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1、 密 级 桂林电子科技大学 硕硕 士士 学学 位位 论论 文文 题目 题目 创业板风险投资企业股本演变及控制权 配置问题研究 （英文）（英文） A study on the evolution of equity and allocation of control rights about GEM listed companies that backed by venture capital firms 研 究 生 学 号: 研 究 生 学 号: 112051204 研 究 生 姓 名: 研 究 生 姓 名: 李思霖 指导教师姓名、职务: 指导教师姓名、职务: 任汝娟 副教授 申 请 学 位
2、门 类: 申 请 学 位 门 类: 管理学硕士 学 科、专 业: 学 科、专 业: 企业管理 提 交 论 文 日 期: 提 交 论 文 日 期: 2014 年 4 月 论 文 答 辩 日 期:论 文 答 辩 日 期: 2014 年 6 月 摘 要 I 摘 要 风险投资的介入会稀释创业企业家的股权。 企业家不得不把部分控制权让渡给风险投资者以换取风险投资者带来的货币以及非货币要素。 这些非货币要素包括带来先进的公司治理经验，帮助企业完善组织结构，建立人脉关系以及开发海外市场等各种增值服务。为了对风险投资企业（被投资企业，即具有风险投资支持背景的企业）的经营活动进行监督管理，风险投资常常要求参与董
3、事会，以获得相应的表决权和董事会权，从而对企业的发展战略等方面施加影响。他们的目标是当企业业绩提升到一定阶段时通过某种退出途径获取高额回报。但是，风险投资进入董事会或者入股常常使企业家的实际控制人地位受到威胁， 由此引发的控制权之争对企业的长远发展很不利。因此，控制权的配置问题在投资双发合作过程中很重要，良好的控制权配置状态能够促进合作共赢。风险投资在获取期望的投资回报的同时，被投资企业也在风投的支持下茁壮成长，有的甚至发展成为全球知名企业。 选择2009年10月到2012 年10月这三年间在创业板上市的具有风险投资支持背景的公司作为样本数据，探究影响控制权配置的主要因素。在回归模型 1和回归
4、模型 2 中发现，家族企业性质、企业业绩（净资产收益率）对创始人及实际控制人拥有的表决权和现金流权都有显著的正向影响，与预期相符。即，当一个企业是家族企业或者企业业绩（净资产收益率）较好时，该企业的创始人及实际控制人拥有较多表决权及现金流权。在回归模型 3 中发现，风险投资机构的平均年龄对风险投资机构持股比例有显著的正向影响，与预期相符。企业业绩（净资产收益率）与风险投资机构持股比例之和有显著的负向影响，与预期相符。在模型 4 中发现，风险投资持股比例对其进驻董事会有显著的正向影响，即，风险投资持股比例越高，越有可能进入董事会，与预期一致。 研究表明在具有风险投资支持背景的创业板上市公司中，家
5、族企业性质、企业业绩、 风险投资机构年龄等是部分影响控制权在创始人和风险投资机构之间分配的决定因素。在对所选择的样本进行描述性统计时发现，家族企业占比为40.50%， 表明我国创业板上市公司中一大部分是家族企业。 另外还发现绝大部分风险投资项目投资的是具有 10 年以上发展经历的企业， 而这些企业经过 10 多年的发展已经具有一定规模与实力，表明我国风险投资机构比较谨慎，极少选择具有更高不确定性和风险性的处于种子期的新创企业。 关键词：创业板上市公司 风险投资 控制权配置 Abstract II Abstract Venture capital firms participating in t
6、he company will dilute the equity of entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs had to give up a portion of control rights to investors in order to obtain funds and other non-monetary factors from venture capital firms. These non- monetary factors include advanced management experience that helps companies improv
7、e the organizational structure, establish connections and develop the overseas markets, and other value-added services. In order to supervise the operating activities of enterprises, venture capital firms usually ask to participate in the board of directors to obtain the corresponding voting rights
8、and the right of the board, thereby exerting influence on the development of corporate strategies .Their goal is to get high returns by selling stake or by other ways when the performance of the companies improve. However, venture capital firms participating in the board of directors or shareholding
9、 often means that the actual status of entrepreneurs are threatened, and the consequent competition for control rights make a disadvantage on the long-term development of enterprises. Therefore, the issues of allocation of control rights in the process of cooperation corporate are important. Reasona
10、ble state of allocation of control rights is benefit for both sides. Venture capital firms obtain the expected return while enterprises thrive in support of venture capital. And some of companies backed by venture capital firms become world famous at last. The sample includes the companies backed by
11、 venture capital firms and to be listed on GEM during Oct.2009 to Oct.2012.This paper try to explore the main factors of affecting the allocation of control rights between venture capital firms and founders. The regression model one and model two suggests that the nature of the family business and t
12、he company performance (ROE) all have a significant positive impact on the founders voting rights and cash flow rights. These results are in line with expectations, that is, when a company is a family business or the company performs well, the companys founder or actual controller have more voting r
13、ights and cash flow rights. The regression model three suggests a significantly positive correlation between the average age of venture capital firms and their shareholding. The regression model three also suggests a significantly negative correlation between the company performance (ROE) and the sh
14、areholding of venture capital firms. These results are in line with expectation. The model four suggests that the higher the Abstract III proportion of shareholding by the venture capital firms, the more likely to take part in the board of directors for them. Studies show that for the companies list
15、ed on GEM with venture-backed background, the nature of the family business, company performance, and the average age of venture capital firms are the main factors of affecting the allocation of control rights between venture capital firms and founders. The descriptive statistics shows that family businesses accounted for 40.50%, indicating that family business is a large portion of companies listed on GEM. It a
