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1、PHILOSOPHY 100 (Ted Stolze),Notes on James Rachels, Problems from Philosophy,Chapter Six: Body and Mind,Two Positions on the Mind/Body Problem,Dualism Materialism,Ren Descartes,Descartes was an important 17th century thinker whose ideas have had a great influence down to the present day. He been cal
2、led the “father of modern philosophy (and of mathematics).” Perhaps his most famous philosophical work is called the Meditations on First Philosophy (1641).,(1596-1650),Cartesian Dualism,Body and mind are different substances, and mental states have the following two distinctive characteristics: Pri
3、vileged access Infallibility,Descartes on Minds and Machines,“It is indeed conceivable that a machine could be made so that it could utter words, and even words appropriate to the presence of physical acts or objects which cause some change in its organs; as, for example, if it was touched in some s
4、pot that it would ask what you wanted to say to it; if in another, that it would cry that it was hurt, and so on for similar things. But it could never modify its phrases to reply to the sense of whatever was said in its presence as even the most stupid men do.” (From Discourse on Method, translated
5、 by Laurence J. Lafleur Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1960 (1637), pp. 41-42.),Princess Elizabeth of Bohemias Objection to Descartes,How could a non physical mind interact with a physical body, and vice versa?,(1618-1680),Descartess Responses to Elizabeth,Its too difficult to explain, so dont wor
6、ry about it! The pineal gland is where the mind interacts with the body: “The soul has its principal seat in the little gland in the middle of the brain, whence it radiates into all the rest of the body by the mediation of the spirits, nerves, and even blood, which, participating in the impressions
7、of the spirits, can carry them through the arteries into all the members” (from The Passions of the Soul, 34, translated by Stephen H. Voss Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1989, p. 37). NOTE: For Descartes the mind is connected to the entire body.,Another Objection to Cartesian Dualism,The problem of the
8、 radical emergence of mind from matter during the evolution of life on earth (pp. 70-1),Three Kinds of Materialism,Behaviorism Mind-Brain Identity Functionalism,Behaviorism,Human thoughts and feelings can be explained purely in terms of observable behavior: “When someone shouts at us, we say it is b
9、ecause she is angry; when someone grabs a sandwich, we say it is because he is hungry” (p. 71).,Support for Behaviorism,Cross-cultural comparison of facial expression of emotions (see Paul Ekman, Emotions Revealed, revised edition NY: Owl Books, 2007 and Daniel Goleman, Social Intelligence NY: Banta
10、m, 2006.) Consider the next two illustrations from Golemans book (pp. 39, 87).,Identify the Emotion Expressed Below,Objections to Behaviorism,The theory only makes sense of simple behaviors such as universal emotions-but how do you look when, for example, you are listening to a CD or watching a base
11、ball game? It is possible to control external behavior, for example, by presenting a “poker face.” We need to distinguish between the external emotion and the internal feeling (see Antonio Damasio, Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, and the Feeling Brain NY: Harcourt Trade, 2003.),Mind-Brain Identity
12、,Mental events are neurological. “Each of a persons mental states is identical with the firing of particular neurons, or cells, in the brain” (p. 75).,Type/Token Distinction,Ex: $20 is a type; the crumpled, old twenty dollar bill in my pocket and the crisp, new twenty dollar bill in your pocket are
13、tokens of that type.,Two Theses regarding Mind-Brain Identity Theory,Type-type identity = “being in pain (considered as a type of thing) is identical with a particular sort of neuron firing (considered as a type of thing)” (p. 76). Token-token identity = “each instance of pain is identical with some
14、 particular physical state” (p. 76).,Two Objections to Type-Type Identity (but not Token-Token Identity),Pain comes in many forms Life-form with a different physiology,Functionalism,“Being in pain is identical with the activation of a system that serves this function-that links these kinds of inputs
15、, outputs, and relations to other internal states. For you, therefore, a particular token of pain may be a neural firing, while for an extraterrestrial a particular token of pain may be the activation of a different internal mechanism. The physical character of the mechanism doesnt matter. All that
16、matters is that the mechanism serves the appropriate function” (p. 78).,Problems with Materialism,Cant account well for subjectivity (thought experiment about the scientist Mary) Cant account well for intentionality Cant account well for mystical experiences The mind is “wider” than the brain,Other Examples of Intentionality,Love for a particular individual; and the associated problems of maternal separation and bereavement (see Bruce E. Wexler, Brain and Culture: Neuro
