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1、Journal of SoutheastUniversity (English Edition) ? V o.l 23, Sup, pp. 15- 22Dec .2007?ISSN 1003? 7985Coordinating pricing strategies in supply chain under asy mmetric information and disruptionsZhuang Pin1 , 2? ?Zhao Lindu1(1Schoo lof Econom ics andM anagemen, t SoutheastUniversity , Nanjing 210096)
2、(2College of Econom ics andM anagemen, t N anjing U niversity ofA eronautics andA stronautics , N anjing 210016, China)Abstract : The coordinating pricingstrategies w ithasymmetric costinfor m ationunder disruptions are investigated in a one -supplier -one -retailer supply chain syste m. W hile the
3、retailer?s cost structure is asymmetric infor mation, supply chain pricing contractmodels ( awholesale price contract and an al- l unit quantity discount contract) under asymm etric infor m ation are proposed by e mploying the principa- l agent principle in a regular scenario.W hen the retailer?s co
4、st distribution is fluctuated by disruptions , we obtain the opti mal emergency strategies of the supply chain under asymmetric infor mation by considering deviation costs and show how to effectively handle the cost uncertainty . U sing numerical methods ,i mpacts of cost disruptions on the opti mal
5、 wholesale price , the retailer price , the order quantity and the expected profits of the retailer ,the supplier ,as well as the total system are analyzed. It is found that the al- l unit quantity discount policy can obtain better perfor mance than the wholesale pricing policy. Key words : supply c
6、hain; disruption manage men; t asymmetry infor mation; pricing strategyReceived 2007 -09 -10 .Foundation ite m s : The National Key Techno logy R.i e . , the retailerhasprivate infor m ation about his cost contract , that the supplier does not know. W e assu m eF (c) isprior distribution function of
7、 c, w ith continuousden - sity function f(c ), andm ean value of ? . F (c ) isdifferentiable , strictly increasing and isdefined on c, ? c, where 0? c? ? c? ? . LetF ( 0) = 0 and ? F (c ) = 1- F (c). A ll parameters except c are common know ledge . The supplier announces the wholesale pricew thatm a
8、xi m izeshisexpected profit before observing the actualc; the retailer then makes his opti m al pricing and order quantity decision independently under the supplier?s pricing policy. The profit of the retailer can be w ritten as ?A r(p) =Kp- ?(p- w - c ). By the first opti mality condition , weobtai
9、n the opti mal retail pricepA(w ) =?(w + c) ?- 1, w ith an opti m al order of quantityQA(w ) =K ( ?- 1)?(w + c) ?.Therefore , this gives the supplier?s expected profit as?A s(w ) =? ccQA(w ) (w - s) f (c) dc( 1)By solving the firs- t order conditions of ?A s(w ) /? w = 0 , w e can derive the follow
10、ing le mm a . Le mma 1?The who lesale pricing po licy under asymm etric infor m ation w ithout disruption is as fo llow s :The opti m alw holesale price iswA=? s+ ? ?- 1.The opti m al retail price ispA=? ?- 12 (s+ ?) .The opti m al order quantity isQA=?- 1 ?2?K (s + ?)?.The corresponding retailer?s
11、expected profit is?A r=K (?- 1)2? - 2?2? - 1(s + ?)? - 1.The supplier?s expected profit is?A s=K (?- 1)2? - 1?2?(s+ ?)? - 1.The supply chain system?s expected profit is?A=K ( 2?- 1) (?- 1)2? - 2?2?(s + ?)? - 1.1?2? The al- l unit quantity discount strategy w ith asymmetric infor m ation A quantity d
12、iscount can be used as a vehicle to achieve the channel coordination necessary to arrive at the m axi m u m joint profit to both the supplier and the retailer . The supplier provides an al- l unit quantity discount po licy to the retailer ,encourag ing the retailer to place a larger order and subseq
13、uently i mproving the supplier?s profit as w ell as the supply chain profi. t An al- l unit quantity discount schedule isdenoted by AQDP(wz, w* z,Q*), wherewz is the regularwholesale price , w* zis the discount w holesale price , andwz w* z. If the retailer ordersQ 0 , wzw* z.The corresponding retai
14、ler?s expected profit under AQDP policy is?* r=K (1- ?) ( ?- 1)? -1?(s+ ?)? - 1, ? ?* r= E Q*(p*- w* z- c) ( 4)Substituting Eqs . ( 2) and (3) into Eq . ( 4), the opti mal retail price isp*=? ?- 1(s + ?)( 5)The supplier?s expected profit underAQDP po licy is?* s=K ?( ?- 1)? -1?(s + ?)? -1( 6)The sup
15、ply chain system?s expected profit underAQDP policy is?*=K ( ?- 1)? - 1?(s + ?)? -1( 7)2? Coordinating Pricing Strategies underD isruptions2?1? The wholesale pricing strategies under disruptions ? ? Now w e consider the situation w ith asymmetric infor mation under disruptions . W e assu me that the
16、re are only retailer cost disruptions and other settingsare unchanged . The situation isas follow s : After the supplier?sproduction plan ismade and before the selling season is com ing, an unforeseeable event takes place , and it causes the retailer?s cost disruption ;.i e . , the cost distribution changes from F toG ( its density function is assu med to beg ). The same asw ith the distribution functionF, w e assu m e the distribution function of demandG isdifferentiable and st
