委托代理视角下基础设施PPP项目政府激励监管研究分析 公共管理专业

摘 要 伴随着中央政府在基础设施领域大力推行PPP模式，2014年以来我国的基础设施PPP建设项目出现了爆发式增长。政府通过将社会资本引入基础设施项目建设，不仅可以减轻自身的财政压力，还能有效利用社会资本提升项目建设效率，因此，公私合作呈现出较广阔的发展前景。然而，随着实践的推进，在PPP项目参与方合作过程中，由于社会资本的天生逐利性，会引发一系列逆向选择和道德风险问题，这些问题已经严重阻碍了PPP项目的顺利推进。因此，如何有效地激励和监督社会资本已经成为确保PPP项目顺利推进的重要环节。 本研究首先对PPP模式相关理论、政府监管理论、激励规制理论、委托代理理论等做了系统的阐述，强调了政府监管和激励的重要性。其次分析了我国基础设施PPP项目的政府监管与激励现状，提出了目前的监管模式和激励手段存在的问题，并尝试从两个方面解决政府对社会资本的激励和监督问题，即先确定激励和监督的最优力度，再选择最佳的激励方式自己能起到作用的监督管理机制。 第一部分是根据委托代理的经典理论来阐述的，引入政府对社会资本的激励与惩罚函数，基于参与约束与激励相容原理建立了政府期望收益最大化的委托代理模型，求解了公私双方在不同风险态度下政府的最优监督力度和激励水平，以及社会资本的最优努力水平，设计了一个包含政府激励和监督的最优激励监督契约。通过求解模型得出：在基础设施PPP项目中，政府与社会资本不同的风险态度会对公私双方期望收益产生影响。政府激励与监督是有效的，社会资本努力水平与政府激励水平和监督力度均呈正相关；政府可以通过激励和监督引导社会资本采取更高努力水平；当政府为风险规避时，政府愿意通过提供更高的激励水平来促使社会资本努力工作；而当社会资本为风险规避时，政府将降低激励水平减少社会资本的收益分成。政府监督力度存在一个最优值，能更好地促使社会资本努力工作。 第二部分通过实证分析的方式对委托代理视角下政府激励社会资本的16种激励措施进行分类和排序，并分析何种激励措施能更好地促使社会资本努力工作，同时建立了政府监管机制，实现更好的监管。得到的相关结论如下：政府对社会资本激励的一级激励指标中，激励效果较好的是项目的经济支持和相关政策法规支持，项目相关的资本增值保证激励效果较差。其中，政府对项目的经济支持5种具体激励措施，激励效果最好的是税收减免，贷款贴息、融资协助和财政补贴激励效果居中，投资赞助的激励效果最差；政府对项目的政策法规支持6种具体激励措施，激励效果最好的是政策完备与连续稳定和项目审批流程通畅，招投标过程规范与公正、项目退出机制健全和项目纠纷协调通道顺畅激励效果居中，项目信息公开透明的激励效果最差；政府对项目相关的资本增值保证5种激励措施，激励效果最好的是项目服务定价调整，特许经营期、项目沿线开发权、项目相关配套设施保证激励效果居中，项目唯一性保证的激励效果最差。建立PPP项目监管体系，提出设立独立的综合性监管机构，以实现更好的监管。 最后以某市的大众创业园项目建设为背景,根据本文研究结论针对该项目建立了良好的激励机制和监督机制，分析了政府激励和监督的有效性，验证了合理的激励和监督机制对提升基础设施PPP项目实施效果的重要性。 关键词：委托代理；PPP项目；激励；监督；风险态度； Abstract Since 2014, as the central government has vigorously promoted the PPP mode, China's PPP project has reached a climax. By introducing social capital to participate in the construction of public projects, the government financial pressure has been alleviated and on the one hand, the efficiency of social capital has been fully made use of. Public-private partnerships have broad prospects. However, in the process of cooperation, as social capital is inherently profit-oriented, it can lead to a series of adverse selection and moral hazard problems with the advance of practice, which seriously hinder the construction process of PPP projects. Therefore, effective stimulation and supervision of social capital plays an important role in promoting the success of PPP projects. In this study, we first expounded the theory of PPP, government regulation theory, incentive regulation theory, the principal-agent theory, and emphasized the importance of government regulation and incentive. Secondly, analyzed the current situation of government supervision and incentive of infrastructure PPP projects in China, and puts forward the existing problems in the supervision mode and incentive mechanism, then proposed to solve the problem of government's incentive and supervision on social capital from two aspects, one is to determine the optimal strength of incentive and supervision, the other is to choose the best incentive method and reconstruct the supervision system. In the first part of this paper, based on the principal-agent theory, we have introduced the government's incentive and penalty function for private investors, established a principal-agent model maximizing the expected income of the government based on the participation constraint and incentive compatibility principle, solved the government's optimal supervision and incentive levels, and the optimal effort level of private investors under different risk attitude of both parties, finally designed a optimal incentive supervision contract for the government. By solving the model, it is concluded that: In the infrastructure PPP project, the different risk attitudes of the government and private investors will have an impact on the expected earnings of each. Government incentives and supervision are effective, and the level of private investors' efforts is positively correlated with the level of government incentive and supervision. The government can encourage and supervise private investors to take higher efforts. When the government is risk-averse, the government is willing to encourage private investors to work hard by offering higher incentives. When private investors are risk-averse, the government reduces incentives to reduce the share of private investors' profits. There is an optimal level of government oversight that would better encourage private investors to work harder. In the second part of this paper, 16 kinds of incentives are classified and sorted from the perspective of principal-agent to analyze what can better encourage social capital to work hard through the empirical analysis, and a regulatory mechanism has been established at the same time to achieve better regulation. The relevant conclusions are as follows: In the first level of incentive indicators , economic support and related policies and regulations support have better incentive effect, project-related capital appreciation guarantee has poorer incentive effect. Among the 5 kinds of specific incentives of economic support, tax credit is the best , discount loans , financing assistance and financial subsidy are the second, investment sponsor is t