非文学翻译(口译)week12

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1、1 翻译练习:For his part, Braun in his book is very scathing of Maos part in a military excursion into Sinkiang in 1936.This affair remains mysterious, but there is no doubt of Brauns vendetta with Mao during his final years in China. The Chinese leadergave him a perpetual brush-off from meetings of impo

2、rtance in Yenan. Braun found that Maos “knowledge of Marxism. seemed superficial“, and that his pronouncements were full of aphorisms, the product of a pragmatic utilitarian mind which had not come to gripswith the philosophical premises of communism. Braun ridiculed Maos determination of class stat

3、us by such subjective criteria as income and concluded that his real goal was that of complete personal power. It is not perhaps surprising that this German communist even finds a word of praise for one of the leading (and extremely 2 hostile) historians of Chinese communism on the Kuomintang island

4、 of Taiwan. 而布劳恩则在他的书里就毛在1936 年红军远涉新疆的事件 (指红军西路军远征河西走廊,失败后少数人员最终抵达新疆的事件译注) 中所起的作用进行了尖锐的抨击。虽然这次事件的真相至今仍然是个未解之谜,但布劳恩在中国最后几年与毛的结怨却是确凿无疑的。凡是在延安召开的重要会议,这位中国领袖总是一概地将布劳恩拒之门外。布劳恩认为:毛的“马克思主义知识似乎很肤浅”,而且他的言论中充斥着格言警句,这是他实用主义功利思想所导致的,在他的思想里共产主义的哲学基础并没有融会贯通。 对于毛用诸如收入一类的主观标准来划分阶级成分的做法,布劳恩大加嘲讽。他的结论是: 毛的真实目的是为了获得完全的

5、个人权力。因此,对一位在国民党占据的台湾岛上从事中国共产主义历史研究的极端学者, 身为 德国共产主义者的布劳恩竟然也赞誉有加一事,或许并不出人意料。3 Introduction to A Comintern Agent in China (19321939) (Excerpt) Dick Wilson 1. When the young German schoolmaster Otto Braun (1900-74) stepped off the gangplank at Shanghai in 1932 to take up a hazardous assignment as Comint

6、ern military adviser to the Chinese Communist Party, no one - least of all himself - could have anticipated just how crucial his role would be and that his testimony about the years that followed would become unique. By an accident of history Braun became the only Westerner to take part in the epic

7、Long March of Chinese Communist Party leadership and Red Army in 1934-5, from Kiangsi in southern China to Shensi in the north. He thus witnessed not only the unexpected salvation of the beleaguered CCP 4 from extermination at the hands of its right-wing enemy, the Kuomintang Party, but also the tak

8、e-over of Chinese Communism bythe rural and nationalistic Mao Tse-tung from the younger urban intellectuals who, trained in Moscow, were always ready to follow the Russian lead in international communist affairs. the Comintern:(Communist International ) , 罗马化的俄文缩写为Komintern ,指共产国际或称“第三国际”Third Inter

9、national )(1919 年成立于莫斯科,1943 年解散)1932 年 , 年 轻 的 德 国 教 师 奥 托 .布 劳 恩 (1900-74)从踏板上走下船, 抵达了上海,他要接受一项危险的任务:出任共产国际派驻中国共产党的军事顾问。此时,甚至连他自己在内, 没有人能够预料到他的角色将会多么关键; 他对此后数年内发生情况的见证将会独一无二。由于历史的偶然,布劳恩成了唯一一名参加了中共领导层和红军长征5 西方人, 这次传奇的长征从中国南部的江西开始,到北方的陕西结束。因此,他不仅见证了中共如何在其右派敌人国民党的重重围困下出人意料地逃出生天,避免了被歼灭的厄运,而且也目睹了来自农村、有

10、民族主义倾向的毛泽东如何从比他更年轻的城市知识分子手中接管了中国的共产主义事业。这些人曾在莫斯科受训,在国际共产主义事务中唯俄国的马首是瞻。2. Braun was noticed in 1936 by Edgar Snow, the first Western correspondent to reach the new Communist base in Shensi, as a “blond-haired and blue-eyed aryan“ with a Chinese name (Li Te) . The German had participated in all these

11、developments and had seen both the political and military manoeuvres at first hand. But since he did not solicit contacts with the few Western visitors to the Communist headquarters in northwest China in the late 1930s, distrustingtheir motives, his actual identity remained a 6 mystery right up to t

12、he 1960s. Development: a fact, event, or happening, esp one that changes a situation 1936 年,第一个到达陕西共产党新根据地的 西方记者埃德加.斯诺曾注意到了布劳恩这个有着中文名字(李德)的“金发碧眼的雅利安人”。这位德国人参与了上述所有事件全过程, 而且还直接见证了当时中共的政治和军事 谋划 。 30 年代末少数几个西方人到访过共产党在西北的总部,但布劳恩怀疑他们的动机,并没有寻求与他们接触,因而他的实际身份一直保密到了60 年代。3. In fact, after his influential thr

13、ee years of service to the military leadership of the CCP from 1933 to 1936, and another three years when Mao made him a scapegoat for the setback of the Red Armys evacuation of its Kiangsi base in 1934, Braun waited impatiently for his recall to the Soviet Union and to his German homeland. Not unti

14、l the 7 summer of 1939 did this come, and so anxious was Braun to leave China that he was said to have sat in the Russian aeroplane as soon as it landed and refused to budge again until it took off. In Moscow he found that charges were furnished against him by Chou En-lai and other senior Chinese co

15、mrades about his conduct in China. Luckily they were not taken with full seriousness by Moscow authorities and he was merely told to go home and say nothing about what he had done in China. That silence he preserved faithfully for twenty-five years while Western historians continue to speculate on t

16、he identity of that “blond-haired and blued-eyed aryan“. 4. Only in 1964, in the East German newspaper Neues Deutschland, did Braun reveal himself and his role, in an article highly hostile to Mao. 5. The Sino-Soviet split and the polemics 8 which the Kremlin and its East European allies launched against Maos regime in the 1960s enabled Braun at long last to speak about his work in China with official approval. A few years later his recollections were serialised in Horizont, and

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