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1、湘潭大学硕士学位论文上市公司盈余管理研究基于公司治理结构的分析姓名：温佐望申请学位级别：硕士专业：会计学指导教师：刘长青20060503I摘 要 近年来，世界各国资本市场纷纷爆发财务丑闻，严重影响了投资者的信心，损害了资本市场的健康发展。针对资本市场上日益严重的财务舞弊现象，世界各国纷纷探讨其治理对策。广义地说，财务舞弊属于盈余管理范畴，美国蓝带委员会于 1999 年提交了关于提高审计委员会效果的报告和建议 ，标志着盈余管理治理重心开始转向公司治理方面， 2002 萨班斯奥克斯利法案也强调公司治理在财务报告监管中的重要性。然而，我国上市公司治理结构却处于一种“股权失衡、内部人控制”状态，盈余管
2、理成为一种普遍化和系统化的行为。如何在我国特殊治理结构背景下治理上市公司盈余管理，这是一个迫切需要解决的难题。 盈余管理属于财务会计范畴，主要研究委托代理契约关系下的财务报告干预行为。公司治理结构是在企业委托代理关系下规范利益相关者之间权、责、利关系的一种制度安排。公司治理结构与盈余管理形成一种互动影响关系，治理结构构成盈余管理机理中的关键制度因素。把公司治理结构引入盈余管理的博弈分析，我们发现：公司治理结构是影响盈余管理效率的关键制度因素；失衡性治理结构抑制效率型盈余管理形成，刺激机会主义盈余管理产生；制衡性治理结构能够有效地约束机会主义盈余管理，激励效率型盈余管理达到帕累托最优均衡；盈余管
3、理治理应以公司治理为导向，具体包括激励效率型盈余管理和约束机会主义盈余管理两个方面。 我国上市公司治理结构整体处于“一股独大，股权失衡，国有股产权缺位，内部人控制”的状态。这种失衡性治理结构刺激了机会主义盈余管理的产生，导致盈余管理动机和手段的特异性。在这种特殊的治理结构背景下，盈余管理动机在报酬契约和债务契约方面表现不明显，其政治成本动机呈现逆向操作，并突出体现为资本市场动机。盈余管理特殊手段包括关联方交易、地方政府援助和滥用会计政策估计变更等方面。针对我国上市公司盈余管理的特殊性，盈余管理治理应包括完善上市公司内部和外部治理结构、建立高质量的会计准则体系几个方面。 关键字：上市公司；盈余管
4、理；公司治理结构；机会主义盈余管理； 效率型盈余管理 IIAbstract In these years, financial scandals were broken out in many capital markets all over the world, by which investors confidence was influenced seriously and the healthy development of capital market was damaged greatly. Facing with serious financial frauds in capit
5、al markets, many countries governments in the world are approaching tackles of financial frauds. In a broad sense, financial frauds belong to earning managements, The Blue Ribbon Committee of American submitted Report and Recommendation of the Blue Ribbon Committee on improving the Effectiveness of
6、corporate Audit Committees in 1999, which indicated that governances of earning managements turn to corporate governance mainly. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 also put emphasis of governance of financial report on corporate governance. However, the structure of listed corporate governance in our co
7、untry is in an out-of-balance position, which can be described that shareholder structure is out-of-balance, and internal person control. As earning managements becoming common and systematic behaviors, that how to govern earning managements of listed corporate under the background of special struct
8、ure of corporate governance in our country is a difficult problem needed to solve urgently. Earning managements belong to Financial Accounting category, which mainly research the behaviors by which financial report is intervened under the principal-agent contracts. The structure of corporate governa
9、nce is an institution, which standardizes interested groups rights, responsibilities and benefits under the principal-agent contracts. There is a reciprocal-influence relationship between the structures of corporate governance and earning managements; the structure of corporate governance is an impo
10、rtant system factor in mechanism of earning managements. When putting structure of corporate governance into game analysis of earning managements, we found that the structure of corporate governance is a key institution factor affecting efficiency of earning managements. Out-of-balance structure res
11、trains the formation of efficient earning managements, and stimulates the generation of opportunistic earning managements. Structure of corporate governance in balance can restrain opportunistic earning managements, and stimulates efficient earning managements in order to arrive to Pareto Efficiency
12、 Equilibrium, governances of earning managements should be oriented as corporate governance, and include IIIencouraging efficient earning management and restraining opportunistic earning managements. The structure of listed corporate governance in our country is in an out-of-balance position which c
13、an be described that one company is in control of a powerful shareholder, and shareholder structure is out-of-balance, in the same time; the property right of national shares is out-of-position, and internal person (not shareholders) control the company. Out-of-balance structure stimulates the gener
14、ation of opportunistic earning managements, and leads to deferent and special earning managements motivations and measures. Under the background of special structure of governance, bonus contractual and debt contractual motivations of earning managements is not obvious in statistic. Political cost m
15、otivations of earning managements show reversal manipulation, and earning managements motivations concentrate on capital market. Measures of earning management include relationship trade, help of local government and misusing evaluation or change of accounting policy, and so on. Because of specialty
16、 of earning managements of listed corporate in our country, governance of earning management of listed corporate in our country include perfecting inside and outside structure of listed corporate governance and establishing high quality accounting standards system. Keywords: Listed Corporate；Earning Management；Structure of Corporate Governance；Opportunistic Earning Management；Efficient Earning Management 湘潭大学湘潭大学 学位论文原创性声明学位论文原创性声明 本人郑重声明：所呈交的论文是本人在导师的指导下独立进行研究所取得的研究成果。除了文中特别加以标注引用
