论我国上市公司重整计划的强制批准论文

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1、.33 / 33.内容摘要法院的裁定批准是重整计划发生法律效力的必要条件,在破产重整程序中,有着关键作用的一个步骤也正是重整计划的批准。这个批准分为正常批准与强制批准。其中,重整计划的强行批准,是指当债权人会议没有一致通过重整计划草案的情况下,同时,此草案满足法律规定的一系列条件,法院可以行使强制批准的权力使重整计划发生法律效力制。因为破产重整计划可能左右重整的成败,直接关系到债权人、出资人及其他利害关系人等各类当事人的切身利益。又法院在这一制度的适用过程中,具有十分关键的控制作用与无以伦比的至上地位,为保障法院作出强行批准与否的决定确实能维护社会利益,保护债权人及其他利害关系人的利益,须对制

2、度充分彻底理解基础上,履行谨慎注意义务,在现有法律机制中实现重整效益的最大化,在实践与理论碰撞加深司法运行与法律瑕疵的正确认识。本文以国内上市公司的重整实践状况为主要参考,论述了本国上市公司之重整计划的强制批准的制度。本文分为引言、正文、结论,正文又分别分为以下四个部分。第一部分是对重整计划强制批准的概述。第一,介绍重整计划强制批准的各项基础问题,论述此制度在重整制度之地位。第二,以重整批准权行使者法院的职权和重整各机构间的关系,显现法院这一方在强制批准制度中的地位。最后,阐述了我国上市公司强制批准的的实践形态与现状。第二部分论证了重整计划强制批准的合理性。该制度实际上让法院来选择重整程序,又

3、不对重整失败的结果承担责任,那这种强制选择的合理性为何?首先,从最直接的各种利益关系考虑,是为平衡利益和社会资源维护的需要。其次,阐述了假定债权人以自利而行为可能导致钳制问题及债权人不付成本坐享他人之利的问题,而重整计划的强制批准恰能卓有成效地解决。再者,考虑到在我国实践中,银行一般是上市公司主要债权人,又特别阐述了银行债权保护的相关问题。最后,通过对其他国家或地区相关法律的立法态度的阐述,对比得出我国该制度的合理性所在。第三部分着重阐述强制批准的条件。根据企业破产法的相关条款,结合比较法上的相关规定,该些特殊要求可以归纳为最低表决组同意原则、债权人利益最大原则、公平对待原则、绝对优先原则。本

4、部分即使结合我国上市公司在重1.整过程中实践对这四项原则逐一进行分析。第四部分着力阐述重整计划强制批准的制度保障。当前我国的重整计划强制批准制度尚不完善,但完善与成熟需要一个过程,在这期间,强制批准制度的司法运行除了需要逐渐完善,也必有所保障才可行。本部分从以下两个点分别做了相关探索:一是法院行使权力的科学性保证;二是我国破产重整表决中的表决内容规则。关键词:强制批准;上市公司;法院地位;社会资源;利益平衡;2.AbstractThe courts approval ruling of reorganization plan is the necessary condition forthe

5、plan being legally effective, which plays a key role in the bankruptcyreorganization process.This approval is divided into normal and mandatory forapproval.The cram-down of the reorganization plan points to the legal system thatwhen the draft of reorganization plan is not passed unanimously by the t

6、he PartyConference , and if the draft of reorganization plan conforms with the lawsregulations, courts could approve this plan imperatively and make the plan coming tobe effective.Bankruptcy reorganization plan is not only related to the success orfailure of the bankruptcy restructuring, and the vit

7、al interests of creditors, investorsand other stakeholders of the parties.And the court has a very key control function andunbeatable position in the process of this systems applying. To ensure the courtsjudge of cram-down could maintain social interests and protect the interests of thecreditors and

8、 other interested parties,It is necessary to be asked to perform obligationsaccording to the law carefully based on the fully and thoroughly understanding of thesystem,Then achieving the reorganizations maximum benefit , and furtherunderstanding and mastering the judicial operation or legal defects

9、in the process ofinteraction of theory and practice.The essay combining with the experience of domestic Listed Companyreorganization , drawing lessons from the rule of law about the cram-down ofreorganization plan in other countries or regions,following the basic spirit ofEnterprise Bankruptcy Law ,

10、 by the means of comparative analysis, deductiveinduction and other methods, discusses the cram-down of reorganization plan systemcomprehensively. The easy is divided into preface, text, conclusions, and the text isdivided into four parts again.Part: the overview about the cram-down of the reorganiz

11、ation plan. Firstly,starting from the reorganization system , the author introduces the basic problem ofthe cram-down of the reorganization plan system, and discusses the systems positionin the reorganization system . Secondly, the author discusses the status of courts indetail in the system , throu

12、gh the introduction of courtss powers and the relationship1.between the agencies in reorganization. Finally, the author outlines present situationof Listed Companies experiencing the system in China .Part: demonstrates the rationality of the cram-down of the reorganization plan.This system actually

13、let courts choose reorganization process, but have noresponsibility for a failure,that this rationality? Firstly, considered from the mostdirect relations between various kinds of interests , It is need to balance interests andprotect social resource. Secondly, the author elaborates the Hold -up pro

14、blem, ahypothesis the creditors behavior caused by self-interest , and the problem that thecreditors enjoy the fruits of others without having toiled , which could be solved by thesystem. Moreover, considering with the bank as a main creditor to Listed Company inour country, the author discusses the

15、 bank creditors rights protection in thesystem .Finally, through legislation of other countries or regions, the author analysesrationality the system of our country .Part: the condition of the cram-down of the reorganization plan. According torelevant terms of the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law , integrated comparative regulations,the requirements can be concluded to the Acceptance principle of lowest limit, theprinciple ofcreditor first, the principle of fair treatment, the principle of absoluteoptimization. This section analyses the four principles one by one combined withpractice

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