is for us to counter his efforts. The Communist threat is a global one. Its successful advance in one sector threatens the destruction of every other sector. You cannot appease or otherwise surrender to communism in Asia wit
7、hout simultaneously undermining our efforts to halt its advance in Europe.Beyond pointing out these general truisms, I shall confine my discussion to the general areas of Asia.While I was not consulted prior to the Presidents decision to intervene in support of the Republic of Korea, that decision,
8、from a military standpoint, proved a sound one. As I say, it proved a sound one, as we hurled back the invader anddecimated his forces. Our victory was complete, and our objectives within reach, when Red China intervened with numerically superior ground forces.This created a new war and an entirely
9、new situation, a situation not contemplated when our forces were committed against the North Korean invaders; a situation which called for new decisions in the diplomatic sphere to permit the realistic adjustment of military strategy. Such decisions have not been forthcoming.While no man in his righ
10、t mind would advocate sending our ground forces into continental China, and such was never given a thought, the new situation did urgently demand a drastic revision of strategic planning if our political aim was to defeat this new enemy as we had defeated the old.Apart from the military need, as I s
11、aw it, to neutralize the sanctuary protection given the enemy north of the Yalu, I felt that military necessity in the conduct of the war made necessary -(1) The intensification of our economic blockade against China.(2) The imposition of a naval blockade against the China coast.(3) Removal of restr
12、ictions on air reconnaissance of Chinas coastal area and of Manchuria.(4) Removal of restrictions on the forces of the republic of China on Formosa, with logistical support to contribute to their effective operations against the Chinese mainland.For entertaining these views, all professionally desig
13、ned to support our forces committed to Korea and to bring hostilities to an end with the least possible delay and at a saving of countless American and Allied lives, I have been severely criticized in lay circles, principally abroad, despite my understanding that from a military standpoint the above
14、 views have been fully shared in the past by practically every military leader concerned with the Korean campaign, including our own Joint Chiefs of Staff.I called for reinforcements, but was informed that reinforcements were not available. I made clear that if not permitted to destroy the enemy bui
15、lt-up bases north of the Yalu, if not permitted to utilize the friendly Chinese force of some six hundred thousand men on Formosa, if not permitted to blockade the China coast to prevent the Chinese Reds from getting succor from without, and if there were to be no hope of major reinforcements, the p
16、osition of the command from the military standpoint forbade victory.We could hold in Korea by constant maneuver and at an approximate area where our supply-line advantages were in balance with the supply-line disadvantages of the enemy, but we could hope at best for only an indecisive campaign with its terrible and constant attrition upon our forces if the enemy utilized his full military potential.I have constantly called for the new politica
