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1、1本科毕业论文（设计） 外 文 翻 译外文题目 Audit quality and the relationship between auditees agency problems and financial information quality 外文出处 Department of Accounting and Finance University of Vaasa 外文作者 Johanna Miettinen 原文：原文：Audit quality and the relationship between auditees agency problems and financial i
2、nformation qualityAbstract This study examines the role of audit quality on the relationship between auditees agency problems and financial information quality. It contributes to the existing literature by considering agency theory and audit research concerned with audit quality. The following hypot
3、heses are tested based on the underlying literature: 1) Auditees agency problems are positively associated with audit quality, 2) Audit quality is positively associated with financial information quality, and 3) Audit quality mediates the relationship between auditees agency problems and financial i
4、nformation quality. To provide insight on the above hypotheses a path analysis is employed for a sample of 932 S Chung, Firth Richardson 2006). Auditing provides assurance about the quality and credibility of companys financial information and thus, is considered a means to mitigate agency problems
5、(Jensen DeFond 1992; Parkash Nikkinen Lennox 2005). On the other hand, audit research has concentrated on the supply side of audit quality and investigated how audit quality is reflected in financial information quality (e.g. Frankel, Johnson Geiger Larcker DeFond 1992; Parkash et al. 1993; Nikkinen
6、 et al. 2004; Lennox 2005) as well as audit quality and financial information quality (e.g. Frankel et al. 2002; Geiger et al. 2003; Larcker et al. 2004). This research attempts to place these relationships into a more holistic model. More specifically, the proposed model suggests a mediating role o
7、f audit quality on the relationship between auditees agency problems and financial information quality. 2. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT The prior agency and audit research has determined relationships between auditees agency problems and audit quality as well as audit quality and financial information qua
8、lity. These relationships will be discussed in this section. In the end of this section, a model combining the relationships will be introduced. 2.1. Agency problems and audit quality 6Agency literature suggests that certain company specific characteristics increase management incentives to act agai
9、nst shareholders or debt-holders interests. Agency problems can increase management propensity to produce substandard financial information in order to cover actions that have not been in the best interest of the shareholders or debt-holders (Jensen et al. 1976). Prior research has determined a vari
10、ety of company specific variables which potentially cause agency problems. This research focuses on agency problems generated by leverage, management ownership and free cash flow. Firstly, the agency problem of leverage postulates that managers (acting on behalf of shareholders) have incentives to t
11、ransfer wealth from debt-holders by taking various actions such as paying dividends to shareholders at the expense of profitable projects or restructuring of debt (Jensen et al. 1976; Chow 1982; DeFond 1992; Parkash et al. 1993). Some of these actions can result in a decline in firm value because th
12、ey involve suboptimal investment policies (Chow 1982). Moreover, the literature suggests that firms with high leverage are more likely to face bankruptcy and such firms are more likely to engage in earnings management since they are closer to debt covenant violations (Gul Ng Richardson 2006). Accord
13、ing to agency theory auditing services are required to reduce agency problems arising from conflict of interests between shareholders and managers or debt-holders and managers (Jensen et al. 1976). Studies focusing on agency issues predict that as agency problems become more severe management will d
14、emand higher audit quality in an effort to assure financial information credibility to shareholders, debt-holders or other investors (Chow 1982; Francis DeFond 1992; Lennox 2005).Early studies used auditor reputation (size or brand name) as a measure of audit quality and documented that companies fa
15、cing agency problems hire auditors with better reputation (Francis et al. 1988; DeFond 1992; Lennox 2005). More recent research has used audit fees as a proxy for audit quality. For example Nikkinen et al. (2004) examined the relationship between agency problems and total fees paid to incumbent audi
16、tor. They found a positive relation between free cash flow and totalfees and a negative relation between management ownership and total fees. These results imply that management demands a higher quality audit as firms agency problems increase. Source：Johanna Miettinen Department of Accounting and Finance University of 8Vaasa译文：译文：审计质量、审计代理问题与财务信息质量的关系审计质量、审计代理问题与财务信
