《论国有商业银行监管的有效性》由会员分享，可在线阅读，更多相关《论国有商业银行监管的有效性（36页珍藏版）》请在金锄头文库上搜索。
1、内容摘要全球经济一体化、金融创新、银行业竞争加剧等多种因素的推动下,伴随着跨国资本流动规模的不断扩大，跨国银行的业务迅速扩大，建立适应新的国际环境的、有效的国际银行监管原则和风险管理方案的问题也被提上了议事日程。同时如何在银行监管中构建有效的激励契约来达到银行监管的目标成为新巴塞尔协议中的亮点。2004年巴塞尔资本新协议推出后，银监会颁布了商业银行资本充足性管理办法，这标志着我国进入了对银行实施监管的重要时期。但是在银行监管中建立有效契约，以及有效契约如何实施国内专家都有很多讨论却并没有正式成为监管当局很重视的监管手段。但是巧合的是，本文通过银行监管有效激励契约的设计得出的资本充足监管是有效激
2、励契约的核心手段。该监管手段也是我国银行监管的主要手段。但是由于我国银行股东和经理人，监管人和银行之间的委托-代理问题有其特殊性。那么通过建立有效激励契约来对我国银行也监管是不是有效的，以及资本充足率监管作为银行监管有效契约的最核心的监管手段对我国国有商业银行的监管有多大效果值得研究和探讨。本文是运用委托-代理理论来研究我国国有商业银行的有效性，运用的工具是委托-代理理论下的激励契约模型。文章首先是对银行监管有效激励契约作理论分析，主要借助的是DT激励模型。该模型首先从银行股东与银行经理人之间存在委托代理问题出发，在这两者之间构建一个最优的激励契约。最后所能到的契约的效果是当经理的绩效能达到一
3、个好的预期目标的时候，该契约是事后有效的。DT模型在对契约进行改进，引入一个外部的监管人。推导出实施事前激励契约。本文然后考虑到我国银行股东和银行行长、外部监管人在银行监管建立激励契约中的委托代理关系与在DT模型中假设的委托代理关系之间的区别，来对在我国银行监管中能否建立一个监管契约，以及建立起的监管契约能否达到有效监管的目的作进一步的研究。并最后针对性为我国银行监管提出相关的政策建议。关键词： 银行监管 有效激励契约 国有商业银行 委托代理理论英文摘要AbstractUnder the promoting of the global economic unification, financi
4、al innovation and the more violent banking competition, with the accelerating expansion of the circulation scale of transnational capital and the operation of Multinational bank.The problem that the establishment of an effective and adaptive to the new international environment international bank su
5、pervising principle and risk-management plan has been put on the agenda. At the same time, in the banking supervision, how to construct an effective motive-contract have become the highlights of the new Basel Accord. After the “Basel Capital New Agreement” has been published in 2004, the Banking Reg
6、ulatory Commission promulgated the “Regulation Governing Capital Adequacy of Commercial Banks”, which indicated that our nation came into an important period implementing supervision to banks. Although there were many domestic experts discussed much about how to construct and implement a valid contr
7、act in banking supervision, it did not become the supervising method of which the regulatoryauthoritytakes much account. But what coincident is, this paper obtains that the capital adequacy supervision is the core method of the effective motive-contract by devising the banking supervision valid moti
8、ve-contract. And it is also the main supervising method of our banking supervision. But in our country, because of the particularity of the principal-agent problem both existing between the bank-stockholder and manager and between the supervisor and bank. It would be not so effective to establish a
9、valid motive-contract to supervise our banks, especially the capital adequacy supervision which is the most crucial monitoring measure in the banking supervision has become the important supervising method in our country, so how much effect this supervising method would have on the state-owned comme
10、rcial banks supervision is worth studying and discussing.This article will make the theoretical analysis to the banking supervision effective motive-contract by DT model at first. This model will start first from the principal-agent problem existing between the bank-stockholder and manager, and then
11、 construct an optimal motive-contract between them. The final effect that the contract could make is, when the managers performance could achieve a good anticipative purpose, the contract is effective afterward. The DT model ameliorates the contract, and introduces an exterior supervisor, then educe
12、s the implementation of the forgone motive-contract. Then basing on the DT model and incorporating Chinas actual situation, at the same time taking account of the principal-agent problem both existing between the bank-stockholder and manager and between the exterior supervisor and bank-stockholder,
13、to research whether the state-owned commercial banks could construct motive-contract and the validity of the motive-contract, finally this paper will put forward some politic suggestion aiming at the banking supervision of our country.Key words: Banking supervision Effective motive-contract State-ow
14、ned commercial banks Principal-agent theory目 录内容摘要I英文摘要II1.绪 论11.1.选题背景与意义11.2.文献综述21.3.研究思路和框架31.4.本文的技术路线图52.银行监管有效激励契约设计的理论分析62.1.委托代理理论概要62.1.1.委托代理理论的假设前提62.1.2.分析逻辑与基本结论72.2.银行监管有效激励契约的构建72.2.1.银行股东与经理人最优激励契约的构建92.2.2.引入外部监管人后银行监管的契约改进133.我国国有商业银行委托代理问题对监管有效激励契约的影响173.1.我国国有商业银行监管中存在委托代理问题173.
15、2.国有商业银行的委托代理问题对有效契约的影响213.2.1.银行股东与经理人委托代理问题对有效契约的影响213.2.2.外部监管人的委托代理问题对有效契约的影响234.结论及政策建议254.1.基本结论254.2.政策建议26参考文献29致 谢32文档由本人精心搜集和整理，喜欢大家用得上，非常感谢你的浏览与下载。凡本厂职工应热爱电厂、热爱岗位、热爱本职工作，发扬“团结务实、争创一流，立足岗位，爱厂敬业，尽职尽责，不断提高工作质量和工作效率，圆满完成各项生产和工作任务，为华能的建设和发展作出贡献2019整理的各行业企管，经济，房产，策划，方案等工作范文，希望你用得上，不足之处请指正1. 绪 论
16、1.1. 选题背景与意义20世纪70年代金融自由化浪潮兴起后，各国普遍放松了对银行业的管制。但随着时间的推移，在全球经济一体化、金融创新、银行业竞争加剧等多种因素的推动下，各国银行业的经营风险明显加大。这促使各国金融监管当局必须探索建立与新经济环境相适应的金融监管方式，以维护银行体系的安全和稳定。同时，伴随着跨国资本流动规模的不断扩大，跨国银行的业务迅速扩大，客观上要求建立适应新的国际环境的、有效的国际银行监管原则和风险管理框架。在这样的背景下，各国银行业监管的发展动向明显表现出两个特征：其一，原有的直接管制手段逐渐被间接管制取代，银行管制的方法和理论基础都发生了很大变化；其二，各国的监管合作程度提高了，国际清算银行的巴塞尔银行监管委员会推出的巴塞尔
