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1、本人声明所呈交的学位论文是本人在导师指导下进行的研究工作和取得的研究成果，除了文中特别加以标注和致谢之处外，论文中不包含其他人已经发表或撰写过的研究成果，也不包含获得 西南政法大学 或其他教育机构的学位或证书而使用过的材料。与我一同工作的同志对本研究所做的任何贡献均已在论文中作了明确的说明并表示了谢意。学位论文作者签名：签字日期：年月日学位论文版权使用授权书本学位论文作者完全了解 西南政法大学 有关保留、使用学位论文的规定。特授权西 南 政 法 大 学 可以将学位论文的全部或部分内容编入有关数据库进行检索，并采用影印、缩印或扫描等复制手段保存、汇编以供查阅和借阅。同意学校向国家有关部门或机构送
2、交论文的复印件和电子文档。（保密的学位论文在解密后适用本授权说明）学位论文作者签名：导师签名：签字日期：年月日签字日期：年月日硕 士 学 位 论 文家族控制对高管薪酬影响的实证研究An Empirical Study on the Impact of Family Control on Executive Compensation作 者 姓 名：指 导 教 师：黄俊杰罗本德教授西南政 法大学Southwest University of Political Science and Law摘要摘要摘要近年来，高管薪酬受到了很多的关注。大多数的研究基于股权分散公司的模型，在这类公司里，主要的代理问
3、题是拥有公司所有权的股东和拥有经营权的经理之间不同利益的一致性问题，而高管薪酬就是为了克服这个代理问题。然而，在欧洲大陆和东南亚国家，主要的治理模型是家族企业。当企业为家族企业时，由于股权集中在家族股东手里，这类代理问题将会弱化。而为了追求控制权私有收益，家族控股股东会与高管合谋来掠夺小股东，并且分享这些私有收益。代理问题变为经理只为家族控制性股东服务而忽略小股东。因此，研究家族控制上市公司高管薪酬具有一定的理论意义和现实意义本文首先对国内外的研究成果和相关基础理论进行回顾和评述，并运用理论模型分析了家族控股股东对高管薪酬的影响。然后，在理论分析的基础上进行实证检验。以 2008-2010 年
4、我国沪深两市家族控制上市公司为样本，利用 CCER民营数据库的相关面板数据，通过家族控股股东持股比例、家族控股股东所有权和控制权分离度、股权制衡和独立董事比例等方面来实证检验不同控制特征和制衡特征对高管薪酬的影响。研究结果表明：（1）家族控股股东持股比例与高管薪酬在 1%水平上负相关。当家族股东拥有的股权比例有限时，家族股东有足够的激励来攫取私人收益，并且将一部分私人收益以薪酬的形式分享给高管，使其同意合谋来侵占小股东权益。（2）家族控股股东所有权和控制权分离度对高管薪酬无显著影响。（3）股权制衡与高管薪酬绩效敏感性正相关。其他大股东的股权制衡达到了抑制家族股东与高管合谋的动机，促使了家族上市
5、公司制定与业绩相挂钩的高管薪酬。（4）独立董事比例与高管薪酬绩效敏感性无显著相关关系。独立董事对家族控股股东并没有约束能力，在家族控制下的董事会并不具备独立性。独立董事没有发挥其监督职能和内部制衡作用。 最后针对上述结论从建立相互制衡的股权结构、发挥声誉激励机制在经理人市场中的作用、完善上市公司信息披露制度和完善监事会制度四方面提出对策建议。关键词：家族控制；高管薪酬；公司治理AbstractIIAbstractIn recent years, the impact of executive pay received a lot of attention. Most of the studie
6、s based on dispersed shareholding company model, in this kind ofcompany, the main agent of the problem is with ownership of the company sshareholders and has the right to operate the manager between the different interestsof the consistency problem, and executive compensation is to overcome this age
7、ncyproblem. However, in continental Europe and Southeast Asian countries, the mainmanagement model of family business. When the enterprise is family business, dueto the equity concentrated in the family stock, this kind of agency problem willweaken. While in the pursuit of private benefit of control
8、, the family holdingshareholders and collusion to plunder small shareholder, private benefits and sharethese. In a family business, the agency problem is the manager only for familycontrolling shareholder services while ignoring small shareholders. Therefore, studyof family controlled listed compani
9、es executives compensation has certain theorysignificance and the practical significance.This paper by reviewing the relevant literature, the domestic and foreignresearch results and related basic theory were reviewed and discussed, and the use oftheoretical model analysis of family controlling shar
10、eholders of executivecompensation effect. Then, on the basis of theoretical analysis is proposed to studythe hypothesis, to develop a research model. We use 2008-2010 Chinese two stockmarkets family listed companies as samples,and take the CCER private database forempirical test. The ownership, the
11、separation of cash flow rights and control rights,wnership balance degree and the ratio of independent directors and so on differentcontrol characteristics and governance characteristics on the impact of executive pay.The results show that: (1) The family ownership and executive compensationnegative
12、 correlation. This conclusion and some scholars research results areconsistent. This paper argues that the family has the cash flow rights limited, thefamily have incentives to uptake of personal income, and to be a part of personalincome to pay in the form of share to executives, which agreed to co
13、llusion to emptyenterprise, damage the interests of small shareholders. (2) The separation of cashflow rights and control rights on executive compensation effect. (3) Thecheck-and-balance ownership structure and executive compensation performancesensitivity is correlation, the higher the proportion
14、of shareholding , the executivesIIIAbstractpay performance sensitivity is stronger. Other large shareholders are prompted the family listed companies make linked to performance on executive compensation,thus suppressing family executives and controlling shareholders collusionmotivations. (4) The pro
15、portion of independent directors and executivecompensation performance sensitivity had no significant correlation.Finally, the conclusion from the establishment of the mutual ownershipstructure, develop the reputation incentive mechanism in the manager market,perfect function of information disclosure system of the listed companies and perfectthe supervision board system four respects put forward suggestions.Key Word: Family Control; Executive Compensation; Corporate Governance目录目录摘要.IIV目录Abstract. II1 绪论.
