2015灰色地带白皮书

UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND White Paper The Gray Zone 9 September 2015 Defining Gray Zone Challenges Gray zone security challenges,existing short of a formal state of war,present novel complications for U.S.policy and interests in the 21st century.We have well-developed vocabularies,doctrines and mental models to describe war and peace,but the numerous gray zone challenges in between defy easy categorization.For purposes of this paper,gray zone challenges are defined as competitive interactions among and within state and non-state actors that fall between the traditional war and peace duality.They are characterized by ambiguity about the nature of the conflict,opacity of the parties involved,or uncertainty about the relevant policy and legal frameworks.Gray zone challenges can be understood as a pooling of diverse conflicts exhibiting common characteristics.Notably,combining these challenges does not imply a single solution,since each situation contains unique actors and aspects.Overall,gray zone challenges rise above normal,everyday peacetime geo-political competition and are aggressive,perspective-dependent,and ambiguous.As the worlds leading superpower and de facto guarantor ofthe current world order,American national security interests span the globe and intersect with numerous circumstances fitting the definition of gray zone challenges.However,many of these challenges exist independent of U.S.agency or action and do not merit American involvement(e.g.civil conflicts in Africa).Accordingly,this paper acknowledges and briefly discusses the larger construct of gray zone challenges across the world,but it focuses on the United States national security interests and those gray zone challenges such as Russian actions in eastern Ukraine and Daesh(ISIS)that are relevant to America today.Gray Zone Challenges-The new and old normal The U.S.government can improve its ability to operate effectively in the gray zone between war and peace by reshaping its intellectual,organizational and institutional models.Americas conventional military dominance and status as a global power guarantee continual challenges and incentivize competitors to oppose the United States in ways designed to nullify our military advantage.The U.S.already possesses the right mix of tools to prevail in the gray zone,but it must think,organize,and act differently.Gray zone challenges are not new.Monikers such as irregular warfare,low-intensity conflict,asymmetric warfare,Military Operations Other Than War(MOOTW),and Small Wars have all been employed to describe this phenomenon in the past.President Kennedy was speaking about the gray zone during his 1962 address to West Points graduating class when he said:This is another type of war,new in its intensity,ancient in its origin-war by guerrillas,subversives,insurgents,assassins,war by ambush instead of by combat;by infiltration,instead of aggression,seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him.1 Massive investments in technology and unrivaled expertise in combined arms warfare give the U.S.a conventional military dominance not seen since the Roman Empire.However,this only holds true for the model of state-on-state conflicts dominated by traditional militaries fighting one another for battlefield supremacy.History shows tbis depiction of war is accurate only by exception.1 John F.Kennedy:Remarks at West Point to the Graduating Class of the U.S.Military Academy.June 6,1962.Online by Gerhard Peters and John T.Woolley,The American Presidency Project.http:/www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pld=8695.1 N 12 0 10:2:8 6 4 2 0 r I I r:-,-:-=-:-wo.w _!_rl T 1 I 1 1915 1921 1926 1931!IIC1Ua(ll&(l9122.S)NIOati,JUalt263J fMuico 11914171 I Ratti tt9163.4)Chi.Ga(l912-41t I Jott.i.aiou.RoputUo(1916-4)I I C:Uta(h&FAI j l.oo(191.1tlj(Runla(191820)1 iloaua(19191 Turlte,(l919)I Hoad:uu(1919)I;Ouatctll-.la(192011 I Ruoili(19202211 1 11.,.,I HondV&a(1924);I n ,.,.,I IPUt.da(lYA:OJI 1 1936 A Century of War and Gray Zone Challenges Wol1d11arll IKorea.a Wu I Yiet-m War I O.ortttor U.S.Miltary Active Forces T I I o TT T1,1941 1948 1953 1958 1963 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003 2011 letSi A1rlift p.U)1s aea CrWa 419$)1 Docdnicu Ropll)lfo(196&J I Leb&DOA(1958)I&mllodla(197Sij(2nn(l9 I Chall(l98711t(m,(MOJIC199l2003)1 c:h!.;.ti94s.491J Bq 01 Plp(l961)L,_,.7.,_j r Cu-.Mtulk C.W.t tt.962)I Cooao(l.l I I Co.oao tt96T)Traditional war is the paradigm Gray zone conruct is the norm Li.bya(1981)I Hoadvu(1981)I Haiti(1994961 J I Atlhaobtu(20012014)I LO-ba.-o(lV8:.C:s;JJ 1 ar.u(1913)I lt1(199196)I a.t.(119.1961 Chad(19-83(h.&ama flJM)lrraq(lfPI)j.,.,Ubya t19&6J Somalia 9-929SI.,Bouia t 1995)I&a-.Jvdot t19S0921 p LlMria(1996)I I A.Jlr.ui.a(l7 I-.-ra111ppu1n(2002-XXJ(.Yimtll f2006lCl!I Somallf2008XX j J t.ibyafl0111 I I.20IXXII Srria/ltaq f2?l4XXJ I AfJ)!.aiUst,./S14.(1998)Sabiaf1fl9t-_.-Tl Figure I:A century or U.S.wars.gray L.one conllicts and active duty end strength Figure 1 depicts the la