《He and Wu, JUA, 2005（第八周阅读文献）》由会员分享，可在线阅读，更多相关《He and Wu, JUA, 2005（第八周阅读文献）（24页珍藏版）》请在金锄头文库上搜索。
1、PROPERTY-LED REDEVELOPMENT IN POST-REFORM CHINA: A CASE STUDY OF XINTIANDI REDEVELOPMENT PROJECT IN SHANGHAISHENJING HE University of SouthamptonFULONG WU University of SouthamptonABSTRACT:Urban redevelopment in China has experienced great transformation. Govern- ment-backed redevelopment has been r
2、eplaced by privately funded and property-led redevelop- ment. This article discerns the impetus of ongoing property-led redevelopment. A case study of the Xintiandi project in Shanghai reveals how property-led redevelopment actually works. Pro- growth coalitions between local government and develope
3、rs are formed. Despite its role as capital provider, the private sector is still regulated by the government due to its negligible influence on local governance. The government controls the direction and pace of urban redevelopment through policy intervention, financial leverages, and governance of
4、land leasing. Property-led redevelopment is driven by diverse motivations of different levels of the govern- ment, e.g. transforming urban land use functions, showing off the entrepreneurial capability of local government, and maximizing negotiated land benefits. Driven by profit seeking, some thriv
5、ing urban neighborhoods are displaced by high-value property development, and suffer from uneven redevelopment.Property-led regeneration is a concept developed in the British context. According to Turok (1992), property development refers to the assembly of finance, land, building materials and labo
6、ur to produce or improve buildings for occupation and investment purposes (p. 362). During the 1980s, urban policy in the UK came to rely increasingly on private-sector property development to provide the driving force (Turok, 1992). Property- led regeneration, which offers the potential to achieve
7、visible results and changing appear- ance, thus became the focus of urban policy in the UK and other western countries. The primary thrust of the policy was to achieve urban regeneration through attracting and assisting investment by the private sector in property development (Healey, Davoudi, OTool
8、e, Usher, Imrie Wilks-Heeg, 1996). The essence of these property-led initiatives has been the removal of private-sector supply-side constraints through attracting private capitals with a series of subventions. The spatial focus of these initiatives was very often the city center or waterfront sites
9、(Jones Berry Cameron Loftman low-income people have suffered from rising property prices; also, taxpayers have suffered from lost opportunities as funds for social and environmental objectives have been appropriated for property development (Healey et al., 1992, p. 287). In short, the growing influe
10、nce of an economically neo-liberal government and the profit-seeking private sector has marginalized those voices advocating the specific targeting of benefits to the urban underprivileged since the mid-1980s (Harding, 1992, p. 231). Turok (1992) thus puts forward the idea that property development
11、should be part of a more holistic approach embodying concerns for people living in deprived areas and for the underlying condition of the local economy to achieve positive economic effects. To overcome the adverse impacts of property-led regeneration, several major changes occurred in 1990s urban po
12、licy, e.g., encouraging communities participation, tackling social exclusion. However, the economic emphasis, the enterprise strategy, and the pri- vatization of public policy have continued from the decade of the 1980s (Deakin Imrie Molotch, 1976). Jonas and Wilson (1999) interpreted the fundamenta
13、l insight of this theory as coalitions of land-based elites, tied to the economic possibilities of places, drive urban politics in their quest to expand the local economy and accumulate wealth (p. 1). Urban regime theory suggests that the complexity of modern urban governance demands the participati
14、on of nongovernmental actors in the task of development regulation. Within this context, a growth coalition consisting of local gov- ernment and business groups is created (Elkin, 1987; Stone, 1993). Instead of accepting the notion of autonomous participants independently coming together to form gro
15、wth coali- tions, this theory seeks to explain the formation, activities, and influences of urban regimes in terms of their structural origins and the power they manipulate. In China, a series of institutional changes, ongoing land and housing reform, and prosperous property development are turning
16、the long neglected inner city into a hotspot of urban (re)development. With the increasing involvement of private enterprises there has been a great transformation of the dynamic urban redevelopment process. Property development significantly facilitates urban redevelopment and transforms urban land- scapes in the post-reform period. At an unprecedented scale and speed, urban redevelop- ment has become an eye-catching and contentious issue in China and deserves further
