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1、Study on BOT applied in the process of SEMs Financing on Environment Protection in ChinaA Thesis Submitted to Chongqing Universityin Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement for theDegree of Master of ManagementByCui ZhifangSupervised by Prof. Meng WeidongMajor: FinanceCollege of Economics and Busines
2、s Administration ofChongqing University, Chongqing, ChinaJune 2011重庆大学硕士学位论文摘要中文摘要20 世纪 90 年代以来，我国工业污染问题越来越严重。中小企业作为推动国民 经济持续健康发展的主要力量成了我国工业污染的主要来源，污染负荷约占工业污染的 40%50%，且有继续增加的趋势，这对环境构成了严重的威胁1。在解决企业的环境污染过程中，中小企业由于其自身的特点，很难筹得污染防治所需要的资金，因此大大加重了企业环保的难度，中小企业污染问题一度成为我国环境治理的重点和难点2-3。在污染治理过程中，虽然政府投入环保项目的资金不断
3、增加，但是它们更多的是用于大型企业或大的污染控制项目上；银行信贷资金也多半偏爱大型企业。中小企业往往难以取得污染治理所需的资金，目前，中小企业的环保资金主要还是依靠自有资金。然而，国家有关部门调查显示，我国 81%的中小企业认为其一年内的流动资金能部分甚至不能满足生产的需要，相当比例的中小企业连进一步发展的资金都面临着困难，更不要说有剩余资金用于环保事业上4。因此，中小企业污染防治面临着严重的资金瓶颈。BOT 模式作为一种可以有效利用国内外闲散资金的融资方式，如果能够很好地应用到中小企业环保过程中，它必将分担企业污染治理的巨额成本，解决其治污不规模的问题。据此，本文对 BOT 模式在中小企业环
4、保融资中的应用情况进行了分析和研究，研究的主要内容包括：对中小企业环保的投融资现状进行了分析，认识到改进中小企业污染防治融资渠道的必要性和重要性，并指出 BOT 作为一种新兴的融资模式被应用到中小企业污染防治过程中的可行性和现实意义。通过分析 BOT 项目公司在项目运营期间的道德风险行为，构建了政府与项目公司的监督博弈，研究了政府的最优监督策略，分析出项目公司的努力水平、政府的监督成本、监督效率及对项目公司的处罚力度等因素对最优监督策略的影响，并提出相应的政策建议以达到有效防范项目公司道德风险行为的目的。通过建立 BOT 模式下项目公司治污定价及投资决策的博弈模型，研究了 BOT治污模式的实施
5、条件以及治污收费价格的制定过程，对比分析了单独治污和 BOT治污模式下的中小企业的产量、利润，项目公司的利润以及社会福利的大小。发现在市场运作下制定出的收费价格，不仅会使排污企业的利益收到损害，甚至还会引起社会福利的损失，导致“市场失灵”现象的出现。这种情况下，政府就要对治污价格进行控制。据此，本文进一步分析了政府怎样对 BOT 治污收费价格进行控制才能在不挫伤项目公司投资积极性的前提下，达到保证排污企业利益和社会福利不I重庆大学硕士学位论文中文摘要降低的目的。总之，本文认为 BOT 模式是解决中小企业环保融资难的有效途径，它的运用有利于提高企业投资的治污效率，符合政府改善环境的目标。为了进一
6、步提高 BOT治污的运作效率，提升治污效果，在项目运营期间，政府可以通过提高自身监督效率、加大处罚力度等方法来防止项目公司道德风险行为的发生；另外，为了防止“市场失灵”现象的出现，在收费价格的制定过程中，政府可以通过降低项目公司投资成本、延长特许权期等途径对价格进行控制以达到优化社会福利的目的。关键词：中小企业，项目监督，BOT 治污，单独治污，收费定价II重庆大学硕士学位论文英文摘要ABSTRACTSince the 1990s, the problem of pollution in China gets worse and worse. As adriving force in the
7、growth of national economy, SMEs become one of the main sourcesof industrial pollution, 40% 50% of ambient pollution burden in our country comesfrom SMEs and there still present a growth tendency which is a serious threat to ourenvironment. In the process of SMEs pollution treatment, because of its
8、own traits,raising and operating funds becomes the main obstacle which increases the difficulty ofpollution abatement. The problem of SMEs pollution prevention and control becomes thekeystone and aporia.In the process of anti-pollution, although the funds used for environmental protectionprojects fr
9、om our government is increasing, yet it is always used on large enterprises or abig pollution control project, and the bank credit funds prefer large enterprise as well,SMEs are often difficult to achieve enough funds for anti-pollution. At present, theanti-pollution funds of SMEs main rely on their
10、 own funds, but the relevant statedepartment shows that 81% of SMEs in our country consider that the liquidity can part oreven not meet their production needs, and a large number even lack funds for furtherdevelopment, let alone for environmental protection. Therefore, SMEs pollutionprevention is fa
11、cing a serious capital bottleneck.As an effective financial method to use domestic and foreign idle funds, if BOTfinancing model can be well applied to the process of SMEs environmental protection, itwill share the massive cost of the pollution and resolve the diseconomies of scale。Accordingly, the
12、article studies the application of BOT in the process of SMEsenvironmental protection. The main contents include: The paper analyses the present situation of SMEs financing on anti-pollution, andrealize the necessity and significance to improve the channels of financing. Also it pointsout the feasib
13、ility and importance that if BOT can be applied in the process of SMEsanti-pollution. By analyzing the moral hazard of the project company in BOT project, it buildsa game between the government and the project company, and studies the bestsupervision order in the game theory. Also, it analyzes the i
14、nfluence on the supervisionorder that come from the effort level of the project company, the governmentssupervision cost as well as its supervision efficiency, and the penalties for the projectIII重庆大学硕士学位论文英文摘要company. Last, it puts forward the relevant policy suggestions to achieve the aim that can
15、prevent the moral hazard of the project company effectively. By establishing the pricing and investment decision model, the paper studies theimplement conditions of BOT project as well as the process of pricing, and it comparesthe SMEs production, profits, the companys profits and the social welfare
16、 both in themodel of individual control and BOT control. It points out that if the price is completelydeveloped under market operation, it will easily damage SMEs interests and even reducethe social welfare, and finally appear the situation of “Market Failure“. When it happens,the governments control on pricing is necessary. Thus, the paper analyzes how thegovernments do can not only keep the project companys investment enthusiasm, but alsoensure SMEs benefits and t
